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ABSTRACT  
This dissertation explores British perceptions of and discourses on the 
‘Ottomans’ in the mid-nineteenth century, which have been largely overlooked 
in the existing literature. It approaches the question through three case studies 
analysing the construction of the perceptions through a discourse-analytic 
framework.  
This thesis is divided into two main parts, with the first part providing 
essential background information for the three case studies which make up the 
second part. 
Chapter 1 sets out the research question and the methodology. Chapter 2 looks 
at the development of Anglo-Ottoman relations from the beginning until the 
nineteenth century, identifying important stages in these relations which in 
turn impacted upon British perceptions. These early British perceptions are 
traced in Chapter 3, identifying a range of perceptions none of which achieve a 
dominant position in the British public discourse on the Ottoman Empire and 
the Ottomans.  
Part 2 constitutes the core of the dissertation. Chapter 4 focuses on Britain and 
the Ottoman Empire in the 1860s and 1870s, analysing the wider setting which 
forms the background to the case studies. Chapter 5 examines the Lebanon 
Crisis of 1860 tracing the formation of two discourses on the Ottomans in 
Britain: the sick-man discourse and the integrity discourse, which competed 
for dominance in the public debate.  Chapter 6 examines the Cretan Crisis of 
1866, which showed the continued use of these two discourses, with the sick-
  
 
man discourse finding more support but not yet dominating the debate. This 
changes during the Bulgarian Atrocities Campaign of 1876, which is explored 
in Chapter 7. During this crisis, the sick-man discourse undergoes both a 
radicalisation and popularisation following the graphic coverage in the British 
press of the atrocities committed in the Balkans which is picked up by 
politicians who feel the need to respond to pressure from the streets.  
The Conclusion sums up the main findings of the dissertation and discusses 
how far the nineteenth-century constructions of the Ottomans as the ‘other’ in 
Britain remain relevant in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, when the 
Muslims take the place of the Ottomans as the ‘other’. 
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1.) The Research Question  
The 1874 general elections did not end successfully for W. E. Gladstone, the Liberal 
Prime Minister of Britain. Following his party’s defeat in the elections, he resigned 
from the Party’s leadership and decided to continue his career as an MP. At the age of 
65 it looked like his political career was over.  
2 years later in late August 1876, he wrote a pamphlet after one week of research in 
the British Museum and sent it over for publication. Bulgarian Horrors and the 
Question of the East was published on September 7 and was a phenomenal success. 
All copies of the pamphlet were sold within the day of publication and it sold a total 
of 200,000 copies in one month. In the next four years Gladstone’s political career 
revitalised, his electoral campaign in 1879 was hugely successful and he was back in 
the Prime Minister’s office after the general election of 1880.  
For historians, Gladstone’s renaissance in late 1870s was not surprising; he was 
popular in electorate even after his resignation, and he continued to dominate the 
political scene until his final fall in the 1890s. However, in retrospect, the success of 
his pamphlet is surprising. Although Gladstone and his pamphlet is not the focus of 
this dissertation, ‘why did a pamphlet on Bulgaria, a place that hardly anyone had 
ever heard of in 1876, become so popular’ was the first question that draw my interest 
to this topic. 
The first answer to this question in the literature was straightforward. The pamphlet 
was successful because it was a part of a wider campaign called the Bulgarian 
Atrocities Agitation which was organised in form of public meetings to protest the 
atrocities committed by the Ottoman irregular troops in Bulgaria. Gladstone’s 
pamphlet was written at a time when the press informed the people about the 
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massacres and agitated people to protest both the Ottoman government, because of its 
crimes, and the British government because of its indirect support to the Ottoman 
Empire.  Therefore, there was already an audience eager to learn his say on the issue.  
The Bulgarian Atrocities Agitation, which is analysed in Chapter 5 of this thesis was a 
part of an international crisis started in 1875 in Ottoman Bosnia as a revolt against the 
Ottoman government.
1
 The revolt turned into the ‘Great Eastern Crisis’ of 1875-1878 
which was the climax of the so-called Eastern Question, one of the major 
preoccupations of Great Power diplomacy in the 19
th
 century. The April Uprising of 
1876, a failed nationalist revolution in Bulgaria, was a part of the Great Crisis. The 
Ottomans suppressed the Uprising with brutality which was presented to British 
public by daily newspapers and caused public outcry that formed the Agitation.  
The Bulgarian Atrocities Agitation had been subjected to numerous studies which 
could be principally grouped into two categories. The first is the studies which treat 
the Agitation as a part of diplomatic-international history of the Eastern Question. 
The second treats it as a predominantly domestic phenomenon arguing that it 
influenced the British domestic politics more than it did the international politics.  
The first of the three major studies in the area was Robert William Seton-Watson’s 
Disraeli, Gladstone, and the Eastern Question: A Study in Diplomacy and Party 
Politics, first published in 1935
2
. Seton-Watson’s account was authoritative and 
influenced the subsequent works on the area because it presented vast archival 
material to its readers. Seton-Watson’s work placed the Agitation within the context 
of the Eastern Question and created the backbone of the contemporary international 
                                                 
1
 The literature on the issue and a historical account of events are presented in Chapter 5 of this thesis. 
See  Appendix 1 for the chronology of events.  
2
 R. W. Seton –Watson, Disraeli, Gladstone and the Eastern Question: A Study in Diplomacy and 
Party Politics, Norton, 1972.  
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relations studies which concerned with the Agitation as an example of ‘humanitarian 
intervention’.3 Seton-Watson, like most of the earlier 20th century British historians, 
suffers from the ‘pro-Gladstonian bias’; being born in 1879, he was a member of the 
era he was studying and shaped by the same cultural presuppositions and ideological 
positions. Seton-Watson’s account was highly critical of Disraeli’s defence of the 
Ottoman Empire as he accused the Prime Minister of focusing on narrow ‘British 
self-interests’ in contrast to Gladstone’s appeal for ‘civilisation and humanity’.4  
The second important work was R. Shannon’s Gladstone and Bulgarian Agitation 
published in 1963 and formed the basis of the second category of works.
5
 Shannon 
analysed domestic sources such as personal letters, diaries and petitions, in order to 
understand the ‘public opinion’ in Britain. His work also focused on Gladstone’s role 
in the Agitation and argued that the Agitation contributed more to Gladstone’s career 
than he contributed to the Agitation. Although Shannon’s focus is different than 
Seton-Watson’s, they both appreciated Gladstone’s role and position in the Agitation, 
and were highly critical of Disraeli.   
The final important work was by Ann Pottinger Saab, The Reluctant Icon: Gladstone, 
Bulgaria and the Working Classes in 1991
6
. Saab criticised the earlier works for 
being too top-down in approach and focusing too much on the ‘high politics’. Saab’s 
approach was similar to Shannon’s in arguing that the Agitation was chiefly a 
domestic event. In contrast to him, Saab argued that the Agitation could be best 
explained with the sociological theory of Neil Smelser, Theory of Collective Behavior. 
                                                 
3
 See M. Finneson, Constructing Norms of Humanitarian Intervention in P.J. Katzenstein (eds), The 
Culture of National Security, Columbia University Press, 1996, pp. 153-175 and D. Rodogno, Against 
Massacre: Humanitarian Intervention in the Ottoman Empire, 1815-1914, Princeton University Press, 
2012.  
4
 R.W. Seton-Watson, p.102. 
5
 R. Shannon, Gladstone and the Bulgarian Agitation 1876, Thomas Nelson, 1963.  
6
 A. P. Saab, The Reluctant Icon: Gladstone, Bulgaria and the Working Classes, Harvard University 
Press, 1991.  
8 
 
 
 
Thus, the conventional view of the Agitation is that it was primarily developed as a 
response to Disraeli’s inhumane foreign policy and his insistence on the Palmerston’s 
realpolitik approach to the Eastern Question. According this view, Gladstone’s 
‘humanitarian, principled and moral’ foreign policy stands in contrast with the 
Conservative policy and represented the will of the Agitators and the ‘public opinion’. 
The Agitation was successful in altering the domestic political configuration by 
reinvigorating Gladstone’s political career, as a first step in his way to Prime 
Ministership in 1880, although its impact on foreign policy was more ambiguous.  
These three major works present us invaluable information and analyses of the 
Bulgarian Atrocities Agitation. However, one crucial dimension of the Agitation was 
left unexamined; none of the studies focused on the link between the ‘perpetrator’ 
Ottomans and the ‘agitated’ British. In all of the studies, the Agitation was either 
treated as a domestic issue and thus the historiography was concerned with the actors 
that took part in it or as a part of the intra-state ‘diplomatic’ history which concerned 
primarily with the actions of the state. The third, cultural dimension, was overlooked; 
what the Agitators –newspapers, MPs and others- thought about the perpetrators in 
general, before, during and after the Agitation was not examined. 
The reason of this gap is difficult to understand; if the Agitation was developed in 
response to the horrors committed by the ‘Ottomans’ and if all the meetings were 
organised principally to protest the Ottoman Empire –Disraeli was protested because 
of his support to the Ottoman Empire- then the British understanding of the 
‘Ottomans’ is crucial in explaining the Agitation. This gap in the literature on the 
Bulgarian Atrocities Agitation led me to ask the main research question: how did the 
British perceive the ‘Ottomans’? How much did they know about the Ottoman Empire 
and more importantly which factors shaped their understanding of it?   
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The question of perceiving and representing the other cultures have been subjected to 
a major debate in scholarly literature in the 20
th
 century. One work particularly stands 
out in the studies concerning the Western representations of the Middle East, Edward 
Said’s Orientalism published in 1978, and has been the most influential work for 
scholars preoccupied with the questions on cultural representation such as ‘how 
people perceive and represent other cultures’. Said was concerned with how the 
‘Orient’ was constructed by the ‘West’, particularly in the 19th and 20th centuries. Said 
notes his main thesis in Orientalism as:  
the essential aspects of modern Orientalist theory and praxis (from 
which present-day Orientalism derives) can be understood, not as a 
sudden access of objective knowledge about the Orient, but as a set 
of structures inherited from the past, secularized, redisposed, and re-
formed by such disciplines as philology, which in turn were 
naturalized, modernized, and laicized substitutes for (or versions of) 
Christian supernaturalism.
7
 
 
In Said’s theory, the 19th century representations of the East by the Westerners were 
primarily depended on the sense of European superiority of the Orient. In this way, 
Said claimed that 19
th
 century Orientalists served to justify Western imperialism, by 
creating a terrain of social practices. For instance, ‘academic Orientalism’ was 
concerned with the study of the Orient by Western scholars and authors; an extensive 
list of names including Renan, Flaubert and Marx jointly created an ‘imagined or 
Orientalized’ Orient. The common denominator of these thinkers were their ‘style of 
thought’ which depended on ‘an ontological and epistemological distinction made 
between the Orient and the Occident’; a well-rooted dichotomy which was well-
rooted in the pre-modern times.  
Although Said’s primary case was the Western perceptions of the Arabs and Muslims 
                                                 
7
 E. Said, Orientalism, Pantheon Books, 1978, p. 122.  
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in the 19
th
 (and 20
th
) century, there was surprisingly few references to the Ottoman 
Empire and Ottoman society. Two important works in the literature scrutinised Said’s 
theory in the Ottoman context; Asli Cirakman’s From the ‘terror of the World to the 
sick-man of Europe’: European Images of Ottoman Empire and Society from the 
Sixteenth to the Nineteenth Century, published in 2002, surveyed the perceptions of 
Ottomans in Britain and France until the beginning of the 19
th
 century. Cirakman 
refuted the ‘one-sidedness’ of Said’s framework and argued that the Orientalists in the 
16
th
 and 17
th
 centuries ‘neither had an Orientalist world-view nor subscribed to the 
idea of European superiority and hegemony over the Ottomans’.8 Moreover, 
Cirakman argues that the 18
th
 century Enlightenment brought a radical change to the 
European imagination of the Ottoman Empire, as anti-Ottoman images started to 
prevail. Cirakman’s study is valuable as it explores the themes used in early-modern 
‘European’ thinking which were used to analyse the Ottomans; however it does not 
cover the 19
th
 century.  
The second work on the issue is primarily concerned with the 19
th
 century British 
perceptions of the Ottoman Empire; the only monograph in the literature focused on 
this period. Reinhold Schiffer’s Oriental Panaroma: British Travellers in 19th 
Century Turkey, published in 1999, explores the perceptions of the British travellers 
to the Ottoman Empire and thus presents us a valuable but skewed picture of the 
period; the book focuses solely on the traveller accounts.
9
 Schiffer, similar to 
Cirakman, also disagrees with Said’s framework and argues that the travellers 
constructed multiple views on the ‘Ottomans’, and some of these were not Orientalist 
in the Saidian sense.  
                                                 
8
 A. Cirakman, From the ‘Terror of the World to Sick-man of Europe’: European Images of the 
Ottoman Empire from the Sixteenth to Nineteenth Century¸ Peter Lang Publications, 2002, pp.31-2.  
For a detailed analysis of Cirakman’s work see Chapter 2 of this thesis.  
9
 R. Schiffer, Oriental Panaroma: British Travellers in the 19
th
 century Turkey, Radopi, 1999.  
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The available literature on the British perceptions of the ‘Ottomans’ was unable to 
provide a definitive answer to the research question posed, which led me to the main 
research objective of this thesis; to explore the British perceptions of the ‘Ottomans’ 
in the mid-19
th
 century in a wide range of available sources such as newspapers, 
parliamentary debates and periodical press. In this way the research aims to 
contribute to the literature on the British perceptions of the ‘Ottomans’ through 
analysing the Bulgarian Atrocities Agitation as a case study.  
2.)  Research Strategy 
The main strategy of this research was to situate the Bulgarian Atrocities Agitation 
into a wider context and to use it as a reference point to examine and understand how 
the British subjects, more precisely the British elites, constructed the Ottoman image 
in that period. In this approach the Agitation is used as a ‘case study’ to explore how 
the British perceptions were constructed, contested and, finally, how they succeeded 
in dominating the public imagination.  Therefore, the preferred methodology of this 
research is the case study method.  
Flyvbjerg defines a case as a ‘detailed examination of a single example’10 which 
could be used ‘as a basis of generalization, comparison and lending support to proto-
explanations’11 to shed light on a phenomenon. One of the virtues of the case study 
method, as outlined by Glynos and Howarth in their recent study, is ‘its greater 
attention to detail and its closer proximity to the object of study’12 which reduces the 
risk of selective bias, choosing cases according to researchers’ predilections, which is 
the main argument against the use of case study method. Cases provide an 
                                                 
10
 B.Flyvbjerg, Making Social Science Matter, Cambridge University Press, 2001, p. 65.  
11
 J. Glynos and D. Howarth, Logics of Critical Explanation in Social and Political Theory, Routledge, 
2007, p. 202. 
12
 Glynos and Howarth, p. 204. 
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opportunity of in-depth study of a given phenomenon, and in most of the reported 
cases, including mine, the case research reveals results which challenge the 
assumptions of the researcher due to its detailed nature.  
Cases could be contextualised in various ways, which proves the explanatory capacity 
of the method. Flyvbjerg outlines four types of cases, which are instructive in 
understanding the different roles cases could play in explaining a phenomenon. The 
first example, critical cases, is important if the objective is to gather the greatest 
possible amount of information on a given problem because uncommon, critical 
cases, ‘activate more actors and more basic mechanisms in the situation studied.’13 
The second type, extreme cases, ‘can serve to highlight particular phenomena in 
dramatic fashion’14 and the third type, maximum variation cases, may enable the 
researchers to ‘obtain information about the significance of various circumstances for 
case process and outcome’ because they are different from each other in certain 
respects: size, historical background, geographical location etc.
15
 The fourth type is 
paradigmatic cases, which function as exemplars or metaphors for a whole class of 
cases that highlight the general characteristics of a society or system.
16
  
The mostly used example to explain a paradigmatic case is Foucault’s usage of the 
‘panopticon’, an architectural design of Jeremy Benhtam which gave a single 
watchman the opportunity to watch every single inmate in a prison.
17
 For Foucault, 
the panopticon was not only a disciplinary mechanism for prison, but it ‘must be 
understood as a generalizable model of functioning; a way of defining power relations 
                                                 
13
 Flyvbjerg, pp. 77-78.  
14
 Glynos and Howarth p.202. 
15
 Ibid. 
16
 Flyvbjerg, p. 80.  
17
 M. Foucault, Discipline and Punish, the Birth of Prison, Vintage Books, 1995, pp. 200-209.  
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in terms of everyday life of man’.18 Therefore, it was a paradigmatic case 
representing the system of disciplinary and surveillance mechanisms emerging at the 
end of the 18
th
 century. Foucault used the prison system as a case of the emerging 
modern state’s control over individuals, which was best represented in the example of 
panopticon.  
Once these four basic types are established, the question is how to decide on which 
category the case will fall under. According to Flyvbjerg and Dreyfus, it is difficult to 
pre-determine the category of a case especially for critical and paradigmatic cases.
19
 
The paradigmatic cases are the most difficult to establish in advance because 
‘paradigmatic case transcends any sort-of rule based criteria’. As Flyvbjerg notes, the 
selection of a paradigmatic case also depends on the execution of the case study by 
the researcher and the reaction to the study by the research community. Moreover, 
these four types are not exhaustive and more importantly they are not mutually 
exclusive, they can overlap with each other.
20
 
In this perspective, the Bulgarian Atrocities Agitation emerges foremost as a 
‘paradigmatic case’ in examining the British perceptions in the mid-19th century as it 
was the major event in Britain which brought the ‘Ottomans’ to the centre of public 
attention. Similar to Foucault’s panopticon, the Agitation served as the exemplar case 
in which the perceptions on the Ottomans in British society became visible.   
Although choosing a single-case can be very useful to illuminate a social 
phenomenon through providing context-depended knowledge, generalising over a 
single-case carries the risk of simplification and over-generalisation. In order to tackle 
                                                 
18
 Foucault, p. 205.  
19
 B. Flyvbjerg, Five Misunderstandings about Case-Study Research, Qualitative Inquiry, Vol. 12, 
No.2, 2006, p. 233. 
20
 Flyvbjerg p. 81.  
14 
 
 
 
this problem, Glynos and Howarth propose a second methodological device, 
‘comparison’. Choosing multiple cases and comparing them enables the researcher to 
assess the importance of the main case and renders the phenomena under question 
more intelligible.
21
  
Researching an area as wide as British perspectives necessitates the usage of multiple 
cases, as this will bring a larger sample of examples and broaden the analysis. 
Moreover, comparing various cases with each other enables us to explore the 
significance of the paradigmatic case through focusing on the differences and 
similarities of it with other cases.
22
 Because of these reasons, this research is 
developed through three cases studies; the Agitation is analysed in relation to two 
other case studies that chronologically precede it. I have chosen the Lebanon Crisis of 
1860 and Cretan Crisis of 1866-68 as two other cases to investigate the British 
perceptions. The criteria in selecting the case studies were ‘periodisation’ and 
‘contextual unity’; the three case studies complement each other to provide us a 
detailed picture of the British perceptions on the ‘Ottomans’ during the mid-Victorian 
era.  
In terms of periodization, the 1860s and 1870s form a unity in two aspects. In terms 
of the foreign relations, the Crimean War (1853-56) and the Berlin Treaty (1878) 
which ended the Russo-Ottoman War have become two important moments shaping 
the Anglo-Ottoman relations as the former symbolised the peak and the latter the 
decline of the cooperation between the two states. The Crimean War was the peak of 
the relations because the British Empire fought with the Ottoman Empire against 
Russia, the traditional adversary of the Ottoman Empire. The Berlin Treaty on the 
                                                 
21
 Glynos and Howarth, p. 205.  
22
 Ibid. 
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other hand signalled the end of the ‘close cooperation’ between these empires as 
Britain left the Ottoman Empire alone in its fight with the Russian Empire.  
The period in between was a period of relatively stable and tranquil cooperation 
which neither led to war nor a souring in bilateral relations. On the other hand, the 
same period was a period of transformation in Britain, where a multitude of factors 
initiated a change in politics and society.
23
 Hence, this period offers both a 
comparable background due to its unity while offering various differences which 
render a comparative study necessary. The aim of these three cases is to provide us 
with a complete picture of a transformatory period in which the British perceptions 
were shaped.  
3.) Discourse Theory  
The main argument so far, after analysing the available literature, is that the British 
perceptions of the ‘Ottomans’ in the mid-Victorian era has been overlooked by the 
literature, and the Bulgarian Atrocities Agitation, complemented with two other case 
studies, provides us a valuable case to study these perceptions. Once this is 
established, a final question should be asked before the research could be conducted: 
‘what is the best way to extract information from the case studies and interpret them 
in a systematic way?’ This question is crucial as it is both an ontological and 
explanatory question; it concerns vital issues such as ‘what to look at’ in a case and 
‘how to explain them’. These questions are important for every research and they are 
vital for a research concerning an abstract issue such as ‘perceptions’.  
Discourse analysis emerges as the main theoretical tool at the disposal of the 
researchers who aims to capture, identify and interpret the construction of the social, 
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political and cultural identities.
24
 The main argument of discourse theory is that the 
meaning of an object depends on the particular systems of differences or discourses 
that constitute its identity.
25
 It is this function of discourse analysis that makes it 
highly relevant for this research as the main aim of this thesis is to investigate how 
the identity of the ‘Ottomans’ was constructed in Britain.  
In the last three decades, the term discourse gained prominence and various theories 
of discourse have been developed by the researchers. It is therefore crucial to define 
the type of discourse analysis used in this thesis as well giving the basic definitions of 
the main concepts used throughout the case studies. 
This thesis utilises poststructuralist discourse theory (PDT) which focuses ‘neither on 
observable facts nor on deep meanings, but on the historical formation of the 
discursive conditions of social being’ and thus offers a relationist, historical and 
contextual explanation to identity formation.
 26
 In this way, PDT offers us a novel way 
of explaining how the identities and ‘meanings’ or, in a broader sense, how the social 
world is constructed through the functioning of discourses.  
3.1) Main Arguments of the Poststucturalist Discourse Theory (PDT) 
The key arguments of the PDT are set by Laclau and Mouffe in The Hegemony and 
Socialist Strategy (1985) and in Laclau’s later writings.27 The first argument is that 
identities are formed against a background of historically specific discourses. 
Discourse can be approximated as a ‘shared way of apprehending the world’ which 
‘enables those who subscribe to it to interpret bits of information and put them 
                                                 
24
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Macmillan, 2005, p. 1.   
25
 D. Howarth, Discourse, Open University Press, 2000, p. 102. 
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together into coherent stories or accounts.’28 Each discourse rests on certain 
assumptions, judgments and contentions that provide the basic terms for analysis, 
debate, agreement and disagreement on an object. Natural, physical and cultural 
objects are understood and acquire meaning in discourses and do not have any 
meaning prior to or beyond discourses.
 29
 Moreover, in PDT, discourse is a political 
category formed through power relations such as domination, coercion or consent:   
discourses are concrete systems of social relations and practices that 
are intrinsically political, as their formation is an act of radical 
institution which involves the construction of antagonisms and the 
drawing of political frontiers between ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’. The 
construction of discourses thus involves the exercise of power and a 
consequent structuring of the relations between different social 
agents.
30
 
 
In light of this, the discursive representation of an object is not a passive act of 
identifying an already existing object; rather, it creates the identity of the object as 
such.
31
 For instance, the ‘Turk’ is represented as an ‘Asiatic barbaric race’ by British 
elite through the sick-man discourse analysed in this thesis. It is through this 
representation that the identity of the ‘Turk’ is established in Britain. Similarly, when 
the ‘Turk’ is identified as a ‘barbaric’ race it is subordinated to the more ‘civilized 
races’ such as the British; therefore the discursive representations instituted the power 
relations between the ‘Turk’ and the ‘British’.  
In Laclau and Mouffe’s understanding, a discourse is a combination of discursive 
elements such as text and non-discursive elements such as institutions, regimes and 
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practices. This is crucial in understanding the usage of discourse analysis throughout 
this thesis. Discourses analysed in this thesis consist of both textual elements, such as 
newspaper articles and Parliamentary speeches, and set of practices, such as 
‘humanitarianism’ or ‘interventionist foreign policy’, which aims to transform 
institutions such as the British state or the Liberal Party. 
Another key argument of PDT is that social phenomena are never finished or total as 
there is no predetermined essence capable of fixing all identities/meanings within a 
totalising structure.
32
 This is an essential point in the construction of meanings; 
according to discourse theory, meanings could only be ‘partially fixed’. The creation 
of meaning is about the fixation of a word within a specific discourse and different 
discourses compete in this process. The main task of the analyst is to determine how 
the meanings are fixed and why some fixation of meanings become conventional or 
hegemonic.  
3.2) Key Analytical Concepts 
The category of discourse refers to a ‘relational configuration’ of different elements 
that comprise subjects, words, actions or things.
33
 It is through this relationality that 
the meanings are formed; within a discourse, meaning is constructed either in terms 
of difference or equivalence or a combination of the both.
34
 For instance, in the sick-
man discourse analysed in this thesis, the identity of the ‘Turk’ is fixed in relation to 
its difference from the ‘European’ or ‘British’ and the ‘Muslim’ from the ‘Christian’. 
Naturally this process is a reductionary process; defining the meaning of the ‘Turk’ as 
‘non-European’ forecloses various other possibilities that could have been used to 
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define the ‘Turk’.  
In a discourse, the elements of a discourse are related to one another in a process 
called ‘articulation’.35 The meaning of the objects changes as a result of this 
articulatory process, and thus, the same term could have different meanings in 
different discourses. Articulation of various elements in a discourse is contingent 
(possible but not necessary) and singular (context-dependent). It is through 
articulation that terms and objects acquire meaning in a discourse, and this is also the 
reason why meaning of a term can never be fully fixed. The possibility of being 
articulated with different terms enables the redefining of the term differently in a 
different discourse. For instance, the term ‘Ottoman Christian’ in the sick-man 
discourse is articulated to ‘civilized’ and thus presented as being superior to the 
‘barbaric Muslim’. On the contrary, in the integrity discourse it is articulated to the 
‘Oriental’ and thus presented as being inferior to the Western Christians and as 
equally barbaric and backward as its Muslim neighbours. In this way, discourse is an 
operation of foreclosure of possibilities and partially-fixing the meaning of a term in a 
particular context.  
To sum up, according to PDT, discourses partially fix the meaning of elements in a 
relational process called articulation. Because articulation opens up the theoretically 
infinite possibilities of meaning production, discourses are never fully complete and 
in constant struggle with each other to define the social world. This brings us to 
another important concept of PDT; social antagonism which defines the limits of a 
discourse through its constitutive other. Social antagonism occurs when different 
identities or meanings mutually exclude each other and are found when discourses 
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collide.
36
  
Antagonisms are dissolved through hegemonic interventions, when one discourse 
dominates the other through articulating its elements. An illuminating example here is 
from World War 1, where the ‘workers’ were split between fighting for their nation 
(nationalist discourse) and to reject fighting against fellow workers from other 
countries (socialist discourse). An English worker therefore had two identities; being 
English and being a worker, and they mutually excluded each other in the face of the 
event (war). These two discourses colluded with each other to define a course of 
action in the War and the nationalist discourse prevailed; the English worker went to 
war and fought against other workers from the Central Powers. In this example, the 
nationalist discourse became the hegemonic discourse by articulating the English 
worker as ‘Englishman’ at the expense of articulation the same person as the ‘class-
conscious worker’.37  
3.3) Discourse Analysis and the Sources 
The merits of the PDT for this thesis can explained in light of the information 
provided. The vague concept of ‘perceptions’ could be best explained within a 
discourse analytic framework because this ontology enables us to explain not only 
‘which perceptions’ were formulated, but more importantly, ‘why and how these were 
constructed’. In this way, this research differs from other works on this area by 
focusing on the ‘construction’ of the perceptions.  
The main sources of the research are twofold; the newspaper archives and the 
Hansard archives. The main newspapers used throughout this dissertation are The 
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Times and the Daily News and these papers were supported by numerous other 
newspapers.
38
 The Times was the most popular and most read newspaper in the 1860s, 
which makes the paper the most relevant source in investigating the perceptions. On 
the other hand, the Daily News had a constitutive role in the Agitation and became the 
most important paper in setting the tone of it. This makes the paper relevant for this 
research.  
In addition to the newspaper archives, various periodicals are also analysed 
particularly in Chapter 4; exploring the periodicals enriches the research because it 
enlarges the sample size as well as reflecting the more ‘specialist’ view. The 
periodicals targeted a smaller but more educated group of readers than newspapers, 
and this increases their importance in studying the elite perceptions.  
The final important source used in this research is the Parliamentary debates. I have 
analysed the discussions in both the House of Lords and Commons where the 
political class of the day articulated their views on the ‘Ottomans’. Their ideas were 
reproduced in the newspapers and disseminated to the public. Moreover, they held the 
executive power to shape the British policy which, as explained above, constituted the 
non-discursive element of the discourse. Through analysing these sources, this 
research then focuses on how each discourse constitutes ‘the knowledge and reality’ 
about the conflicts analysed in the case studies.  
4.) Organisation of the Thesis 
This thesis is broadly organised in two parts. Part I is concerned with providing the 
historical background necessary for the case studies and developed in two chapters. 
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Part II deals with the case studies which deploy discourse analysis to explore the 
construction of British discourses on the ‘Ottomans’ and is developed through three 
chapters, each dealing with a case study. The main argument of this thesis is that the 
British perceptions on the Ottomans could be categorised in two separate discourses 
in the 1860s and 1870s, the sick-man and the integrity discourse. Each of these 
discourses formulated a different understanding of key concepts such as the ‘Turk’, 
the ‘Muslim’, the ‘Eastern Christian’ and had an antagonistic relation with each other, 
and the radicalisation of these two discourses played a key role in the making of the 
Agitation in 1876.  
Chapter 2 provides a historical narrative of the Anglo-Ottoman relations from the 16
th
 
century to mid-19
th
 century. The main focus of the chapter is to analyse the literature 
on the ‘diplomatic’ relations between the two states in order to explore the impact of 
the political-diplomatic relations on the formation of the early modern British 
perceptions on the ‘Ottomans’. The chapter concludes that the British interest to the 
Ottoman Empire is increased in the early 19
th
 century, which brought the ‘Ottomans’ 
into closer contact with the British elite in a political context, different than the earlier 
centuries.  
Chapter 3 deals with the historical perceptions of the Ottomans in early modern 
Britain and traces the emergence, disappearance and transformation of these 
perceptions until the mid-19
th
 century. I argue in this chapter that, although the 
Ottoman representations in Britain were ‘plural’ from the earlier centuries onwards, 
the way they were constructed started to transform in the 19
th
 century. The earlier 
vague perceptions were transformed in the 19
th
 century and began to be constructed in 
coherent political discourses, which renders a more systematic examination necessary 
for the 19
th
 century.  
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Chapter 4 aims to bridge Part I and Part II by focusing closely on 1860s and 1870s to 
Britain and the Ottoman Empire. The former’s economic, political and social 
development is analysed and specific attention is given to map the Weltanschauung of 
the period. Similarly, the reformation period in the Ottoman Empire is examined in 
order to shed light on how these reforms affected the British discourses.  
The first case study is the Lebanese Civil War, which is analysed in Chapter 5. The 
first analysis investigates British newspapers, Hansard papers and two major traveller 
books in order to explore how the Crisis was understood in Britain. I argue that the 
Civil War was reflected through two major discourses which competed with each 
other to define the Civil War, construct perceptions on the Ottoman society and offer 
different foreign policy options for Britain in light of these discussions.  
Chapter 6 deals with the second case study, the Cretan Revolt, which happened six 
years after the end of the Lebanese Civil War. Different from the first study, the 
second case study adds material from a new source, British periodical press, and tests 
the continuities and discontinuities in the discourses established during the Lebanon 
Civil War.  Therefore the aim of the second case study is twofold; to observe the 
construction of British discourses in a different context and to compare the results 
with the earlier case to establish the perceptions in the 1860s.  
The main case study of the thesis is analysed in Chapter 7, the Bulgarian Atrocities 
Agitation. The final case analyses the discourses produced during the Agitation, 
depending on similar sources used in the first two cases. Moreover, specific attention 
is given to examine Gladstone’s pamphlet, which was one of the main symbols of the 
Agitation. The findings of the chapter is compared with the findings of the earlier 
case studies, and in this way, the dominant perceptions of the 1860s and 1870s are 
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presented.  
The conclusion of the thesis deals with the main findings of the analysis and draws 
results from them through discussing the relevance of these findings with today’s 
perceptions.  
5.) A word on terms used in this Thesis 
At this point it is necessary to explain the terminology used in this thesis. In 19
th
 
century Britain, the Ottoman Empire was referred as ‘Turkey’ both in newspapers and 
in Parliament and because of this, the term ‘Ottoman’ did not exist in the primary 
sources. Two seemingly interchangeable terms, the ‘Turk’ and the ‘Muslim’ was used 
to refer to the Muslim part of the society. One of the aims of this research is to 
examine the meaning of these terms through the case studies, to discern how the 
terms Turk and Muslim was used in British sources. I used the term ‘Ottoman’ 
throughout this thesis to refer to the Ottoman society including all religious and 
ethnic groups, as an umbrella term.  
Some background information on the Ottoman Empire is also useful. The Ottoman 
Empire was established in 1299 or 1301 by Osman I in Western Anatolia as a small 
Muslim warrior state in order to wage a religious war against the Byzantium 
Empire.
39
 Osman established the dynasty which ruled contemporary Balkans, Turkey 
and the Middle East until the end of the World War 1. The head of the Ottoman state 
was named as the Sultan who was a member of Osman’s dynasty. The highest 
authority in the Ottoman bureaucracy was the Grand Vizier, who was chosen and 
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replaced by the Sultan. The Grand Vizier was the head of a number of viziers 
responsible of different parts of the state affairs. The Porte was the name used to 
denote to the Ottoman bureaucracy, due to the large door of the building where the 
Grand Vizier and other viziers were based. In the 19
th
 century, the period focused in 
this thesis, the Porte exerted great influence over the Sultan in decision making.  
In terms of geography, the Ottoman realm in the 19
th
 century Britain was named as 
the Near East, a term that is largely forgotten in today’s world and partly replaced by 
the Middle East. The Near East encompassed the territory from Balkans to India, and 
from Crimea to the southern edge of Arabia.  
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Chapter 2: A Short Overview of the 
Anglo-Ottoman Relations up to the 
Mid-Nineteenth Century    
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1.) Introduction 
The diplomatic relations between the English and the Ottomans were established at 
the end of the 16
th
 century when the Ottomans emerged as a European power and 
English sailors started to penetrate the Mediterranean for commercial purposes.
1
 The 
diplomatic relations between the two states continued uninterruptedly from this time 
on although the importance of the relations for the two countries declined in the 
middle of the 17
th
 century until it was revitalised in the 19
th
 century with the 
emergence of the Eastern Question.
2
 
The Eastern Question had a profound impact on the Anglo-Ottoman relations. It 
emerged as a result of the international order established in the 18
th
 century, when the 
balance of power between the Ottoman Empire and the Western Powers became 
significantly different from the 16
th
 century. Development of the relations in the 19
th
 
century as a result of an international question had a significant impact on the nature 
of the relations, which in turn influenced the perceptions of the Ottomans in Britain.  
The first purpose of this chapter is to present the diplomatic history of the Anglo-
Ottoman relations from its emergence until 1860 in order to present the political 
landscape in the development of the relations. The diplomatic history is central to 
understanding the formation of the English elites’ perceptions of the Ottomans which 
are analysed in the Chapter 2. In this way, the chapter aims to provide a background 
for the following chapter by focusing on the political relations.  
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The second aim of the chapter is to focus on the 19
th
 century political transformations, 
embodied in the Eastern Question, which reshaped the Anglo-Ottoman relations. This 
part aims to lay the diplomatic background to the crises analysed in the case studies, 
which are vital in understanding the discourses constructed in Britain after 1860. 
2.) The Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries  
2.1) The Levant Trade Company and Anglo-Ottoman Commerce 
The commercial concerns were one of the major factors in the establishment of the 
direct relations between the English and the Ottomans. Although the English traded in 
the Levant from the beginning of the 16
th
 century, the Venetians, who were engaged 
in a bitter rivalry with the Ottomans to control the trade routes between the East and 
Europe, acted as the middle-man in this trade.
3
  
In the mid-16
th
century, the Ottomans asserted their control over the Eastern 
Mediterranean trade routes as a result of a series of military victories, and one of the 
results of this situation was the direct contact established between the Ottomans and 
the English. The Sultan granted independent trading rights to English subjects in 1553 
after an English commercial agent arrived at Constantinople to regulate the trade.
4
 A 
few years later, the Levant Trading Company was established in England and the first 
official English representative to the Ottoman Empire arrived in Constantinople in 
1583 who acted as both the representative of the Levant Company and the English 
court.
5
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In the development of the early Anglo-Ottoman relations, the Levant Company 
played a central role. Until 1804, the dual role of the representatives of the Levant 
Company in Constantinople continued and their expenses were covered by the 
Company.
6
 The Company operated in three cities, Constantinople, Smyrna and 
Aleppo and the representatives in Smyrna and Aleppo acted as the British consuls 
during their residence.  
 
The trade between the two states rose rapidly at the end of the 16
th
 century, and by 
1620, England became the main European trading partner of the Ottoman Empire.
7
 
Throughout the 17
th
 century, the Levant Company’s trade with the Ottoman Empire 
century faced competition both from the East Indian Company over the monopoly of 
certain commodities, silk being the most important, and from France over textile 
exports.
8
 Between 1620-1683 the English domination in the Levant trade continued; 
the English trade constituted an estimated 39.6% of the Ottoman exports in 1638 and 
39% in 1686.
9
  
 
The Anglo-Ottoman trade volume diminished significantly in the 18
th
 century; at the 
end of 1700s only 1% of British foreign trade was with the Levant.
10
 Similarly, by the 
end of the 18
th
 century, only 9.2% of the Ottoman exports headed to the British 
Empire.
11
 The trade between two nations improved in the mid-19
th
 century; Ottoman 
exports to Britain rose from 13% in 1830 to 29.2% in 1850, following the free-trade 
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treaty signed in 1838.
12
  
2.2) The Political Situation in Britain and the Ottoman Empire at the 
Start of their Relations  
Politics played a key role in the establishment of the direct relations between England 
and the Ottoman Empire, which took place at the backdrop of the political/religious 
struggle in 16
th
 century Europe between the Habsburgs, England, France and the 
Ottomans. 
In the mid-16
th
 century, the religious struggle in Europe between Catholicism and 
various branches of Protestantism intensified, especially after the ascendance of 
Philip II to the Spanish branch of the Habsburg throne. The main rival of the Spain in 
the Western Mediterranean was the Ottoman Empire which was also engaged with a 
series of wars with the Austrian branch of the Habsburgs.  
On the other corner of Europe, England also found itself engulfed with the same 
political/religious struggle; Elizabeth, the Protestant Queen, supported the revolt in 
Netherlands against Philip II’s Spain which, in turn, aimed to first quell the revolt and 
then invade England to put an end to the Protestant rule.
13
 Elizabeth sent 6000 troops 
to fight against the Spanish Habsburgs in the Low Countries in 1585, and Philip II 
assembled the ‘Great Armada’ in 1588 to invade England. Existence of the common 
powerful enemy provided the   
The first British Ambassadors to the Porte, William Harborne and Edward Barton 
encouraged the Ottomans to attack Spain.
14
 Moreover, the English Ambassador 
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Edward Barton participated in the Ottoman military campaign against Habsburgs in 
Hungary in 1596 in which the English supported the Ottomans by providing them 
with war materials.
15
 The political friendship of the English was also important for 
the Ottoman Empire as the basic tenet of the Ottoman foreign strategy was to keep 
Europe divided. In this respect, the emergence of Protestantism in the 16
th
 century 
provided a political opportunity for the Ottomans and they exploited the religious 
rivalry in Europe until the mid-17
th
 century. 
The religious struggle in Europe ended with the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 which 
coincided with major political changes in England, which reduced the importance of 
Mediterranean and the Near East for English. By the end of the 17
th
 century, England 
became much less engaged in European affairs and much more with the overseas 
expansion.
16
 
2.3) The Eighteenth Century  
At the turn of the 18
th
 century, the political relations with the Ottomans were of minor 
importance for England since the country was preoccupied with developing its 
commerce with the Americas and Asia.
17
 Similarly, as the British devoted more 
resources to their navy and newly acquired colonies in the North America, the 
political importance of the Ottomans was significantly diminished.  
The relations between the British and the Ottomans were rekindled only at the end of 
the 18
th
 century when a series of changes necessitated a re-arrangement of the 
priorities of the British foreign policy. The most important of these was the American 
Revolution and the increased importance of India, which developed simultaneously 
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for the British Empire in the last quarter of the 18
th
 century.  
The second important change was the emergence of the ‘Great Power’ system in the 
1760s and 1770s which reshaped the way European states, including Britain, 
approached international relations. Britain became one of the five major Powers in 
Europe, with France, Austria, Prussia and the Russian Empire.
18
 The Ottoman Empire 
was included in the new European diplomatic system in the 18
th
 century as one of the 
lesser states.
19
 The first diplomatic mission of the Ottoman Empire was sent to France 
in the 1730s and the first Ottoman Embassy in London was established in 1793 as a 
part of Selim III’s modernisation reforms.  
3.) The Eastern Question and its Impact 
3.1) The Emergence of the Eastern Question  
The relations between Britain and the Ottoman Empire developed substantially after 
the 1820s, and this was due to the emergence of the Eastern Question as one of the 
major issues of the 19
th
 century Great Power diplomacy.  Increased British interest in 
the Near East were due to a number of interconnected political reasons; the French 
Revolution and the two decades following it brought drastic changes in the European 
order, which shifted the positions of every Power.  
 
The basis of the Eastern Question was the conflict between the Ottoman rulers and 
the Christian subjects, which became more acute as the Ottomans attempted to 
modernize their administration by centralization and the Christian minorities 
demanded autonomy or independence.
20
 The European Powers intervened to this 
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interaction in order to preserve the ‘balance of power’ established in 1815 and 
accommodate the demands of the Christian minority and the Ottoman centre at the 
same time; which proved to be an insurmountable task. 
 
The second important aspect of the Eastern Question was diplomatic and it was a by-
product of the 18
th
 century developments. The emergence of Russia as a major 
European Power in the 18
th
 century posed a substantial threat to the Ottoman 
hegemony in Eastern Europe.
 21
 During the reign of Catherine II (1762-96) Russia 
developed a more aggressive policy towards the Ottomans and positioned itself as 
‘the defender of the Orthodox religion’ in the Ottoman Empire. During the late 18th 
century, Britain and Russia were allied against France and its eastern allies Ottomans, 
Poland and Sweden. In the war which resulted with the 1774 Treaty of Kucuk 
Kainardji, Britain assisted Russia to despatch its navy to the Mediterranean to fight 
against the Ottoman navy. Russia gained access to the Black sea and large economic 
privileges; all to be contested by Britain in the 19
th
 century and some provided the 
pretext of British intervention to the Crimean War (1854-56).   
 
One of the most important consequences of the Treaty of Kucuk Kainardji for the 
Russian Empire was obtaining the status of ‘protector of the Orthodox Christians’ in 
the Ottoman Empire which turned the tide in the relations of the two states in favour 
of the Russian Empire.
22 
Soon after, Catherine II constructed an alliance with Austria 
with the aim of partitioning the Ottoman Empire and declared war in 1787. Although 
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the war ended without making a significant change in the balance of power, it made a 
significant impact on the Anglo-Ottoman relations.  
 
The second important diplomatic event in the development of the Eastern Question 
was the rise of Napoleon in the Revolutionary France, who embarked on the Egyptian 
Expedition in 1798.
23
 The most important result of the Expedition for the Ottoman 
Empire was the fall of the old order in Egypt after Napoleon’s invasion. Furthermore, 
it resulted with the first formal alliance of Britain and the Ottoman Empire in 1799; a 
triple alliance which included Russia against France.  
The reason for Napoleon’s Expedition to Egypt is debated in the literature but it 
raised suspicions in Britain against France because of the belief that it aimed to assert 
French control in India.
24
 British navy fought with the Ottoman forces and the joint 
expedition stopped Napoleon’s advance at Acre. Soon after, Napoleon withdrew from 
Egypt to return to France without a significant military result in the Near East.  
After the withdrawal of the French contingent from Egypt, the British interest to the 
Ottoman Empire waned. The main British interest during the first decade of the 19
th
 
century laid primarily in the continental Europe, although Britain re-established 
contacts with the region during the Napoleonic Wars. For a short interval, Britain 
joined the Russian Empire in its war against the Ottoman Empire in the 1806-1812 
Russo-Ottoman War, but signed a peace treaty with the Ottoman Empire in 1809, 
without making a significant contribution to the War.
25
 
The Ottoman Empire’s involvement to the Napoleonic Wars was limited and the 
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Ottoman Empire did not participate in the Vienna Congress in 1815. The major 
impact of the Napoleonic Wars for the Ottoman Empire was that it brought the Near 
East back to the European scene. This was partly because of the importance of India 
for the British Empire, as the Near East was strategic in defending routes to India, and 
partly due to the changing balance of power in Europe after the capitulation of France 
in 1815 and the rise of Russia as a major continental power.  
3.2) The British Foreign Policy in 19th Century 
The Vienna settlement of 1815 which ended the Napoleonic Wars was designed to 
preserve the ‘balance of powers’ between the major European states, Britain, France, 
Habsburgs, Prussia and Russia against the dangers of revolution.
26
 The Concert 
System was designed to restrain the risk of war by convening diplomatic conferences 
between Powers to settle the international issues.
27
 In this setting, the Anglo-Ottoman 
relations became a part of the broader international relations in Europe in the 19
th
 
century. 
 
In the first half of the 19
th
 century, British foreign policy was based on the country’s 
superior industrial power and naval force.
28
 This period, when compared with the last 
quarter of the century, was visibly more peaceful. This stability was due to the fear of 
a political revolution in Europe. Through the mid-century, ‘the idea of free-trade’ 
gained prominence in Britain, especially after the repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846; 
this required an active foreign policy to open the world markets for British goods.
29
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An early example of the free-trade treaties was the one signed with the Ottoman 
Empire in 1838 with which the Ottomans abandoned all state monopolies and 
reduced the tariffs for British exports in exchange of British military and political 
support in Egypt.
30
 
 
The two basic principles of the British foreign policy after the Vienna Settlement 
were to prevent the domination of Europe by a single power and to open global 
markets for British trade.
31
 The former of these principles was due to the peculiar 
position that Britain occupied in European affairs; it was neither a truly European 
power like the continental states, nor completely outside of it. Due to this peculiarity, 
British foreign policy in the 19
th
 century swung between two opposite policies of 
‘non-intervention’ and ‘active interference’ in European affairs.32 
 
Britain was committed to the preservation of the ‘balance of power’ in Europe 
because of these two principles, and in the 19
th
 century, one of the real dangers which 
threatened it was the Eastern Question. The risk of the total disintegration of the 
Ottoman Empire, either due to domestic revolts or a foreign occupation, threatened 
the stability of the whole of Europe. Such a collapse would definitely alter the 
European balance of power and in order to prevent this, Britain committed itself to 
defending the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire, particularly during the so-
called ‘classical age’ (1812-1865) of British foreign policy, dominated by the 
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statesmen born in the 18
th
 century, such as Castlereagh, Canning and Palmerston.
33
 
 
The second principle was related to the rapidly expanding British economy. Britain 
was the only power in the first half of the 19
th
 century with interests spread across the 
globe due to its trade links with far-off territories.
34
 Following the loss of the North 
American colonies at the end of the 18
th
 century, British trade with India became 
more significant for the Empire and securing the trade routes became a chief aim of 
British foreign policy.
35
 In this context, the Russian Empire emerged as the main 
threat that could disrupt the British position in India by either asserting its dominance 
over the Eastern Mediterranean or invading Persia and Afghanistan.
36
 British 
statesmen feared the possibility of Russian control in the Near East because if the 
Russian navy controlled the Black Sea and achieved free access to the Straits, it 
would be able to disrupt the British shipping in the Mediterranean and sever British 
communications with India. Such a scenario looked increasingly more likely at the 
end of the 18
th
 century, following a series of Russian military victories against the 
Ottoman Empire.
37
 
 
The first British reaction against Russia in defence of the Ottoman Empire happened 
during the Russo-Turkish War of 1787-92. In 1791, the British Foreign Secretary Pitt 
contemplated a British intervention against Russia at Ochakov, a small fortress at the 
northern coast of the Black Sea.
38
 His proposal met with resistance at the Cabinet and 
the House of Commons where the majority had no interest of a military intervention 
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against the Russian Empire with which Britain had strong commercial ties.
39
 
Although Pitt’s proposal was defeated, it was significant because it marked the 
beginning of revival of the British interest, after 150 years of oblivion, to the Ottoman 
Empire.
40
  
 
Until 1860s, France, albeit steadily losing its influence and power in Europe firstly 
against Britain and then Prussia, continued to occupy a significant position in the 
Near East. In some occasions, like Mehmed Ali’s revolt of 1830s, its position clashed 
with the British, and in some other occasions like the Greek Revolution (1821-32) it 
cooperated with Britain and other powers to preserve the status quo.
41
 As a general 
principle, British foreign policy aimed to keep the French as an ally or at least as a 
neutral force; due to the traditional British aversion of keeping a standing army, it was 
necessary for Britain to cooperate with at least one European force such as France, 
Austria or Prussia in times of a crisis against Russia.
42
 
3.3) The Greek Revolt as a case in Eastern Question 
The national movements in Europe proliferated after the French Revolution and 
spread throughout the continent, from Italy to Poland and to the Ottoman Empire, 
also influenced the foreign policy of the European Powers.
43
 One of the first of 
national independence movements in the Ottoman Empire was the Greek Revolution 
(1821-32) which aroused sympathy and support in Britain, especially after the 
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popular poet Lord Byron decided to join the Greeks to fight against the Ottoman state 
in 1824.
44
  Greek intellectuals educated in the West and aware of the privileged 
position of ancient Greece in Western educated cadres aimed to capitalize on this 
sympathy; they drafted constitutions during the Revolution in order to gain the 
support of liberal public opinion in Britain and France.
45
 
 
The British official position before and during the Revolution was neutrality, since 
the official foreign policy in the Near East was to support the Ottoman Empire. 
Similarly, Russia under Alexander I (1801-25) initially did not support the Revolution 
and together with Austria and France, four European Powers declared their 
decisiveness to protect the status quo. 
46
 However, as their expectation of a swift 
Ottoman victory did not materialise and the conflict prolonged, the trading interests 
of the powers were harmed, British public opinion turned more philhellene, and as a 
result, Russia and Britain decided to intervene on behalf of the revolutionaries.
47
 In 
1827 a joint Russian, French and British fleet destroyed the Ottoman fleet in 
Navarino and saved the Revolution which was on the brink of military defeat. 
48
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British and Russian foreign policy towards the Revolution illustrated the importance 
given to the ‘balance of power’ by the European states; in 1822 they refused to 
intervene and after 1826, Russia and Britain concerted their policy with the Protocol 
of St. Petersburg, which was then joined by France in 1827 with the London 
Convention.
49
 Secondly, it showed the importance of the concepts of ‘prestige’ and 
‘public opinion’ in the 19th century policy-making. Alexander I balanced his fear of 
revolution, which was widespread for the early 19
th
 century, and his willingness to 
preserve Russia’s prestige as the defender of Orthodox Christians. Similarly, Canning, 
the Foreign Secretary of Britain during the Revolution, faced public and 
parliamentary pressure to support Greeks on one hand, and fending off a unitary 
Russian action against the Ottomans on the other.
50
 
 
Although British policy aimed to prevent a Russo-Ottoman war on the Greek 
Revolution, it failed to achieve this target; in 1828 Ottomans declared war on the 
Russian Empire and the next year, Russia managed to reach Adrianople, threatening 
the Ottoman capital. However, Russia preferred to preserve a weak Ottoman Empire 
rather than dismember it because of Austrian, British and French opposition to such a 
scheme.
51
 Similarly Russia allied with the Ottoman Empire in 1833 to defend 
Constantinople from Mehmed Ali’s Egyptian army marching towards the capital. 52 
This demonstrated the change in the Russian policy between the 18
th
 century and the 
19
th
 century; Russia in the 19
th
 century was committed to a preserve a weak Ottoman 
Empire under Russian influence rather than outright partitioning it as a general policy, 
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and this transformation resulted with increased British interest to the Ottoman Empire 
after 1833 to counter the influence of the Russian Empire.
53
 
3.4) Emergence of Russophobia and Turkophilism in Britain  
Russophobia in Britain emerged in this international context, when Anglo-Russian 
rivalry towards the Empire became more eminent in 1830s. Although the two Powers 
concerted their actions against France during the Near Eastern Crisis of 1839-40, 
mutual suspicions continued. For the liberals in Britain, Russia’s crush of Polish 
Revolution in 1830 and then Hungarian Revolt in 1849 reinforced its image as ‘the 
oppressor’ state of Europe which influenced the views on the Ottoman Empire since it 
was perceived to be under constant siege of the Tsar’s armies. 54  
 
The Crimean War (1853-56) was a result of the complex relations between Russia, 
France, Austria and Britain over the Ottoman Empire.
55
 The dispute between France 
and Russia started over the rights of the Catholics and the Orthodox Christians over 
the Holy Places in 1850 and escalated to a battle for influence on the Ottoman 
Christians by 1853. Louis Napoleon, who was elected as the President of the Second 
Republic in 1849 and proclaimed as the Emperor Napoleon III in 1852, depended on 
the Catholic support at home and exploited the issue for domestic purpose.
56
Austria 
and Prussia, two allies of Russia, declared neutrality but Austrian neutrality was on 
far less favourable terms for the Russian Empire and towards the end of the War 
Austria moved closer to the Allies.  
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Compared to other Powers, Britain’s position was more complicated. It was led by a 
coalition cabinet which included names who had conflicting opinions on foreign 
policy. British press was far more developed than its counterparts in other countries, 
and more importantly much more free and influential on the public opinion which 
was dominated by the Russophobia in British society, combined with the British 
Cabinet’s mistrust of the Russian intentions on the future of the Ottoman Empire 
resulted with the British military participation in the conflict.
57
 
 
The end of the Crimean War in with the Treaty of Paris in 1856 did not alter the 
European balance of power considerably although it limited the Russian influence 
over the Ottoman Empire considerably because the Treaty prohibited the Russians to 
keep a fleet in the Black Sea and stripped them off their ‘protector of Orthodox 
Christians’ status. Moreover, it included the Ottoman Empire in the ‘European 
concert’ and guaranteed its territorial integrity.  
4.) Conclusion 
The relations between Britain and the Ottoman Empire were established at the end of 
the 16
th
 century, which was of both commercial and political nature. Although the 
relations started after the establishment of the Levant Trading Company, it was the 
political situation in Europe which played the key role in stimulating the English 
interest in the Near East.   
Similarly, in the absence of a key political interest, the importance of the Anglo-
Ottoman relations diminished in the following centuries until the emergence of the 
Eastern Question as a major political issue in Europe, which re-kindled the British 
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interest to the Ottoman Empire. Most importantly, the 19
th
 century not only a marked 
transformation of the history of Anglo-Ottoman relations, but it also constituted a 
clear break in the Ottoman perceptions in Britain due to the changing political setting. 
The 19
th
 century Ottomans was a much closer object for British to observe and 
project on than the earlier centuries.  
The diplomatic events set in this chapter are important in understanding the formation 
of the perceptions of the Ottomans in Britain. The historical elite perceptions which 
will be analysed in the following chapter overlapped with the political events noted in 
this chapter, which in turn influenced the way British perceived the Ottomans. 
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Chapter 3: Images of the Ottomans in 
Britain up to 1860  
48 
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1.) Introduction 
The English curiosity towards the ‘Turks’ started in the late 16th century when the 
British merchants came in to contact with the Ottoman Empire and their African 
vassals. In the early modern England, the term ‘Turk’ was used to denote anyone who 
was a Muslim Ottoman subject.
1
 Thus, in the English writings of the 16
th
 and 17
th
 
centuries, the Balkan converts, African corsairs, Turkish or Arabic peasantry were all 
referred as the ‘Turk’. For example, when the Qur’an was translated to English in 
1649, it was presented as the ‘book of the Turks’, and this usage of continued in the 
17
th
 and 18
th
 centuries.
2
  
The British understanding of the Ottomans became more detailed after the 
introduction of the term ‘Mohammedan’ in the late 17th century which was replaced 
by ‘Muslim’ in the 20th century. However, until the 19th century, Mohammedan (there 
were various different versions of spelling of the term such as ‘Muhammedan’ or 
‘Mahometan’) was used interchangeably with the ‘Turk’.3 Although the British 
established commercial relations with Persia and the Mughal Empire in India, the 
‘Turk’ continued to be used in place of Muslim between the 16th-19thcenturies and the 
image of the ‘Muslim’ was largely shaped by the Anglo-Ottoman relations.  
The first aim of this chapter is to analyse the development of the British perceptions 
of the Ottomans from the beginning of the 16
th
 century to mid-19
th
 century in order to 
provide a historical background of British discourses which emerged in the 1860s and 
1870s, which are analysed as the case studies of this dissertation.  
The second task of this chapter is to analyse the differentiation in the perceptions to 
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mark how and why certain images of the Ottomans dominated the public sphere in 
these centuries. In this way, this chapter aims to shed light on the roots of the 
‘modern’ discourses analysed in the subsequent chapters.  
2.) British Perceptions of the Ottoman Empire before 
1860 
2.1) Early Modern Perceptions 
In the 16
th
 and 17
th
 centuries, the British experience of the ‘Turk’ was radically 
different from the continental European who perceived the Ottoman Empire as a 
military threat.
4
 The Ottoman-Hungarian Wars of the 16
th
 century and the Ottoman-
Habsburg Wars of the early 17
th
 century created an image of the ‘Muslim threat’ to 
Christendom which was felt by the Venetians or the Habsburgs.
5
 On the other hand, 
Britain, away from the warfare in continental Europe, was separated from the feeling 
of a direct threat and even benefited from the wars between Catholic Europe and the 
Ottomans by establishing a lucrative trade in war materials with the latter.
 6
  
The emergence of the interest towards the ‘Turks’ and ‘Islam’ in Britain was due to 
various religious and social reasons.
7
 Increased contact with the Ottomans from the 
late 16
th
 century onwards triggered a curiosity in Britain over the ‘Turks’ which 
overlapped with the era of acute religious battles between Protestantism, Catholicism 
and Islam.  
 
The simultaneous struggle against the Habsburgs brought the English and the 
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Ottomans closer in the Elizabethan era.
8
 Moreover, the English naval activity 
increased in the Mediterranean following the annihilation of the Spanish fleet, which 
used to dominate Western Mediterranean in the 16
th
 century, by the English in 1588.
9
 
This was one of the reasons behind the increased commercial relations between the 
Ottomans and the English, which in turn intensified the English contact with the 
Ottomans and Moroccan Muslims. As more English came into contact with the 
Muslims of the East, the curiosity towards the ‘Turks’ and ‘Muslims ’intensified in 
England.  
 
Throughout the 17
th
 century, the English perceptions of the ‘Turks’ oscillated between 
religious contempt and cultural curiosity. Authors who wrote about the Ottoman 
Empire, travellers and scholars alike, constructed an image of the Ottomans which 
varied between these two opposite poles. The commentary or analyses of the scholars 
in comparison to the travellers contained ‘more contempt and hostility towards the 
Turks rather than curiosity’10 and became influential for their contemporaries, 
because their work was more systematic in their approach to the ‘Turk’ and more 
available for the English readers.  
 
The first of these scholars who worked on the ‘Turks’ was Richard Knolles, who 
published his major work, The General Historie [sic] of Turks, in 1603 and referred 
to the ‘Turks’ as the ‘present terror of the world.’11 His work became a best-seller in 
England and was produced after 12 years of research in chronicles.
12
 Knolles’ work 
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was later continued by Paul Rycaut, the British consul in Smyrna (present day Izmir), 
and a second volume of the Turkish history was published in 1699 after the Treaty of 
Karlowitz, which marked the end of Ottoman invasion to Central Europe. Similar to 
Knolles, John Barclay, a 17
th
 century scholar, noted in 1633 that ‘[t]he Turks a 
barbarous people borne to the destruction of cities, art and learning.'
13
 These were 
among the early examples of negative views.  
 
The British travellers to the Ottoman Empire constituted the other source on the early 
British perceptions of the Ottomans. The travellers of the 17
th
 and 18
th
 centuries were 
from the upper-middle classes, and visited the Ottoman Empire either with an official 
post or for personal curiosity.
14
 The early British traveller accounts demonstrate the 
existence of plural and, in some cases, opposing views on the Turks and the Ottoman 
Empire.  
 
One of the early examples of traveller reports is that of the British lawyer Henry 
Blount
15
,who travelled to the Ottoman Empire between 1634-1636 in order to 
observe the ‘Turks’ and wrote that the Ottoman Turks were ‘moderne [sic] people, 
great in action’.16 His views were positive about the Ottoman Empire and he was 
impressed by the Ottoman military power which ‘suddenly invaded the world’. 
Blount, under the influence of Bacon’s scientific model of rational inquiry and 
scepticism, attempted to present an alternative account of the Ottoman Empire and 
the Turks to Knolles’. The perception of the ‘Turk’ in Blount’s account was 
influenced greatly by the economic and political might of the Ottoman Empire; as a 
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mid-17
th
 century observer, Blount was in awe of Ottoman successes even though the 
Empire itself was already moving away from its so-called the ‘golden-age’ of the 16th 
century at the time of his visit.  
 
A second example is Paul Rycaut, who was both a scholar and traveller and disagreed 
with Blount on the character of the Ottomans. Rycaut was in the Ottoman Empire on 
an official duty but also travelled within the Empire to some extent outside of this 
duty.
17
 Rycaut wrote his book in 1665 and defined the Ottoman Empire as a ‘tyranny’ 
and lamented the Ottoman devsirme system, which was based on the practice of 
taking Christian children from their families during their childhood, converting them 
to Islam for service to the Ottoman state as soldiers or bureaucrats.
18
  
 
Both Rycaut’s and Blount’s work became popular among the reading public in the 
17
th
 century. Blount’s work was printed 7 times before 1671 and translated to German 
and Dutch in 1707 and 1737 respectively.
19
 More importantly, both accounts were 
written in English rather than Latin, which increased their importance since they 
appealed to a wider readership. Similarly, Rycaut’s work was also highly influential 
and was used by the other travellers who visited the Ottoman Empire in the following 
centuries as a primary source of information in the later centuries.
20
 Thus, two 
opposite and popular views were established in Britain in the 17
th
 century which were 
used and reproduced by other travellers in the later centuries as well.  
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One factor which defined the tone of Rycaut’s critical portrayal of the Ottoman 
Empire was the contemporary British politics.
21
 Rycaut wrote his book just a few 
years after the restoration of monarchy in England and addressed his book to King 
Charles II. Rycaut was a royalist; he was appointed to his post by the King himself. 
Thus, most of his harsh and rhetorical critique of the Ottoman Empire was designed 
as an implicit warning for King Charles II on the harms of absolutism rather than 
being a real analysis of the Ottoman system. Moreover, in 1660s’ England, there was 
an intensive debate about tyranny, despotism and liberty where the ‘Ungodly Ottoman 
Empire’ was likened to the Republican England of the ‘despotic’ Cromwell by the 
monarchists.
22
 
 
The 17
th
 century Ottoman sultans, contrary to Rycault’s and others’ generalizations, 
were weak and ineffective; the Ottoman Empire was experiencing a great upheaval 
and transformation at that time.
23
 During Rycaut’s visit in 1660s, the Ottoman Empire 
was recovering from a particularly catastrophic era preceded the leadership of a grand 
vizier, Ahmed Koprulu (r. 1661-1676). The premature death of Sultan Murad IV 
(r.1623-1640), the only strong and despotic ruler of the 17
th
 century Ottoman Empire, 
left the state first at the hands of the mentally disabled Sultan Ibrahim (1640-48) and 
then child Sultan Mehmed IV (1648-87) who acquired the throne at the age of 6. The 
power vacuum created with the death of Murad IV was filled after the appointment of 
Mehmed Koprulu in 1656 whose family acted as Grand Viziers until over 40 years. 
The ascendance of Koprulus to power in the 1860s, thus, restored the political 
stability in the Empire.   
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One of the main flaws of the traveller accounts, such as Rycaut’s, was the absence of 
direct contact between the traveller and the society they were observing; they lacked 
the language skills to communicate with the Ottomans and they were thus confined to 
their own ‘British’ quarter in the capital around the British Embassy. This fact 
distanced them from the Ottomans and made the travellers reliant on the older 
publications.
24
 For this reason, Rycaut read and continued the work of Knolles, which 
had a significant influence on Rycaut’s views.   
 
The plurality of views on the Ottomans was evident not only in the British sources 
but also in the Italian, Russian and French accounts of the Empire which either 
admired the Ottoman system or showed contempt in the early modern era. The views 
on the Ottomans and the Turks in the 17
th
century were influenced from the scholars’ 
point of view towards the European political system and their religious identity. The 
Ottoman Empire appeared as a preferable social model for authors who disliked the 
European society and state models.  
 
In addition, religion also influenced the perceptions; the Turks were perceived as a 
calamity by Knolles, who was a devout Catholic Christian. On the other hand, Francis 
Osborne, a 17
th
 century Protestant thinker, thought that the Ottoman political system 
was superior to the European monarchies.
25
 The enmity between the Catholics on one 
hand and Protestants and Muslims on the other in early modern Europe exacerbated 
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the enmity towards the Ottoman Muslims in the minds of the British Catholics while 
bringing the Protestant English closer with the Ottoman Empire, especially during the 
days of the religious conflict.
26
  
 
2.1.1) The Eighteenth Century 
During the 18
th
 century, the Ottomans ceased to be the ‘invading’ force in Europe 
after three centuries, following their defeat in the Battle of Vienna (1683) and moved 
to a more defensive position which resulted with the decline of European curiosity in 
the Ottoman Empire.
27
 As a second dynamic, the Enlightenment influenced the 
perceptions; as concepts such as political liberalism gained prominence among British 
thinkers, the Ottoman Empire was perceived as a symbol of ‘tyranny’ and 
‘absolutism’, the anti-thesis of the liberal, free society that Europe should become. 
This perception was also because of the rise of the ‘abstract’ knowledge against 
empirical knowledge in the 18
th
 century, which reinforced the stereotypical 
perceptions of the ‘outsider’ societies formed in the previous era.28 
 
An important transformation of the 18
th
 century was the change in England’s place in 
Europe and the world. This transformation began in the second part of the 17
th
century 
with the emergence of England as a commercial power and culminated politically 
after the Act of Union of 1707, which resulted in the birth of Britain. After the Treaty 
of Utrecht in 1713, Britain emerged as a colonial power, dominating the global 
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trade.
29
 This transformation also influenced the British perspectives on the Ottomans 
since the British observers from the late 17
th
 century onwards gained a ‘colonial’ 
perspective in their treatment of ‘other’ cultures.30 
 
Enlightenment thinkers such as Montesquieu based their opinions on scholars who 
wrote on the Orient or Asia, but their analysis was made under the influence of the 
contemporary political situation they were experiencing.
31
 Montesquieu’s impact on 
the perceptions of the Ottoman Empire was important due to his popularization of the 
term ‘Oriental despotism’32 by re-defining ‘despotism’ as an exclusively Oriental 
regime. Many authors and travellers were influenced by him, thus he made a lasting 
impact on the perceptions of the Ottoman Empire in Britain.
33
 
 
One of ‘abstract’ theories of the 18th century was ‘Climatic Theory’, which was 
developed by John Arbuthnot, a British author in 1733, who noted ‘the equability of 
the air rendered Asiatics lazy’ where ‘the great variety of hot and cold in Europe ... 
rendered them active’.34 Similarly, the image of idle, lazy, indolent Orientals was 
constructed against the hard-working Europeans in some traveller accounts and the 
Ottoman ‘backwardness’ was explained as a result of their ‘Asiatic laziness’. The 
image of ‘lazy Oriental’ was related with the Protestant values which rated being 
hard-working as a virtue and perceived laziness as a sin.
35
 This made the association 
of Ottoman Muslims and Orthodox Christians with laziness easier for the Western 
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Christian authors.  
 
One reason in the changing attitude of the Protestant thinkers of the Ottomans was the 
transformation in the European political climate.
36
 The wars waged between the 
Catholics and Protestants ended in the 17
th
 century, and the Peace of Westphalia 
(1648) recognized the various trends of Protestantism as a part of the Christian faith. 
The partial reconciliation between the Protestantism and Catholicism influenced the 
Protestant views on the Ottomans.  
 
Apart from the climatic or religious explanations, the 18
th
 century depictions of the 
Ottomans were also influenced by the visible regression of the Ottoman power in 
Europe. Rycaut’s views became more popular and influenced the 18th century authors, 
including Montesquieu, which in turn influenced later scholars and travellers.
37
 The 
continuity between Rycaut, Montesquieu and the later 18
th
 century authors such as 
Josiah Tucker, a Welshman, was established through the idea of ‘despotism’. The Earl 
of Crawford, a Scottish soldier who fought with the Russian army against the 
Ottomans, noted in his memoir that ‘there are no laws or compacts in Turkey’38; 
William Hunter, an 18
th
 century traveller wrote in his travel work that the government 
of the Turks ‘disclaims the law of nature, equity and reason, and exhibits 
amplification of injustice, tyranny and vice…’39; David Jones, a British scholar, noted 
that the ‘maxim of the Turks as the unlimited power and oppression of the people’.40 
At the end of the 18
th
century, Edmund Burke, British Whig politician and 
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philosopher, in his parliamentary speech, noted that:  
  
What had these worse than savages [the Turks] to do with the 
Powers of Europe, but to spread the war, destruction and pestilence 
among them? ... Any Christian Power was to be preferred to these 
destructive savages.
41
 
 
The term ‘despotism’ became the most prominent term to define the Ottomans in the 
later part of the 17
th
 century. By the 18
th
 century it was being used interchangeably 
with ‘absolutism’, the anti-thesis of constitutionalism and rule of law, which, were 
predominant in Britain in this period.
42
 Aaron Hill wrote in his book in 1733 that 
‘learning was discouraged in the Empire since it is dangerous for the despotic 
regime’.43  For William Hunter, Turks were ‘... a superstitious, an ignorant and a 
sluggish people; declared enemy of arts and sciences...’44; he further claimed that 
despotism and slavishness were the main qualities of the ‘Turks’: ‘Haughty, cruel and 
overbearing when in power; that power is annihilated, cringing, humble and 
irresolute, their different situations only serve to delineate the various shades of a 
weak and vitiated mind.’45 Charles Thompson, a British traveller of the 18th century, 
wrote that the Turks were lazy and spent all day in coffeehouses.
46
 
 
There were also opposite views during the 18
th
 century, albeit shared only by a 
minority; most notably by the philosopher David Hume, on his essay Of National 
Characters. Hume described the ‘Turks’ as people with ‘integrity, gravity and 
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bravery’ and ‘candid, sincere people like the Ancient Romans’.47 In some traveller 
accounts, the ‘Turks’ were defined as ‘hospitable, helpful, honest, kind to children 
and animals.’48Similar to Hume, James Porter, the British Ambassador to the Porte, 
denied that the Ottoman government was despotic and stated that it was ‘a species of 
limited monarchy, not an absolute despotism’.49 Porter refuted Montesquieu’s 
categorization of the Ottoman Empire as despotism and claimed instead that this was 
a misunderstanding. For Porter, the Ottoman Empire was not lawless but the Turkish 
law was corrupted by the administration. Schiffer notes that some of the British 
travellers in the 18
th
 century depicted the Turk as ‘distinguished morally by sternness 
and solemnity.’50  
 
A new factor influencing the British perceptions in the 18
th 
century was the class 
awareness. Travellers who had contacts with only the upper echelons of the Ottoman 
society were more sympathetic in their depiction of the ‘Turks’, especially in 
comparison to the Christian peoples of the Ottoman Empire.
51
 Lady Montagu, the 
wife of the British Ambassador to the Porte, published her memoirs in which the 
‘Turks’ were rated highly whereas subject peoples such as the Greeks and Bulgarians 
were described with particular contempt. Similar to Montagu, many British 
gentlemen who travelled to the Ottoman Empire in late 18
th
 and early 19
th
 centuries, 
sympathized with the ‘Turks’ who were described as an ‘honourable race’ preferable 
over the Greeks and other subject people.
52
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Either in a positive or a negative way, there was an increased tendency among the 
British elite to define the ‘Turk’ as an example of ‘exotic’ people, different from the 
‘Europeans’. The 18th century perceptions of the Ottoman Empire and the Turks 
became more negative; the two basic reasons of this shift was both the decline of the 
Ottoman power, especially in the later part of the 18
th
 century, and the emergence of 
the political liberalism in Britain. 
2.2) The image of the Ottomans in the 19th century 
The perceptions of the Ottomans were shaped on two major levels in the 19
th
 century 
Europe; the ideological level, which was in continuity with the 18
th
 century thinking, 
and the political level, which transformed the importance of the Ottoman Empire for 
Britain. The Ottomans and Britain became more entangled in the 19
th
 century; the 
Ottoman Empire became a popular destination for travellers in the beginning of the 
century at a time when Britain became more politically active in the Near East.
53
 
 
The 19
th
 century secular ideology produced an image of liberal and ‘progressive’ 
Europe. Various political projects constructed in the first half of the century 
acknowledged the technical progress witnessed in Europe, particularly in Britain. In 
this period, the East emerged as the anti-thesis of the progressive and liberal Britain 
and Europe; the Ottoman society was perceived as a decaying organisation because of 
its visible backwardness compared to Britain.
54
 
 
The Eastern Question defined the political level and preoccupied the Western Powers 
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until the First World War. The importance of the Eastern Question for the British 
foreign policy during the 19
th
 century necessitated accumulation of substantial 
‘knowledge’ on the Ottoman Empire.55 It placed the Ottoman Empire at the centre of 
European diplomacy and hence, the Ottoman Empire became not only an ‘exotic’ 
place for travellers and a commercial destination for British trade, but also a 
politically significant state in the international relations. 
 
The Eastern Question resulted with the ‘politicisation’ of the Ottoman perceptions in 
Britain in the 19
th
 century. The British foreign policy made a significant impact on the 
Ottoman image in the 19
th
 century; as the British foreign policy towards the Ottomans 
became more active after the 1830s, the British travellers and scholars developed 
various positions vis-à-vis the official British discourse especially in the periods of 
diplomatic crisis such as the 1830s and the 1850s.
56
 
 
In addition to the emergence of the Eastern Question, a second factor played an 
important role in politicising and radicalising the views on the Ottomans. The rise of 
newspapers and periodicals in Britain, which published numerous analyses on the 
Ottoman society and state, especially after the 1850s, made a major impact on the 
popularisation of the elite views in Britain. Especially from the mid-19
th
century 
onwards, British press emerged as the main source influencing the public image of 
the Ottomans and replaced the other sources, such as traveller narratives, in 
significance.
57
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2.3) Images of the ‘Turk’ in the 19th century 
The technological advances transformed the British society in the first half of the 19
th
 
century, especially through railways and industrial towns.
58
 In contrast to the rapidly 
changing Britain, the Ottoman Empire was left behind by these gigantic 
transformations and the difference was easy to perceive by a regular traveller; by 
1850 Britain has already established its main railway network cutting travel times 
significantly, while travel in the Ottoman Empire, especially in Asia Minor or the 
Middle Eastern territories, was still based on horse carriages on ancient roads.  
 
The visible difference in technology between the two countries resulted in the 
creation of two opposite images of the Ottoman Empire depending on the vision of 
the traveller. The Ottomans were portrayed either as a ‘backward’ and archaic Empire 
or the classical/traditional Empire which protected its traditions against the 
encroachment of the industrial modernity.
59
 
 
On the other hand, the late 18
th 
and early 19
th
 century brought a ‘romantic’ 
representation of the Orient in fiction, especially after the tremendous popularity of 
Arabian Nights in Britain.
60
 These romantic and fictional representations influenced 
the expectations of the 19
th
 century travellers, who attempted to present both an 
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empirical and an imagined Orient.
61
 The influence of romanticism was stronger in the 
works written at the beginning of the century; towards the mid-century, the political 
or scientific representations started to gain prominence and replaced the old romantic 
style.
62
  
 
Thomas Thornton, a British industrialist who was sent to Constantinople to manage a 
British factory, published his memoirs in 1807 after 15 years of residency in the 
Ottoman capital.
63
 Thornton described the ‘Turks’ as ‘grave and saturnine’ and added 
that ‘honesty is the characteristic of the Turkish merchant, and distinguishes him from 
the Jew, the Greek, the Armenian against whose artifices no precaution can suffice’.64 
Thornton’s account was valued as a standard book of reference in Britain by its 
contemporaries although he was perceived as having a clear pro-Turkish bias.
65
 Even 
though his views on the ‘Turks’ was more positive than the others, Thornton 
concluded his book with a remark on ‘European’ superiority over the Asians by 
stating ‘[W]e [Europeans] triumph in our acknowledged superiority over the 
Asiatics’; a common theme between otherwise competing perceptions.66 
 
Charles Colville Frankland, a British navy officer, published his travel account, 
named Travels to and from Constantinople in 1829.
67
 Similar to Thornton, Frankland 
also painted the image of the ‘Turk’ in comparison to the Greeks and other 
nationalities, which was due to the rising interest of British educated classes in 
Greece in the later part of the 18
th
 century. Frankland, in contrast to Thornton, 
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considered the ‘Turks’ inferior to the Greeks who were ‘artisans and artificers’:  
 
The Turks are, personally, extremely brave but so are all barbarians 
... they are said to be honourable in their dealings; and yet worship 
gold, and are sordid and avaricious...  
 
... [t]he Ottoman nation is the bitterest enemy to the human race, and 
the severest scourge that ever sent by Providence to chastise 
mankind.
68
 
 
Frankland’s account was anti-Turkish partly because of its timing; it was written 
during the days of the Greek Revolution (1821-1832), during which anti-Ottoman 
discourses prevailed in the liberal and educated classes of Britain. Philhellenism 
which emerged in Europe in late 18
th
 century as an adoration of ancient Greek 
culture, articulated into the political discourse aiming to save the Greeks from the 
‘Turkish’ yoke during the days of the Greek Revolution. Under the influence of the 
Revolution, the dominant image of the Ottoman Empire in Britain was that of a 
‘tyrannical, oppressive power’.69 
 
The Greeks in the Ottoman Empire were perceived as an oppressed people, similar to 
other oppressed nations striving to achieve independence, from other multi-ethnic 
‘Eastern’ empires, such as the Poles from the Russian Empire, Italians from the 
Habsburgs and South Americans from the Spanish. The swing of opinion towards 
Greeks at the expense of Turks was connected to Britain’s self-imposed image as the 
defender of liberty against political absolutism in post-Napoleonic Europe. For 
British authors, the Ottoman Empire in the 1820s was another example of absolutism, 
which was perceived as the ideological enemy of Britain.
70
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An Irish traveller, Richard Madden, visited the Ottoman Empire in the 1820s and 
published his travel memoirs under the title Travels in Turkey, Egypt, Nubia and 
Palestine in 1829.
71
 Madden mentioned both Thornton’s and de Tott’s opinions of the 
Ottomans; both of which he refutes.
72
 Madden was critical of the impact of 
‘despotism’ on the Ottoman subjects, which for him was ‘the little value it causes to 
people to set on human life’.73 He also noted that the ‘Turks were leading a life of 
indolence’ since they left all trades to the Christians, with the exception of a few such 
as bread-making and shoe-making.
74
 Madden also wrote his work during the days of 
the Greek Revolution and compared the Greeks with the ‘Turks’, concluding that they 
were both not to be admired by a European: ‘I would be inclined to say that the 
Greeks as a nation are the least estimable people in the world, with the exception of 
the Turks who are still less to be admired.’75 
 
Most of the 19
th
 century travellers tried to describe the ‘Turks’ not only in terms of 
moral qualities and habits, but also with their physical appearances. J.M. Kinneir, in 
his Journey through Asia Minor, tried to demarcate the ‘regular Turk’ from the 
Ottoman bureaucrats and concluded that ‘The Turks were not cruel people ... the 
miserable condition of the Sultan’s territories therefore not to be attributed to the 
disposition or habits of the people, but to the inefficiency of the government, the 
insecurity of the private property ...’76 Kinneir’s observation tried to bridge the two 
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different representations of the Ottomans similar to Thornton’s book; the one shaped 
by the 18
th
 century authorities and the ones created by the contemporary author’s own 
observation.
77
 
 
The representations of the Ottomans constructed in the 18
th
 century which claimed an 
essential divide between Europe and Asia, continued in the 19
th
 century.
78
 The two 
popular images of the earlier century, the climatic theory and the ‘lazy, indolent 
Turk’, both constructed Europe and Asia as the two opposite poles; two different sets 
of moral, social, religious values were created for each continent. The climatic theory 
was refuted by the 19
th
 century authors as it was deemed to be not scientific, although 
the basic divide it was built on was reproduced in contemporary, ‘scientific’ theories. 
For example, Thornton argued that ‘interaction with woman’ was the chief driving 
force of civilization –refuting that the climate had any role in the process. He 
concluded that the Ottomans were inferior to Europe due to Islam giving women an 
inferior status in society.  
 
2.4) Impact of Russophobia on the Image of the ‘Turk’ 
 
The main transformation in the image of the Ottomans in the 19
th
 century was the 
‘politicisation’ of the representations. Starting with the Greek Revolution, the 
perceptions of the Ottomans in Britain were influenced by political developments. 
The most important of these affecting the Ottoman image was the emergence of 
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Russophobia in British society in the 1830s.
79
  British public opinion became more 
hostile towards Russia, especially after Nicholas I’s (r.1825-1855) suppression of the 
1830 revolution in Poland.
80
 
 
Although Russia’s image as ‘despotism’ was a representation it shared with the 
Ottomans, its growing military power demarcated the positions of the two empires. 
The Russian Empire was not only a despotic regime; from the perspective of the 
British, it possessed enough military power to fight against liberalism in Europe.
81
 
The anti-Russian sentiments in Britain reached their climax before the Crimean War 
(1854-56) when Britain and France allied with the Ottoman Empire, fought against 
the Russian Empire.  
 
The Russophobia in Britain produced its counter-discourse as the ‘Turkophilism’. 
Turkophilism was linked to the Russophobia as the Russian Empire and the Ottoman 
Empire were the main rivals in the Near East and the main importance of the Ottoman 
Empire for Britain was related to the danger the Russian Empire posed for British 
interests. Through the rest of the 19
th
 century, the perceptions on the Ottomans and 
the Russians converged; as the Russophobia declined after the Crimean War, the 
Turkophil discourses also lost their appeal.  
 
The best example of the Turkophil trend of 19
th
 century was David Urquhart, a 
Scottish diplomat, who travelled to the Ottoman Empire in 1827 and published his 
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book The Spirit of the East in 1838 upon his return to Britain.
82
 Besides this work, he 
had written several pamphlets and contributed to numerous journals in Britain, all 
argued for a strict anti-Russian policy for Britain.
83
 He admired the Ottoman 
civilization and culture and strongly opposed Russia and her foreign policy in the 
Near East.  His work was widely read in contemporary Britain.
84
 In addition to 
Urquhart, opinions of the Liberals and Radicals in the British parliament, who backed 
the Greek independence in the 1820s, became friendlier towards the Ottoman Empire 
after the 1830s, mainly due to impact of the Russophobia.
85
 
 
Urquhart’s Turkophilism was based not only on his opposition to Russia, but also on 
his belief in the ability of the Ottoman Empire to reform itself. The Ottoman political 
reformation, Tanzimat, which started in 1839 with an Imperial Edict, coincided with 
the intensification of Russophobia in Britain and helped to reshape the Ottoman 
image as an ‘empire in reform’ from ‘despotism towards liberalism.86 Urquhart’s 
work also marked a transformation in the travel literature; from his work onwards, the 
travel literature became increasingly politicized, and in some instances, political 
travel books emerged which were written specifically to address a political problem 
in the Ottoman Empire.
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2.5) The Perceptions of Islam in the 19th century 
Although Russophobia and hopes of reforming the Ottoman Empire dominated 
British public opinion after the 1830s, there were dissenting travellers who were not 
optimistic on the prospects of such a reinvigoration. William J. Hamilton, a British 
traveller, visited the Ottoman Empire in the 1830s and published his book in 1842 
claiming that ‘the bigotry and intolerance of Mahometanism barred moral or political 
improvement’, and ‘Russians were far more preferable for humanity and civilisation 
and commerce [than the Turks]’. 88 Hamilton’s main argument was based on his 
opinions of Islam, which were shared by many other contemporary travellers.  
 
In the 19
th
 century, Islam played an increasingly important role in defining the 
Ottoman Empire. Both secular and religious British subjects analysed Islam and 
criticized it both because of its values and beliefs and also because it ‘cannot cope 
with civilization’.89 The blame for the Ottoman technical backwardness against 
Britain was placed on Islam as it was perceived to be at the heart of the Ottoman 
culture.  
 
Two visible factors influenced the perceptions of the Ottoman Empire and the ‘Turks’ 
which were in continuation from the earlier centuries. The first of these was the 
contemporary political context which the author experienced and the second was the 
religious or the political affiliation of the author. The British middle class authors who 
travelled to or wrote on the Ottoman Empire became increasingly anti-Ottoman 
because they sympathised with the oppressed Ottoman Christians whereas the British 
aristocracy were biased towards the Ottoman Turks. The former perceived the 
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Ottoman Empire as ‘despotism’ opposite of the British liberalism and Islam as a 
fanatical, backward religion, closed to progress and civilization.
90
 
 
Moreover, the perceptions were also negatively affected from the decline of the 
Ottoman power vis-à-vis Europe. The abolition of the stamp duty in 1855, alongside 
rising literacy rates, created the backbone of the British press which became a 
prominent force in public opinion making, especially after the 1860s. Similarly, the 
‘public opinion’ became a more eminent force in foreign policy making after the mid-
century, especially following the democratisation of the British politics in the 1860s 
with the Reform Act of 1867, which considerably enlarged the franchise and thus 
increased the importance of the ‘public’ in the policy making.  
 
In the 1850s, even in a more rudimentary form compared to the last decades of the 
19
th
 century, British press created, disseminated and reflected upon this public 
opinion. The turning point in this relation was the Crimean War where The Times 
provided an extensive coverage of the war which was supplemented with the 
photographs printed in the llustrated London News. The conduct of the war in Crimea 
was brought to the public scrutiny by the press, and the mismanagement of the war, 
which left thousands of British troops dead as a result of disease caused by supply 
problems, angered the British public.
91
 A direct result of this anger was the 
resignation of the Prime Minister in 1855 and the bitter complaints of the Foreign 
Secretary on the British newspapers for their coverage.
92
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3.) Conclusion 
Until the 19
th
 century, British authors perceived the Ottomans in the form of vague 
images such as ‘lazy’, ‘indolent’ or ‘backward’ or ‘despotic’ Ottomans. These 
perceptions, until the 19
th
 century, were produced by a handful of elites such as 
travellers, diplomats or scholars. Their work was read by a small group of elites 
consisted of merchants trading with the Levant, aristocrats, and upper-middle class 
travellers who were interested in travelling to the ‘exotic’ Eastern lands.  
 
In the 19
th
 century major transformations occured both in the wider European world 
and in the British domestic politics. On one hand, the transformation of the European 
political order after 1815, and the emergence of the Eastern Question, altered the 
importance of the Ottomans for Britain. The Ottomans, who were perceived as a ‘far-
away exotic people’ until the 19th century, became a topic of British diplomacy in 
Europe in the 19
th
 century. 
 
On the other hand, various important domestic changes, particularly the rise of the 
British press and the transformation of the British political system also altered the 
British perceptions of the Ottomans. From the mid-century onwards, number of 
people writing on the Ottomans multiplied; journalists, newspaper readers and a 
wider group of MPs, began to discuss events taking place in the Ottoman Empire and 
their implications for the British foreign policy. Thus, especially after the Greek 
Revolution, the Ottomans became a subject of British domestic politics and European 
political order. The interest in the Ottomans was no longer limited to a small group; it 
gradually became an issue for larger sections of the British society.  
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In this context, the Anglo-Ottoman relations and the British perceptions of the 
Ottomans were both in a period of transformation in the mid-19
th
 century, when the 
case analyses examined in Part II of this thesis took place. The main impact of these 
transformations was on the nature of the ‘perceptions’. The vague and distant images 
produced in the earlier centuries started to be articulated into wider coherent, political 
‘discourses’ from the mid-19th century onwards. As a result, the earlier perceptions 
were politicised and radicalised as they became a part of competing political 
discourses.  
 
In the 1850s the different perceptions existed in Britain; the anti-Ottoman sentiment 
of the days of the Greek Revolution was replaced by the pro-Ottoman views under the 
influence of the Anglo-Russian rivalry and the anti-Russian discourses it produced. 
However, as can be seen from these two examples, the ‘dominant’ public perception 
of the Ottomans was dependent on the contemporary political issues, and it was open 
to contestation.  
 
The three political crises that happened in the Ottoman Empire in the 1860s and the 
1870s, the Lebanese Civil War, the Create Revolt and the Great Balkan Crisis 
stimulated a discussion in Britain between the government and opposition, between 
the various newspapers and, especially in the case of the last one, between various 
parts of the British public. These discussions gradually radicalised the discourses on 
the Ottomans and in a significant break from the earlier centuries, influenced the 
direction of the Anglo-Ottoman relations.  
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Chapter 4: Britain and the Ottoman 
Empire in the 1860s 
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1.) Introduction 
The mid-19
th
 century was a transformational period for the Anglo-Ottoman relations 
as well as a period of change for the Ottoman images in Britain. This chapter will 
firstly analyse the political, economic and ideational changes in Britain that happened 
in the 1860s and 1870s where the case studies took place.  
Similarly, the period was also a time of rapid transformation and change for the 
Ottoman Empire called the Tanzimat period. The Tanzimat reforms not only altered 
the Ottoman society, but also influenced the British discourses on the Ottomans and 
this makes a broad analysis of the reforms necessary for the purposes of this thesis.   
1.1) British Politics in mid-Victorian Age  
The first of the important political transformation of the period was the evolution of 
the British politics from the ‘parliamentary politics’, where Parliament held the 
executive power in the beginning of the 19
th
 century, to the ‘party politics’, where two 
rival political parties gained prominence in the 1870s.
1
  
Creation of the Liberal Party in 1859 under Palmerston’s leadership paved the way 
for the modern party politics in Britain.
 2
 After the 1860s, the Conservative and 
Liberal parties emerged as institutions enjoying mass membership, centralized 
bureaucracies and an aspiration to maintain ideological homogeneity, which 
demarcated the modern system from the traditional parliamentary politics.
3
 In the 
emerging rivalry between the two parties, the Liberals took the upper hand during the 
1860s; in five elections held between 1859 and 1880 the Liberals won four; the 1874 
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elections, which was held after the economic slump of 1873, was the only one won by 
the Conservatives.  
The emergence of the two-party system was coincided with the advent of the personal 
rivalry between the influential politicians Gladstone and Disraeli in the late 1860s. 
These two politicians’ role in British politics increased especially after the death of 
Palmerston, who was the most popular and influential politician in Britain prior to his 
death in 1865.
 4
  He was at the zenith of his power in the 1850s and 1860s; he was 
leader of the Liberal Party in the House of Commons, the most experienced politician 
in foreign affairs and the most popular politician among the pre-reform electorate as 
proved with two consecutive electoral victories in 1859 and 1865.  
Palmerston’s death in 1865 was a ‘landmark in English political history’ because of 
two main reasons.
 5
 Firstly, it contributed to the development of the two-party system 
under two new leaders. Palmerston obscured the differences between Liberalism and 
Conservatism by combining the virtues of the both. Only after his death a sharper line 
of division appeared between the two parties.
6
 Secondly, with Palmerston’s death, the 
parliamentary reform which aimed to enlarge the franchise to urban classes became a 
more realistic possibility. Although his role in the reform process has been debated in 
the literature, his vision of ‘gentlemanly high-politics’ which was suspicious of 
granting voting rights to the lower classes because they could be ‘bribed or 
intimidated’ created a block in front of the reform movement.7 For the Ottomans, 
Palmerston’s death brought another concern. Palmerston was a man of the ‘Concert 
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system’ that was established after the Congress of Vienna, and he was the chief 
architect of the pro-Ottoman policy in Britain which he staunchly defended.
 8
 With his 
death, the Ottoman Empire lost its most vocal supporter in the British political 
establishment.  
After Palmerston’s death, Gladstone ascended to the Liberal Party’s leadership in 
1867, when Lord John Russell, who was Palmerston’s immediate successor, decided 
to step down.  In the Conservative ranks, Benjamin Disraeli became the leader in 
1869 after Lord Derby’s death and emerged as the dominant figure until his death in 
1881.  
Gladstone and Disraeli’s personal rivalry accompanied the two party system in 
Britain and demonstrated the increasing influence of the middle-class in British 
politics. In contrast with the earlier generation of politicians such as Palmerston, 
Russell and Derby, who were from the aristocratic class, both Gladstone and Disraeli 
were sons of middle-class businessmen. Their background was in accordance with the 
rise of the urban middle-class MPs in their parties after the Second Reform Act.
9
 
Another important factor in the transformation of politics in Britain was the 
reformation of the electoral system. The electoral system in 1860 was still based on 
the Reform Act of 1832, which limited voting rights to property-owners and landed 
classes and thus created a ‘gentlemanly’ parliament. The Second Reform Act of 1867 
brought significant changes to the way British politics organized through presenting 
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an opportunity of better representation for the new urban classes.
10
  
After the Second Reform Act, size of the electorate rose from around 800,000 in 1865 
to 2.3 million in 1868 elections (Figure 1). Almost half of the urban male populace, 
numbering around 800,000, of whom the majority was working-class, was 
enfranchised.
11
 The increased enfranchise transformed the relationship between the 
electorate and government and also between the two-political parties.
12
 
Certain factors such as the conservative redistribution plan reduced the impact of 
these changes in the first instance. Disraeli and the Conservatives, who were 
architects of the Reform, deliberately arranged the seats and constituencies in a way 
that ‘the Liberal votes were piled up and wasted in the great centres of populations’ 
and the ‘Conservative votes were evenly distributed throughout the country’ through 
over-representation of the boroughs.
13
  
Moreover, corruption in the voting remained as a problem and was remedied by later 
reforms such the Ballot Act of 1872 which modernised the ballots and reduced 
corruption during voting process. After the Reform Act, the franchise included only 
around 8% of the population; in this sense the Reform Act was a ‘conservative 
reform’ which enfranchised only a small portion of the working-classes.14 However, 
despite its conservative nature, the Reform Act still constituted a step in the 
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democratisation of the British political system in the 19
th
 century.  
The transformations in the political system were results of larger changes in British 
society; the power of the ‘masses’ started to increase in Britain in the 19th century 
because of the demographic change. Half of the British population was already 
urbanised by 1851 and the population of the country had risen from 8 million in 1801 
to 22.7 million by 1871.
15
 The emergence of this dynamic and populous urban mass 
made reformation of the system necessary.  
Class structure of the society was another important factor affecting the politics in 
Britain. The majority of the population belonged to the working-class; according to 
some calculations, over three-quarters of the population in 1867 belonged to the 
‘manual-labour’ class.16 Only a limited number of the members of this class were 
enfranchised in 1867 and those who were eligible voted for the Liberals. In contrast, 
the urban middle-classes and rural population was known to vote for Conservatives 
during the 1860s.
17
  
Another important change of the mid-19
th
 century was the rise of the ‘pressure-
groups’ as non-parliamentary political institutions representing the will of the masses, 
especially the one who were excluded from power. The Reform League pushed for 
the Second Reform Act with the Hyde Park protest of 1867 and various other pressure 
groups, from trade unions to independent press associations, flourished in this period. 
Religious groups such as the Non-Conformist Association seeking religious freedom 
and political groups such as the Home Rule League pushing for autonomy and home 
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rule in Ireland became active during the 1860s. Wootton notes that ‘by the 1870s and 
1880s, (at the latest) pressure from without was being recommended in so many 
words as a mode of practical action’.18 The two major parties interacted with these 
groups especially during election times. 
1.2) Weltanschauung of the Mid-Victorian Age: Darwinism, Racism and 
Religion  
The 1860s were the heyday of the ‘Liberal Age’ economically, politically and 
ideologically. The ‘great boom’ which started in the 1850s continued in the 1860s, 
which was supplemented by laisser-faire capitalism at home and free-trade abroad, 
provided the economic basis of liberalism. However, the liberal age was not confined 
to the economic realm; science, positivism and progress were all components of the 
dominant ideology of the 1860s.
19
 Although the economic slump of 1873 brought the 
economic liberalism to an end in mid-1870s, the ideological impact survived much 
longer which, in turn, also affected the British understanding of the Ottomans.  
1850 and 1860s were also the times of great scientific discoveries, and Darwin’s 
Theory of Evolution was one of the most significant one. Darwin’s book on 
evolution, Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection  became an immediate 
success and sold all of its 1250 copies on the day of its publication on 29 November 
1859.
20
 The second edition was printed in January 1860 and was reviewed by the 
most important daily newspapers like The Times and the Daily News. Darwin’s theory 
created an immediate stir in the intellectual circles; some of the reviews of his work 
were very favourable while the others were violently hostile. Darwin influenced a 
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number of other works such as T. H. Huxley’s Evidence as to Man’s Place in Nature 
and Sir Charles Lyell’s Antiquity of Man, both published in 1863 and applied 
Darwin’s evolutionary ideas to the human race.21  
Darwin’s theory paved the way for Darwism, a biological theory which aimed to 
scientifically explain how species are formed and become extinct. For Darwin, 
various mechanisms were in play in this process, most notably the ‘natural selection’, 
alongside the ‘sexual selection’ and inheritance. The ‘natural selection’ was a 
biological concept co-co-discovered by Darwin and Albert Russell Wallace and both 
scientists were influenced from the ideas of the preeminent economist Malthus 
developed in Essay on Population (1798).
22
 Malthus argued that the organic 
population and the natural resources available to them would not rise proportionately, 
and eventually, the population will far surpass the available resources. This would 
create competition for resources which would trigger a ‘struggle for existence’, a 
selection process as a result of which some species would perish and some would 
survive. Darwin himself claimed that reading Malthus’ work was significant in the 
development of the Theory of Evolution because it contributed to the development of 
the idea of natural selection as the basis of the evolution of species.
23
  
Natural selection was a key concept in Darwinian Theory of evolution, which was 
based on the argument that each new species was produced and maintained by having 
some advantage over its competitors, and consequently, the less favoured species 
would become extinct. Darwin believed that natural selection also operated on human 
evolution, although it was attenuated in the civilized societies due to the welfare and 
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charity schemes which protected the weak.
24
  
The idea of natural selection and the struggle to survive was not exclusive to Darwin. 
Herbert Spencer invented the term ‘survival of the fittest’ in 1864 and noted that his 
term was the equivalent of Darwin’s natural selection. Darwin picked up the term and 
added it to the 1868 edition of his Origins in order to clear the confusion created 
because of the term ‘selection’.25 Darwin underlined that his usage of the term 
survival of the fittest was ‘metaphorical’ rather than literal because, in evolution, 
cooperation was as important as competition.  
The 1860s also witnessed the development of new scientific disciplines, such as 
anthropology and ethnology, two areas where the impact of Darwinism was clear. The 
Ethnological Society was formed in 1843 and was dominated by the proponents of 
monogenesis, the theory which posits that human beings are of the same origin, 
which was compatible with the theories of ‘creation’. The disagreement between the 
defenders of monogenesis and polygenesis led to a split in the Society and the 
formation of the Anthropological Society of London in 1863 by James Hunt, an 
ardent follower of the Scottish anatomist Robert Knox.  
Robert Knox is accepted as the founder of the modern scientific racism in Britain 
with his work Races of Man (1850), which claimed the superiority of the Anglo-
Saxon race over the non-white peoples.
26
 He was anti-Darwinist in thinking, which 
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was one of the main reasons behind the split.
27
 The two rival institutions merged 
under the name of the Anthropological Institute in 1871 after the death of Knox and 
Hunt.
28
 These institutions were predominantly involved in the research of the human 
race, a question that has also been tackled by Darwin in his work The Descent of Man 
(1871). 
Darwin was interested in the human evolution even before he published the Origins 
and this interest was shared by the followers of the emerging disciplines mentioned 
above. Both Darwin and other anthropologists extended Darwinist evolution to shed 
new light on the social existence of human beings. The result of this endeavour was 
the birth of a new world-view, which was broadly called as Social Darwinism..  
Social Darwinism became a ‘cluster of ideas’ about the nature of societies and the 
causes and dynamics of the social change.
29
 Social Darwinism was based on the 
application of Darwinian ideas, such as the survival of the fittest or gradual 
evolutionary change, to social field.  The interpretations of these concepts for social 
life varied greatly, and as a result, Social Darwinism emerged not as a singular 
political project or theory but as a world view influencing different ideologies and 
political projects. 
Although Social Darwinist projects varied, certain common elements linked them to 
each other. Hawkins notes that ‘scientific materialism, the rejection of supernatural 
forces in natural explanation’ were among the common traits of this world view. One 
particular Social Darwinist view, which was also shared by Darwin, reinforced the 
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views of Anglo-Saxon superiority over the ‘uncivilized’ nations.30 Between the 
Origins and Descent during the 1860s, a number of other social theorists across 
Europe applied Darwin’s theory to social life, which contributed to the emergence of 
Social Darwinism as a Western idea.  
One important interpretation of Social Darwinism during 1860s and 1870s were ideas 
on the racial and class superiority, which was based on the idea of the survival of the 
fittest. Darwin’s own writings on social issues demonstrated the application of 
evolutionary ideas on society. Darwin commented on the Balkan Crisis through the 
lenses of the ‘natural selection’:   
‘Remember what risk the nations of Europe ran not so many centuries 
ago of being overwhelmed by the Turks, and how ridiculous such an 
idea now is! The more civilized so-called Caucasian races have 
beaten the Turkish hollow in the struggle for existence. Looking to the 
world at no very distant date, what an end-less number of the lower 
races will have been eliminated by the higher civilized races 
throughout the world.’31 
 
Darwin’s analysis of the political situation in Balkans depended on the concept of 
‘race’ and the struggle for existence between different races, which was in line with 
natural selection theory. Race as a concept was visibly on the rise in the 1850s and 
1860s Britain and two important British men, Darwin and Walter Bagehot, were the 
main influences behind the rise of ‘racial’ thinking.32  
Definition of ‘race’ varied in the 19th century. In Darwin’s usage the ‘Turk’ appeared 
as a race alongside ‘Caucasian races’ of the Balkans which is puzzling for a 21st 
century reader where the differences between the terms ‘nation’, ‘ethnicity’ and ‘race’ 
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are clear. In the early 19
th
 century, race used to define ‘any group whom one wished 
to examine’ and this tradition partly continued in the mid-19th century. 33 
The meaning of race and racism began to transform in mid-19
th
 century because of 
the works of the scientists interested in the subject.
34
 This new scientific racism 
catalogued the races and believed that size of the brain, which was understood by 
measuring the skull, differed between races.
35
 These ideas had been developing in 
Britain in the 1850s; ‘scientific racism’ had emerged in Robert Knox’s work before 
the Origins was published.
36
 Knox was not the only anthropologist who developed 
the modern scientific racism, many other authors made similar arguments. At the end 
of 1860s, racial determinism and anthropology became intertwined, demonstrating 
the rise of scientific racism in Victorian thinking.
37
  
The rise of the racial thought in the mid-19
th
 century was not only due to the march of 
science; missionaries played their part too.
38
 In many missionary reports, the cultural 
and spiritual inferiority of the Africans against the White Europeans was asserted, 
which ran contrary to the earlier 19
th
 century ‘humanitarian’ views of Christian 
missionaries. The swing from humanitarian egalitarianism to racism in religious 
thinking further demonstrates the prevalence of racial thinking in the 1850s and 
1860s.
39
 
Darwin’s evolutionary theory connected with the existing ideas on racism. By the 
1870s, there was a consensus in the West on the existence of fixed, heritable and 
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unequal race groups and the supremacy of the White-European races over the others. 
Darwin reinforced these views in the Descent by claiming that the blacks were the 
lowest race while the Caucasian race was the most advanced and ‘civilized’ race.40  
Although secularism under the influence of science was on the rise, the British 
society was still a religious society in the 1850s.
41
 Secularism was one of the currents 
in Britain and there were counter-currents such as the rise of Evangelicalism, in the 
form missionary activities, and inclusion of Catholicism in British public life in the 
same period.
42
 Evangelicalism bridged the Nonconformists and the Anglicans and 
created a new moral appeal for the British population as well as fuelling the 
missionary activity in the colonies and beyond. Some of the most influential mid-
Victorian politicians such as Gladstone was influenced from evangelical moralism 
and combined it with political liberalism which in turn influenced the whole liberal 
movement.
43
 The mixture of liberal notion of progress and evangelicalist sense of 
duty resulted in a new articulation where progress became a Christian duty to 
improve society. According to van der Veer, this new mixture of liberal and 
evangelical ideas led to a general emphasis on the moral character of the English 
people and their duty to lead the world.
44
  
Relations between Protestantism and Catholicism, an important issue that shaped the 
Anglo-Ottoman relations in the early modern times, continued to influence the 19
th
 
century society. The Catholic emancipation of 1829 had a positive effect in repairing 
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the Protestant-Catholic relations. The patriotism of the Crimean War period had a 
religious undertone as the War was justified at home by being a ‘Just War’, to protect 
a vulnerable ally from the aggressor.
45
 Therefore, the British support of a Muslim 
power alongside a Catholic power against another Christian power was partly 
justified with a moral-religious discourse. The Crimean War demonstrated that, in 
mid-century, religion still played a central role in articulating the British national 
consciousness and sense of duty abroad.
46
  
1.3) Economy and rise of the City in Anglo-Ottoman Relations  
In the mid-19
th
 century, Britain experienced a period of rapid progress, broadly 
named the ‘second industrial revolution’ with the invention of the railways and 
telegraph.
47
 In the 1860s, compared to its European rivals, Britain was the most 
industrialised country at the zenith of its economic dominance; two thirds of world’s 
coal, and half of the iron and cotton, were produced in Britain.
48
 Moreover, Britain 
was already an open-economy, its foreign trade was more than the combination of 
France, Germany and Italy and it was four times more than the United States.
49
  
British trade with the Ottoman Empire continued to expand, especially after the Free-
Trade Convention signed between the two states in 1838.  Increased volume in the 
Anglo-Ottoman trade coincided with the general expansion in the British foreign 
trade in the 1850-1870 period, and the Ottoman market became an important importer 
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of British cotton textiles.
50
 However, the main determinant of the economic relations 
between the two states in the 1850-1870 period was not the commodity trade, it was 
the emerging British financial capital.
51
 
 
The need for external financing in the Ottoman Empire began during the Crimean 
War, in order to overcome the burden of the war.
52
 Foreign debts of the Empire rose 
rapidly in the next 20 years until 1876 when the Ottoman Empire declared its 
bankruptcy; Britain was among the main creditors of the Empire during this period. 
The chief financial institution in the Ottoman Empire was the Imperial Ottoman Bank 
which was established in 1856 in London and which became the ‘most visible 
manifestation of extension abroad of the new financial instruments developed in 
Britain’.53 
 
British credit to the Ottoman Empire was issued by the City, which emerged as a new 
actor affecting the British views on the Ottomans alongside the traditional 
commercial and strategic interests of the merchants and the political elite. The City’s 
influence was demonstrated after the financial collapse of the Ottomans in 1876, 
when the creditors vehemently protested the Ottoman administration and visibly 
turned against it.
54
 Thus, the nature of the economic relations was reshaped in the 
mid-19
th
 century, where the financial capital gained more influence and importance.  
1.4) The Rise of the Press 
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The British press was also under transformations which were characterised by the 
increased circulation and readership of the newspapers and periodicals, the technical 
developments in printing which reduced the cost in publishing and the ‘liberalisation’ 
of the press with the abolition of the taxes which resulted in the emergence of the 
cheap, mass newspapers.
55
 
First of the important transformations in British press in the 1860s was the 
technological shift in the newspaper industry. Innovations such as the rotary press, 
which was invented in late 1860s, enabled newspapers to press large number of 
copies quickly. The developments in the telegraphic technology, due to the opening of 
sub-oceanic cables to connect Britain with USA and India respectively in 1865 and 
1869, increased the communication speed between continents and enabled the 
newspapers to quickly inform the British public about foreign news.
56
  
The second important transformation was the increase in literacy in Britain, which 
improved gradually in the 19
th
 century.
57
 Vincent estimates that the literacy rate in the 
1840s and 1850s was around 52% ; however, if the ‘collective literacy’ in families, 
where a literate member of the family read the papers aloud to the illiterate members, 
was taken into account, 82% of the population had access to newspapers.
58
 Lee 
estimates the literacy rate in 1850 as 61%, in 1868 as 76% and in 1888 as 97% and 
adds that the disparity between female and male literacy was eradicated by 1898.
59
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The third important transformation was the abolition of the ‘taxes on knowledge’. 
The advertising duty was abolished in 1853, the stamp duty in 1855 and the paper 
duty in 1861, which enabled the newspapers to lower their prices to 1p or even to 
1/2p. In terms of circulation, the impact of the abolition of taxation became 
particularly significant after the 1870s due to the advent of the ‘penny press’ in the 
late 1860s.
60
 In addition, the invention of the telegraph, the usage of railways for 
distributing newspapers and technological developments in paper production steadily 
drove the operational costs down in the 1860s and 1870s.
61
 As a result, the number of 
daily papers rose from 32 (London and the provinces each had 16) to 150 between 
1850 and 1880.
62
   
As a result of these changes, the newspaper circulations rose sharply in the 19
th
 
century, especially after the 1860s. Although the circulation figures are an inadequate 
measure of the readership of the newspapers, they point out to the fact that the 
consumption of newspapers had progressively changed from the 1850s onwards and 
newspapers had become a household product, especially for the middle-classes.
63
 
There was a move from ‘communal ownership of newspapers’, which was the norm 
before the mid-century, to personal ownership, which became the norm at the end of 
the century.
64
 Moreover the illiterate people had the chance to listen to the 
newspapers in the reading clubs, where newspapers were read aloud. 
The second impact of these transformations was the ‘liberalisation’ of the 
newspapers, which developed as a chain reaction: ‘lower prices, increased sales and 
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the development of new print technology to service an expanding market.’65 On one 
hand, the British press became much less dependent on the state and thus was not 
subject to state censorship, unlike the French or the Ottoman press. On the other 
hand, they became completely dependent on sales and advertising revenue to survive, 
and hence became more reliant on the advertisers and owners.  Costs of starting a 
newspaper in the 1870s were 7 times higher than 1855, particularly because of the 
high cost of modern print machinery, which was a reason in the fall of ‘independent’ 
press i.
66
  
The final important change in the British press was the rise of the political press in 
Britain. Parallel to the transformation of the party system in Britain in the mid-19
th
 
century, the new dailies which emerged in the 1860s and after were affiliated to either 
the Liberals or Conservatives.
67
 In this way, the press contributed to the 
transformation of the British political parties to mass movements. A significant 
number of the daily pennies which emerged after 1860 were pro-Liberal, the national 
Daily News, one of the main newspapers which influenced the Bulgarian Atrocities 
Agitation, was among them.
68
  
Prior to the abolition of taxation in 1855, The Times was the undisputed leader of 
British journalism, the most popular paper both in London and the provinces.
69
 The 
circulation of the paper, which was around 30,000 per day in 1847, increased to 
50,000 in the 1850s. Following the reduction of the price to 3d. the paper reached an 
average circulation of 65,000 by 1867.
70
 However, although the paper increased its 
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circulation in the 1860s, it lost its dominant position in the British press; it faced 
increasing competition from the Telegraph and the Daily News on the national level. 
Furthermore, the rise of independent provincial press diminished the impact of The 
Times in the country.  
During the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71, three newspapers fiercely competed with 
each other. The Telegraph’s circulation hit 190,000, the Daily News sold 150,000 
copies and The Times sold around 70,000.
71
 Although these figures increased due to 
the public interest in the War, they nonetheless demonstrate that The Times was no 
longer the only important newspaper in Britain by the 1870s. 
During the 1860s and 1870s The Times, represented the mainstream media and thus 
will be analysed in all three case studies as one of the main sources. The Daily News, 
which was a minor newspaper for most of the 1860s, will also be analysed in all case 
studies, mainly because of the central role it played during the Bulgarian Atrocities 
Agitation. These two papers were also among the most circulated papers during the 
Agitation period. 
2.) Ottoman Empire in the Middle of the 19
th
 Century 
2.1) Tanzimat and the Ottoman Reforms 
The efforts to modernise the Ottoman state institutions began at the end of the18
th
 
century during Selim III’s reign (1789-1807), specifically in the military realm. The 
Ottoman Empire struggled in its military campaigns at the end of the 18
th
 century as 
the traditional Ottoman military institutions' obsolescence in the face of superior 
European armies became more evident. Disastrous military performance of the 
Ottoman army against Catherine II’s Russian army in Russo-Ottoman War of 1787-92 
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and Napoleon’s quick successes in his Egyptian expedition in 1798 persuaded the 
young Ottoman Sultan Selim III to adopt a series of institutional reforms to 
modernise the Ottoman army and state. Selim’s reforms was cut short with a military 
rebellion of the ‘old guard’, janissary corps, against his reforms in the capital which 
led to his deposition in 1807. 
Selim III’s successor Mahmud II (1808-1839) also carried out reforms in military, 
medicine and economy to modernise the Ottoman institutions. Mahmoud eventually 
managed to dismantle the janissary corps in 1826 and then embarked on a more 
extensive reform program. However, his reign was undermined with the rise of 
Mehmed Ali, the Ottoman governor of Egypt who rebelled against the Ottoman army 
and defeated it twice in 1830s.
72At the time of Mahmoud’s death in 1839, the 
Ottoman Empire was in a precarious position due to the Egyptian Question.
73
  
This troubled situation triggered the need to find a strong Western ally to fend off the 
military threat to the Empire’s territorial integrity as well as to modernise the 
Ottoman institutions as a whole to strengthen the central state. The Tanzimat which 
meant ‘organisation’ in the Ottoman language was born in this context as a systematic 
effort to apply far-reaching reforms in the Ottoman Empire’s state institutions and its 
social structure.  
Tanzimat period started with the ascendance of Abdulmejid to the throne in 1839 after 
the death of Mahmud II. The new sultan, who was only 18, appointed to a group of 
experienced statesman including Reshid, who became the initiator of the reforms in 
the Ottoman Empire. Reshid was responsible for foreign relations; he was the 
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Ottoman Ambassador in Paris and London during the 1830s where he experienced the 
workings of the European diplomacy, especially over the Egyptian Question. 
Moreover, the Sultan saw Reshid as the ideal candidate in forming an alliance with 
Britain because of his close personal relationship with Palmerston.
74
  
On November 3, 1839, the Foreign Minister Reshid Pasha read an imperial decree 
which promised wide ranging reforms in various aspects of social life in the Ottoman 
Empire. Reshid was the chief architect of the Edict and the Tanzimat reforms that 
followed it.  Although the reforms were domestic in nature, Reshid aimed to use them 
as a propeller to elevate the status of the Ottoman Empire to a member of the 
European Concert.
75
 
The Tanzimat reforms were far-reaching and aimed to transform the ancient 
institutions of the Ottoman Empire, including military, taxation, legal structure, 
administrative system.
76
 The aim of the Tanzimat reforms was to create a new type of 
social model for the Ottoman citizens, by establishing Christian – Muslim equality in 
society rather than the hegemonic domination of the latter over the former. Above all, 
they aimed to create a new and coherent society united together by a common bond of 
'Ottomanism'. In order to achieve this, another imperial edict promising to establish 
equality between religious groups was proclaimed in 1856, prior to the Paris Peace 
Conference which ended the Crimean War. These reforms continued in the 1860s, and 
culminated with the Ottoman citizenship law (1869), which declared the Ottoman 
subjects as equal citizens before the law.  
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The Tanzimat era witnessed the change in the balance of power between the Sultan, 
religious clerics (ulema) and the Porte, the Ottoman bureaucracy. Reshid and his 
followers, especially Ali and Fuad Pashas, rose to prominence during the reform 
period as the authoritarian reformists. They hoped that the new Ottoman values, 
which embodied equality before law and the introduction of a new and fairer taxation, 
would bring vastly different social, religious, ethnic groups of the Empire together 
and reinvigorate the state. 
They were also skilful diplomats. It was mostly due to these men that the Ottomans 
established themselves as a member of the European concert in the mid-19
th
 century; 
securing an alliance with the French and British in the Crimean War was their finest 
diplomatic point. The cordial Anglo-Ottoman relations during the 1860s was also 
partly due their diplomatic skills; Ali and Fuad continued to replace one another as a 
Grand Vizier or Foreign Minister until the death of Fuad in 1869 and Ali in 1871. 
Death of the two prominent statesmen rekindled a bitter power struggle in the 1870s, 
between the Sultan Abdulaziz and the Porte. Ironically, the dethronement of 
Abdulaziz and the promulgation of the first Ottoman constitution in 1876 ended the 
Tanzimat statesmen’s hold on power. The new Sultan, Abdulhamid II, both 
promulgated and annulled the constitution within a year and established his personal 
rule after 1877.  
The Tanzimat reforms caused significant consequences for the Ottoman Empire and 
some of these were not in the direction hoped for by their instigators. In some cases, 
such as taxation, an effective reform proved impossible to implement, in some other 
cases such as the abolition of slavery created serious backlash in certain parts of the 
Empire where slave trade was the most important commercial activity.  
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The Tanzimat reforms provoked different and mostly hostile reactions from the 
various social, religious and ethnic groups of the Ottoman society. In the Ottoman 
centre, the religious clerics of all religions, particularly the Muslims and Orthodox 
Christians, were hostile to reform,. The reforms continued Constantinople’s earlier 
attempts to modernise the state through centralisation and bureaucratisation, which 
created further backlash in the provinces. For example, in Lebanon and Syria, which 
would be analysed in the subsequent chapter, the immediate impact of the reforms 
was the reinforcement of the sectarian fragmentation on the one hand and emergence 
of political demands, such as 'liberty from tyranny', 'fiscal equality for peasants', on 
the other.  
The role of Britain in the Tanzimat reforms is debated in the literature. The earlier 
British articles attributed a key role to Palmerston, Stratford Canning and the British 
Foreign Office in drawing and implementing the reform programme.
77
 Later Turkish 
historiography, on the other hand, underlined the authenticity of the Ottoman 
reforms.
78
 Both claims hold certain truth; the Ottoman reformation occurred during a 
period when the Anglo-Ottoman relations were at the peak and thus Britain was in a 
favourable position to exert influence on the Ottoman Empire.  
The British position from 1830s to 1860s was to provide encouragement and support 
in the making of reforms in the Ottoman Empire, which were seen as the cornerstone 
in the preserving the territorial integrity of the Empire.  Palmerston noted that the 
British power in maintaining the Ottoman Empire depended on the ‘public opinion in 
Britain’, which would not support government’s pro-Ottoman policy unless the 
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Ottoman government exerted itself to make reforms.
79
 In this way, the Tanzimat 
reforms served both the Porte, who wanted to elevate the Ottomans into the European 
Concert, and the British government, who wanted to preserve the Ottoman territorial 
integrity for as long as possible.  
3.) Conclusion  
The transformations in mid-Victorian Britain was both fast and vast, as explained in 
this chapter. From the Ottoman perspective, the post-Crimean War period brought 
landmark changes. The death of Palmerston, increased influence of the press in 
politics, and the gradual democratisation of the politics which made popular opinion 
more important were among the most important changes that influenced the Anglo-
Ottoman relations and the British perceptions on the Ottomans. Although these more 
‘material’ transformations are important to understand the context for the 
development of British perceptions, the ideational changes hold an equally important 
position.  
The case studies following this chapter explores in depth the usage of important 
concepts such as ‘race’ and ‘religion’ in the way the British related to the Ottomans. 
The literature, as explained in this chapter, argues that racism and belief on Anglo-
Saxon/European supremacy was on the rise in 1860s and 1870s; the case analyses 
aims to test these beliefs in the Ottoman context and aims to analyse the impact of 
this ‘new thinking’ of the mid-Victorian Britain vis-à-vis the Ottoman society. 
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1.) The Lebanon Crisis of 1860 
1.1) Historical Background 
The Ottomans took control of the region in the beginning of the 16
th
 century and 
imposed an indirect control on the region until the 19
th
 century through local feudal 
lords called ‘emirs’. The last of the emirs was Bashir Shihbab II, a Maronite 
Christian, who ruled the region from 1788 to 1840.  His era was turbulent, marred 
with wars for Mount Lebanon, and following his fall, the ancient order of Mount 
Lebanon officially ended.  
In the 19
th
 century, a series of events led to the end of the indirect Ottoman order in 
Mount Lebanon. The first of these was Napoleon’s expedition to the Middle East in 
1798-1801, in which he succeeded to invade Egypt and his army’s march was halted 
by the Ottomans at Acre, a town which is close to the border between modern Israel 
and Lebanon.
 1
 The most important result of Napoleon’s conquest of Egypt was the 
rise of Mehmed Ali, the Ottoman viceroy of Egypt from 1805 to 1849, who 
substantially altered the power relations in the Middle East until his military defeat in 
1840 at the hands of British and Habsburg forces.
 2
 
Mehmed Ali's army invaded Mount Lebanon in 1831 and controlled the region until 
1840, and his era was marked by relentless modernizing reforms which unsettled the 
old order and social relations in the region. The most direct consequence of these 
reforms on social relations was the emergence of sectarianism; with the demise of the 
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local nobility, religious identity became dominant social force.
3
 Moreover, during 
Mehmed Ali period, different religious groups separated in their allegiance between 
the Sultan and Mehmed Ali. Druzes preferred to stay loyal to the Sultan whereas 
Sunni Muslim leader Bashir and Maronites cooperated with the Egyptians. 
Landowning Druzes and Maronite peasants clashed in 1841 and 1845 due to 
economic reasons such as high taxation. However, different from the previous 
agrarian uprisings, religion also played a role in these clashes.
4
  
In 1860 Mount Lebanon was an autonomous region under Ottoman control and 
covered much of the area which is today a part of modern Lebanon. The region was 
populated by Arabs of various religious beliefs; the Maronite Christians, a Middle 
Eastern Christian Church, Druzes; a religious community emerged from Islam, Shi’a 
and Sunni Muslims and Greek Orthodoxs.
5
  
1.2) Run Up to the Civil War  
Sectarianism in Mount Lebanon emerged as a result of two important developments 
during the 1850s. The first of these was the Tanzimat reforms, which sought equality 
in representation, taxation, military service and social status between the Muslims and 
the non-Muslims of the Empire. After Tanzimat, the political identity of social groups 
was defined predominantly by their religious affiliations.  
The second development was the ‘Western penetration’ into the region. Before the 
19
th
 century, Mount Lebanon’s agricultural products was sold in the domestic market, 
particularly Damascus. From the 1840s onwards, Mount Lebanon’s main economic 
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product, silk, started to be exported to European markets which consequently made 
Lebanon more vulnerable to the economic cycles of Western capitalism. The boom of 
the early 1850s brought prosperity, the recession which started after 1857 resulted in 
significant commercial losses for both the merchants and landowners. Moreover, 
trade with the West led to unequal development in prosperity; the Christian merchants 
benefited more from the rising trade due to ‘Capitulation’ system, concessionary 
agreements signed between European states and the Ottoman Empire which provided 
significant privileges, such as low tariffs and tax exemptions, to foreign merchants.
6
 
Many Ottoman Christians acquired protectorates through the European consuls which 
placed them in a favourable position in Western trade.
7
  This process in the end 
reversed the classical economic positions in the region, in which the Muslim 
landowning and merchant classes were economically superior.
8
  
The final important development was the extension of the Great Power diplomacy to 
the region. Each religious group was aligned with a different Great Power, which 
further complicated the political situation in Lebanon. The Maronites established 
cordial relations with the French, as they were perceived as suitable to become French 
agents in Lebanon. The Druzes were backed by the British, the Orthodox by Russians 
and Sunni Muslims by the Porte. These lines were defined by religion; the French 
were the protectors of the Catholics and the Russians of Orthodoxs in the Ottoman 
Empire, and the Sunni Islam was the Ottoman state’s official interpretation of Islam.   
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1.3) The Civil War 
The 1850s were an anarchic decade for Lebanon, which resulted in increased banditry 
and petty crime. Looting by bandits of one religious sect against the other were the 
starting point of the civil war. Murders and revenge murders further escalated the 
tensions. At the end of May 1860, bandit warfare turned into a full-blown inter-
religious warfare between the Maronites on one side and the Druzes and Muslims on 
the other.
9
 
 
The Lebanese Civil War mainly happened in the mountainous areas; the major coastal 
towns were spared from violence. The Ottoman forces were either ineffective or 
collaborated with the Druzes against the Christians. The difficulty with the Ottoman 
forces were twofold; the Ottoman army was a Muslim army and found it difficult to 
fight against other Muslims, and the Ottoman authority in Mount Lebanon was too 
weak to be effective in a full scale civil war. Following the destruction of their towns 
and villages in the mountains, the Christians fled to the coastal towns of Lebanon 
where they were protected by the European warships. 
 
Spilling over of sectarian war to Palestine and Syria was avoided except the key city 
of the Syrian region, Damascus, which had an overwhelmingly Muslim population 
living together with Christian minority. News about the hostilities reached Damascus 
quickly, and tensions between the Muslims and the Christians rose considerably due 
to the hearsay and gossips about the Civil War. A Muslim mob started a riot in the city 
on July 9 1860, attacking almost all of the foreign consulates except the British and 
Prussian. The Christian shops was attacked on the second day and civilian population 
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For a detailed narrative of the War, See L.T Fawaz, An Occasion for War: Civil Conflict in Lebanon 
and Damascus in 1860, University California Press, 1994.  
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on the third day. In Damascus, the riots ceased again mainly due to the efforts of a 
number of Muslim notables who protected the Christian civilians and intervened to 
disperse the mob.  
 
The Lebanese Civil War and the Damascus attacks occurred for similar reasons; the 
emergence of sectarian political identities as a result of modernisation of the social 
order, raising income gap between the Muslims and the Christians favouring the latter 
and in the Damascus case, contempt towards certain European Powers.   
1.4) International Response 
The news about the Lebanese Civil War reached Constantinople in early June, and the 
Porte, fearful of a European intervention to Syria, decided to despatch one of the top 
Ottoman officials, Fuad Pasha, equipped with 15,000 troops to the region in July 
1860.
 10
 Fuad Pasha reached Beirut on 17 July and established a heavy-handed rule by 
swiftly punishing hundreds of mostly Muslim rioters, by issuing death penalties. Fuad 
Pasha and his men stayed in Syria until June 1861 with the aim of not only 
suppressing the riots, but also rebuilding the region and punishing the rioters. In this 
way, the Sultan aimed to counter a European intervention that might undercut the 
Ottoman power in Syria.  
 
The news of the Civil War and Damascus massacres reached European capitals in 
mid-June. Napoleon III was the most eager European leader to intervene hoping to 
increase French influence in the Middle East and consolidate Christian support at 
home with a humanitarian intervention on behalf of the Lebanese Christians. France 
decided to send a European expedition force to Syria in order to protect the Christians 
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and help the Ottomans establish order on 20 July 1860. Britain initially responded 
coldly to this offer as Palmerston was in favour of a non-interventionist policy. 
However, under the threat of a single-handed French humanitarian intervention, they 
accepted with some reluctance to join a conference in Paris to discuss the possibility 
of a joint European action on 25 July. The European Powers agreed on the despatch 
of a small expeditionary force of 12,000 men, which in the end was reduced to 6,000, 
and consisted only of French soldiers, to be send in a 6 months long mission.  
 
The expedition sailed on August 1860 from Marseille to Syria and stayed until June 
1861. The expedition's mission conflicted with Fuad Pasha's mission as both had 
exactly the same aims, most of them already accomplished by Fuad Pasha before the 
French expedition arrived.
11
 Fuad Pasha had succeeded in his aim of limiting the 
influence of the French expedition and re-organizing the region. Mount Lebanon was 
given a privileged administrative status: the governor would be a non-Lebanese 
Ottoman Christian chosen by the Porte and approved by European Powers and he 
would supervise an administrative council filled by the members of local 
communities. This new system proved long lasting and stayed in place until the end 
of the Ottoman rule in Lebanon and Syria at the end of  World War I. 
2.) British Debates of the Lebanon Crisis 
News about the Civil War in Lebanon reached Britain on June 1860 mainly through 
reports in The Times, which were reproduced by other newspapers around the country. 
Parliamentary debates followed the publication of these reports in the newspapers and 
took place during the July and August 1860 sessions.  
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British interest in the Lebanon Crisis was limited; and this was due to two factors. 
First of all, the Crisis was a ‘minor’ one for European diplomacy and this was partly 
because of its timing; the Civil War broke out only 4 years after the Crimean War 
(1853-1856) ended. The Russian and French Empire, the two powers who had 
genuine interests in the Near East, had yet to recover from the Crimean War and had 
no appetite for a new conflict. Secondly, the Crisis in this remote part of the Ottoman 
Empire was not a concern for British press, who played no role in creating a strong 
public opinion on the Crisis.  
 
The debates on the Civil War demonstrated the various interpretations in Britain on 
the Ottoman society. The official interpretation of the War and the Ottoman society in 
general was in continuity with the earlier decades, which focused on the preservation 
of the Ottoman state in the Near East for British interests. This discourse was 
contested by a second discourse, the sick-man discourse, which emerged at the 
‘popular’ level, in the newspapers, traveller accounts and the Parliament.  
 
British perceptions of the Lebanese Civil War was shaped by these two discourses; 
each placed the blame of the War on different parties and offered a different 
diplomatic policy for Britain to follow in the East.  
2.1) The Emergence of the Sick-Man Discourse 
The debates on the Lebanese Civil War reveals the construction of various 
perceptions on the Turks, Muslims, Ottoman Empire and the Lebanese locals. The 
debates analysed the causes of the Civil War and placed the blame on various parties; 
the Ottoman administration, the local Lebanese population or the Muslim residents 
were among the ones that shared the blame for the Civil War.  
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The first of these discourses was named the ‘sick-man discourse’, which articulated a 
negative image of the ‘Turks’, Muslims and the Ottoman Empire. The term ‘sick-
man’ was coined by Tsar Nicholas in 1853, who said to the British envoy Sir George 
Hamilton Seymour that the Ottoman Empire was a ‘sick-man –a very sick-man’.12 
From that point onward, the term sick-man became the main signifier of the Ottoman 
Empire in the literature and its impact is even felt in the contemporary world; the 
current Prime Minister of Turkey noted in his inaugural speech on 27 August 2014 
that his Party has transformed a nation which was once called as the ‘sick-man’.13 
Equating the Ottoman Empire to a deadly sick patient captured the spirit of the first 
discourse which defined the ‘Ottomans’ in a negative and inferior way.  
The Civil War was explained in different ways and each of these distinct explanations 
singled out one group as the main reason behind the War. The discourses emerged 
during this explanation process and constructed the identity of a group on the way.   
2.1.1) The Perceptions on the ‘Muslim’ 
British news reports identified religion as one of the main reasons of the Civil War 
and articulated a perception of the Ottoman ‘Muslim’. The first report from Syria 
appeared on 6 July 1860 in The Times, which explained the events through a Muslim 
vs. Christian dichotomy where the former appeared as the ‘oppressor’ and the latter 
as the ‘victim’. This dichotomy not only presented the Eastern Christians as the pure 
‘victim’ of the Civil War but also as the victims of the Muslim Ottoman rule in Near 
East.  
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 D. Livanios, The Sick-man Paradox: History, Rhetoric and the ‘European Character’ of Turkey, 
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Eastern Question, 1774-1923, 1996, pp. 96-103.  
13
 AKP’nin Yeni Baskani Ahmet Davutoglu [Ahmet Davutoglu is the new head of AKP], Milliyet, 28 
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The news reports sent by the correspondents focused on the violence perpetrated 
against the Christians
 
who ‘being taken unawares, were massacred’ by the Muslims; 
plenty of reports
 
centred on the destruction of the Christian villages and noted the 
injuries inflicted on women and children.
 14
 In one example, The Times reported that 
‘
all villages belonging to Christians had been pillaged and burnt, and
 
women 
violated... men women, children were slaughtered.
’15 
This was a typical news report 
on the Civil War which used the image of ‘slaughtered children and women’  to 
underline the innocence of the victimhood of the Christians in comparison to the 
limitless brutality of the perpetrators.  
The Muslims were blamed for the outbreak of the atrocities, and as a result of this, 
they were defined as ‘semi-barbarians’ whose ‘bloody fanaticism’ against the 
Christians deserved ‘the full weight of a swift and adequate retribution’ by the 
Christian West.
 16
  The victimisation of the Christians reproduced an older view on the 
Ottomans which perceived the ‘Muslim’ Ottoman Empire as the traditional adversary 
of European Christianity. Examples of this logic was not confined to newspaper 
reports; it was also a common theme in traveller accounts.
17
 The Lebanese Civil War 
was contextualised as an example of the ancient Muslim hostility against the 
Christians. 
The victimisation of Christians was effective in concealing the complex nature of the 
Crisis. In this context, the Lebanese Civil War emerged as a purely religious/cultural 
conflict devoid of any economic and social cause. Reports underlined that ‘not only 
Druzes who are working out … the extirpation of Christianity in Syria; but ‘Moslems, 
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 Syria and Palestine, The Times, 11 July 1860, p.5. 
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 The Civil War in Syria, The Times, 9 July 1860, p. 10.  
16 
Ibid. 
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immediately after the massacres.  
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Bedouins, Kurds, Africans’ and … regular troops’ were also taking part in the 
massacres against the Christians.
 18
 In this way, the Civil War was presented as a 
religious warfare between the Christians on one hand and Muslims on the other.
 
 
As noted in the Introduction, discourses are constructed through the reduction of 
possible meanings in a differential process. Throughout the debates on the Lebanese 
Civil War, the Muslim identity was reduced to being a war-mongering, semi-barbaric 
identity which aimed to exterminate Christianity in the East. The traveller accounts 
on the Civil War were particularly more vocal about this point. There were two major 
works written on the Civil War; one was James Lewis Farley’s, The Massacres of 
Syria, published in London in 1861, and the other was written by Charles Henry-
Spencer Churchill, The Druzes and the Maronites under Turkish Rule 1840-1860, 
which was published in 1862.
19 
Among the two, it was Churchill who argued that 
Islam and Christianity were incompatible and thus ‘can only exist together in the 
mutual relation of the conquering and the conquered.’20  
Although this view was an extreme example in the 1860s, numerous authors 
propagated that Britain should not cooperate with the Ottoman Empire due to their 
religious difference: ‘I … hope that my letter may do its share towards causing 
England to see the lives she is sacrificing to uphold a Moslem power.’21 There were 
many anonymous letters sent to The Times protesting against the European apathy in 
the face of this ‘Muslim hostility’ against the Christian co-religionists. One 
anonymous author noted that ‘[T]he Christian governments of Europe must not be 
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content to witness the extermination of their brethren in Lebanon’22 and called the 
European powers to act: ‘Christian powers have issued stringent instructions to put a 
stop to these horrible deeds of rapine, dishonour and blood.’23 Contextualising the 
Civil War as a ‘Muslim attack’ on the Christians was popular especially in the press.  
2.1.2) The Druzes and the Maronites  
The Civil War was a Lebanese event and naturally the British debates on the War 
constructed a view for the local Lebanese people. The two main religious groups, the 
Druzes and the Maronites, and their responsibility on the crimes committed in the 
Civil War were discussed frequently by the MPs in Parliament.  
Parliamentary debates on the Civil War cross-cut the party differences; MPs from 
both parties singled out similar explanations for the Lebanese Civil War. This was 
mainly due to the fact that the two-party system with clear cut differences and strong 
party rivalry was not yet fully established in 1860. The majority of the speakers in 
this question were from the ranks of the ruling Liberal Party, and most of them had 
been in the Ottoman Empire with a formal appointment as holders of diplomatic or 
military posts in the past.  
The second common way of explaining the cause of the Civil War in Parliament was 
that it was because of the ‘long-established animosity between the hostile parties.’24 
Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, the former British Ambassador to the Porte, an important 
and influential figure in the Ottoman affairs and a Liberal member of the House of 
Lords, argued that Mount Lebanon was ‘inhabited by tribes of very imperfect 
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civilization, who are more separated from each other by religious animosities.’25 
Stratford was acknowledged as an authority on the Ottoman Empire, and his words 
influenced the development of the debates in both the House of Commons and Lords.  
Although Druzes and Maronites had lived in peace for centuries, they were deemed as 
being ‘more exposed to violent collisions than even the inhabitants of other parts of 
Turkey’26 due to the perception that they were ‘two races of half-savage and bigoted 
mountaineers’. 27 MPs such as James Fergusson, a conservative member of the House 
of Lords and a retired military officer who had fought in the Crimean War, noted that 
the main reason of the conflict was ‘originated in an irreconcilable quarrel between 
antagonistic races, and … religion had in fact had very little to do with them’.28 
Similarly, the speakers for the Cabinet, the Prime Minister Viscount Palmerston and 
the Foreign Secretary Lord John Russell, supported the view that the ‘Druzes and the 
Maronite Christians have long been divided by sentiments of deep-seated hostility’29 
and ‘these deplorable animosities of race between the Druzes and the Maronites have 
burst out’ in Lebanon as a ‘consequence of the weakness of the Turkish authority in 
Syria’.30 
These examples demonstrated that the category of ‘race’ was used, particularly in 
order to define the Druzes and the Maronites, two religious groups belonging to the 
same ethnicity (Arab). Identifying these groups as ‘separate races’ aimed to give a 
more ‘exotic’ identity, as they were imagined as pre-modern, tribal people in Britain. 
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Moreover, it also underlined the ‘difference’ of the two groups from each other rather 
than their commonality, and thus explained the Civil War as a racial/tribal warfare.  
Furthermore, denoting the Druzes and Maronites as a race also demonstrated the 
power relations embedded in the sick-man discourse; these two groups were deemed 
as ‘barbaric, antiquated’ races who were inferior to the British/European race who 
observed and criticised them. The argument that the Civil War was a result of racial 
animosity contended that the two ‘races’ who engaged in war were ‘Asiatics’ whose 
warfare ‘did not observe the niceties of European warfare’.31 The Druzes and the 
Maronites were imagined to be savage tribes who were engaged in a continuous 
warfare to exterminate each other. The Foreign Secretary Lord Russell claimed that 
Lebanon was ‘an uncivilized country where there are two races which have been from 
time immemorial at war with each other.’32 
These explanations ignore the fact that Sunnis, Druzes and Maronites had lived for 
centuries side by side, sometimes in the same villages and in other times in 
neighbouring villages. Moreover, they had the same customs and had been ruled by 
the same feudal notables for centuries.
33
 In some cases such as the emir Shihbab’s 
case, half of a family was Sunni Muslim while the other half was Maronite 
Christian. In spite of these, British observers perceived the Maronites and Druzes as 
two ‘uncivilized’ tribes who historically aimed to exterminate each other.  
This view demonstrated the second discourse of the Civil War which was presented 
either as a result of the Muslim hatred towards the Christians or the mutual hatred of 
the two savage tribes. The socio economic developments, such as the impact of the 
modernisation on the region, were completely ignored in these discourses which 
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created an inferior and negative perception of the Muslims, Druzes and Maronites as 
‘uncivilized and backward’ people.  
Although some preferred to blame the Maronites and the Druzes equally, others 
placed the bigger blame on the Druzes. Farley, the second traveller who published on 
the War, described the Druzes as men ‘without faith and without pity’, with ‘love of 
plunder’, thirst for blood’ and a ‘criminal origin’. 34 Both Lord Stratford and Farley 
noted the ‘ferocity’ of the Druzes which for the former was ‘added to the prejudices 
of Mohammedan religion they generally profess.’35 Lord Stratford’s description of 
the Druzes demonstrated the perception that Druzes were even more barbaric and 
uncivilized than Maronites because they were peculiarly ferocious, tribal and 
Muslim. According to Lord Stratford, the Maronites acted ‘from time to time with 
little regard for humanity’ ‘in spite of their Christianity’ and, therefore, occupied a 
superior position in British eyes only in comparison to the worse behaving Druzes 
and Muslims. 
36
 
One important point to underline is the duality in the perceptions of the Maronites. In 
some cases, they were seen as ‘as barbaric as the Druzes or the Muslims’ and in some 
others they were regarded as being ‘more civilized’ than the Druzes. This duality was 
down to two factors. Some authors, especially more religiously motivated ones in the 
press, distanced themselves from the Maronites because Maronites were closer to the 
Catholic Church. Secondly, the identities of the Lebanese locals and Muslims were 
articulated in difference to the ‘Christian Europe’. The Eastern Christians were not 
perceived to be the equals of the Western Christians which demonstrated the 
centrality of the East v. West axis in the elite thinking.  
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Farley’s narrative shifted the blame from the ‘Muslims’ to the local ‘Druzes’ and 
illustrated the thinking evident also in Churchill and others who believed that the 
Civil War was because of the Muslim or Druze fanaticism. This explanation argued 
that the basis of the Civil War in Lebanon was the ‘culture’ of its people, which was 
either defined by their religion or race. The culture of the Lebanese people in both 
cases was imagined as being backward and uncivilized. For example, Lord Stratford, 
similar to Farley, also defined the Druzes and Maronites as groups possessing similar 
uncivilized characteristics such as ‘ferocity’ or ‘barbarity’. The perceptions of the 
Druzes and Maronites were constructed in a similar way to the ‘Muslim’ in being 
inferior and uncivilized and, thus, appeared as the objects of the same discourse 
articulated  
2.1.3) Perceptions on the ‘Turk’ 
In an answer to William Monsell
37
, an Irish Liberal MP who had raised a question to 
the government in the House of Commons about the massacres of the Christians in 
the Lebanese Civil War, Sir Charles Napier
38
, a former Navy commander who fought 
in Egypt, blamed the Ottoman governor in Lebanon for being ‘a regular tyrannical, 
cruel, old Turk.’39 Napier held the Ottoman government responsible for the Civil War 
as he believed that ‘the Turkish Government fomented all sorts of quarrels between 
the Druzes and the Maronites.’40 Similarly, William Monsell argued that ‘it was not 
in the nature of the Turks to govern properly’ and thus the Ottoman government 
could not be trusted to govern the region after the ‘European troops were out of the 
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country.’ 41 
The Civil War had a negative impact on the perceptions of the Ottoman government’s 
credibility in the eyes of the MPs. As noted in the earlier chapter, the perceptions of 
the ‘Turks’ oscillated between the two opposite poles, from the days of the Greek 
Revolution onwards between a clear anti-Turkish and pro-Turkish extremes, 
depending the on the political context. The Ottoman Tanzimat reforms was one of the 
elements that positively affected the perceptions of the ‘Turk’ as it was argued that the 
reforms would improve the condition of the Christians in the Ottoman Empire. The 
Civil War on the other hand, contributed to the opposite belief which argued that ‘[i]t 
was useless to attempt to bind the Turks by any laws’ and thus, the reforms would be 
futile.
 42
  
For some Liberal MPs the Civil War demonstrated that the ‘Turks’ could not govern 
successfully because ‘there was in them an ineffaceable cruelty and treachery.’43 This 
argument was similar to the ones constructed on the Druzes and Maronites, which 
branded them as uncivilized barbarians. Similar to the Lebanese locals, ‘[t]he Turks’ 
were also marked as being ‘half-civilized cunning’ whose continuing rule in Lebanon 
would only bring ‘under the name of tranquillity … merely ruin and desolation.’ 44 
There were MPs who argued that if Britain and Europe decide on the future of 
Lebanon, it would benefit the local population, as the Ottoman administration was the 
main reason for the backwardness of the region. For instance, James Fergusson noted 
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that ‘If the Turks were enabled to establish their authority in the Lebanon … there 
was great risk of its being reduced to the same state of misery as prevailed in other 
parts of Syria and to a great extent throughout the Turkish dominions.’45 
This argument was followed by other MPs and authors who noted that Lebanon, one 
of ‘the finest districts in the world’, was in a desolated state due to the rule of the 
‘Turkish Pashas’ who ‘would be glad to have the opportunity of fleecing the 
unfortunate population and enriching themselves at their expense.’46 Thus, the term 
‘Turk’ was used to denote the Ottoman elite and was blamed for the Civil War 
alongside the Muslims, Druzes and the Maronites.   
2.1.4) Perceptions on the ‘Ottoman Empire’  
The nostalgic approach to the past is a common discursive strategy, which aimed to 
reconstruct the present in a particular way, to serve a particular purpose. ‘As many 
scholars of nostalgia agree, this particular structured feeling toward the past is a 
strategy that serves the present both in terms of legitimating and legitimatising its 
parts. What makes each moment of nostalgia unique is the role it plays in relations to 
the present.’47 In explaining the Lebanese Civil War, the past which was invented as a 
glorious golden-era was Mehmed Ali’s rule in Syria in the 1830s. Although Mehmed 
Ali’s regime had complicated results for Lebanon, it was reconstructed by some in 
Britain as a golden age in order to criticise the contemporary Ottoman rule, which 
was argued to be the main reason for the Civil War.   
Literature points out that Mehmed Ali imposed an authoritarian modernisation project 
in Lebanon and Syria through disarming the locals, introducing conscription and 
                                                 
45
 HC Deb, 12 July 1860, Column 1771. 
46 
HL Deb 3 August 1860, Column 2366-7. 
47 
Ozyurek, E., Nostalgia for the Modern: State, Secularism and Everyday Politics in Turkey, Duke 
University Press, 2006, p. 31.  
120 
 
 
 
modern taxation and bringing corveé labour in newly opened mines. As a result of 
these, the antagonism in the Lebanese society was sharpened. For example, the Druze 
revolted against the conscription and requested to reinstate Ottoman rule in 1837. 
This uprising was suppressed with difficulty in 1838 by Mehmed Ali’s regime, with 
the help of the Maronite troops. In 1840, when the Ottoman Empire managed to 
secure British military support against Mehmed Ali, a new revolt united the Druzes 
and the Maronites in Lebanon and played an important role in bringing Mehmed Ali’s 
rule to an end. 
48
  
Despite this complex history of Mehmed Ali’s reign over Syria and Lebanon, 
nostalgic narrative established in Parliament glorified Mehmed Ali’s rule as an 
example of successful administration. The glorification of Mehmed Ali was partly 
because it was the only alternative to the Ottoman rule in Lebanon in contemporary 
times. The history of Lebanon before the Ottoman rule was obscure for the British, 
and Mehmed Ali’s quick victories over the Ottoman Empire in the 1830s helped to 
construct an image of a moderniser in the Middle East in contrast to the corrupt and 
backward Ottoman rule.  
For instance, William Monsell described Lebanon under Mehmed Ali’s rule as 
‘peaceable and quiet’ where ‘the roads were secure and the people comparatively 
happy’.49 Fergusson added that during Egyptian rule ‘there was tranquillity 
throughout the land, and travellers might pass wherever they liked with at least a fair 
security’.50 It was argued that all these had been changed after reinstating the Ottoman 
rule in Lebanon, which returned the country to ‘the condition of its present 
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anarchy’.51   
Constructed nostalgia was a part of the sick-man discourse that blamed the ‘Turks’ 
who ‘did everything they could to stir up rebellion in Mount Lebanon.’52 Monsell 
further added that ‘the allied Powers did a great deal’ in deterioration of Lebanon by 
supporting the Ottoman Empire against Mehmed Ali’s alleged superior rule.53 Thus, 
Britain was claimed to be ‘deeply responsible for these atrocities’ due to their 
intervention against Mehmed Ali; it was claimed that ‘under his rule these horrible 
scenes did not take place’.54  
The British decision of non-intervention during the Civil War was perceived as the 
continuation of the Crimean War alliance between the two Empires. Britain was 
branded as ‘the protector of Turkey’ without whose support ‘Turkey would not … 
[be] existing.’ 55 Marquess of Clanricarde, an Irish member of the House of Lords, 
asserted that the ‘feeble, effete [Ottoman] Government’s right to hold [the country] in 
a state of barbarism’ ‘should not to be tolerated.’ 56 For Clanricarde, the Ottoman 
administration was ‘tolerated by’ the European Powers who have the ability to change 
this situation. In some other examples, it was argued the Ottoman Empire was able to 
survive because of the British support which protects it from its enemies and thus a 
change in British Eastern policy is necessary to stop the extermination of the 
Christians:   
The Turks, with their half-civilized cunning, believe that … we shall 
protect them from France and Russia' and certain it is that, unless we 
act with decision, and put a stop to their fanaticism, we shall ere 
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long see a succession of outbreaks against Christians...
57 
 
 
The foreign policy in this case emerged as the ‘practical’, non-discursive aspect of the 
sick-man discourse; there were ideas circulating in the press and Parliament against 
the contemporary passive support of Britain to the Ottoman Empire. Some authors 
called Britain or the ‘Christian nations to take counsel as to the future of this... land 
[Ottoman Empire] in a way which would be more suitable for the Christian subjects.
 
58
 For example, Churchill concluded his work, in an open declaration against the non-
interventionist policy, with an open call to the ‘Christian emperors and kings’ to save 
the Eastern Christianity from the ‘Turkish rule’:  
How long will
 you … continue bring contumely, reproach and 
disaster on the Christians of the East? How long will you tarnish 
your crowns, sully your sceptres, and put the name of Christ to 
open shame, by submitting to be led captives of the Turk?
59
 
 
This alternative foreign policy functioned as an argument for an imperialist foreign 
policy. It also demonstrated the articulation of various elements; such as religion on 
one hand and the scientific progression on the other hand to each other in constructing 
the perception of the Ottoman Empire in the sick man discourse. The Lebanese Civil 
War was presented as the example of the oppression of the Christians by the Ottoman 
Empire, which was represented as a ‘barbaric Muslim’ Empire. Britain was expected 
to shoulder the responsibility of a benevolent moderniser who could bring justice to 
the Christians in the East. This policy, as noted in Said’s Orientalism, constructed an 
ontologically different East and West; the former represented the ‘oblivion and 
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neglect’ and the latter ‘human progress and advance.’60 This difference created a 
‘humanitarian duty’ for Britain to undertake a civilising mission to transform the 
Ottoman realm.  
The second assumption behind the alternative foreign policy was the belief that the 
Empire’s collapse was imminent and in such a case, it would be the British or other 
civilized European Powers’ duty to shape and organise the region. One of the chief 
propagators of this belief was John Bright, the Radical member of the Parliament. 
Bright was well-known in Britain for his opposition to the Crimean War in the 1850s. 
During the Lebanese Crisis he continued to give speeches in the House of Commons 
against the British non-interventionist policy. For him the Ottoman Empire was 
‘doomed to extinction from a decay which it is altogether impossible, in my opinion, 
for any human aid to avert’.61 Bright underlined the ‘fatalist belief’ that the Ottoman 
Empire did not have the capacity to reform itself or could be reformed by an outsider 
force and thus contested the ‘wisdom and right of the Government of this country in 
interfering to support a Power’ that was visibly collapsing. Instead, he argued to 
‘repudiate it as altogether a mistake—that the integrity of the Turkish Empire is to be 
maintained’.62   
As noted in Chapter 3, Evangelicalism in the 19
th
 century assumed an important 
position in British society which proposed a ‘humanitarian, civilising duty’ to Britain 
in the world. The impact of this thinking was evident in the sick-man discourse which 
argued for a new Eastern policy that prioritised the unity of the Western and Eastern 
Christians: ‘Religion, humanity and civilisation alike demand the adoption of some 
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measures by the powers of Europe.’63 Religion and humanity were articulated 
together to propose a new policy for the European Powers in the East, and it was 
claimed that ‘the imperative claims of Christianity and humanity must and ought to 
absorb all others in the … Eastern Question.’64 In this way, the non-interventionist 
policy of the contemporary government was condemned, and an alternative based on 
the ‘civilising duty of Britain’ and the ‘protection of Christians’ was constructed. 
These two points brought a wide array of people from old Radical Bright to religious 
Churchill and secular The Times newspaper together in arguing for an alternative 
Eastern policy.  
Although this view was not yet strong enough to push for a change of policy in 1860, 
its widespread usage demonstrated the belief that various parts of the world could be 
organized and shaped by Britain, in cooperation with other Great Powers. In the 
Ottoman context, the new organization was proposed to uphold the demands of the 
Christians against the local Muslims and the Ottoman authority.  
2.2) The Integrity Discourse  
The sick-man discourse on the Civil War was used to criticise the government either 
because they did not do enough to protect the Christians in the region or because they 
actively supported the Ottoman Empire, who massacred and oppressed the Eastern 
Christians, through the non-interventionist foreign policy.  
These attacks on the Parliament were countered by the members of the Cabinet who 
defended the official British policy. Government’s discourse primarily argued that 
defending the Ottoman territorial integrity was the best option to defend the British 
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interests in the region. The central point of the government’s discourse was the 
foreign policy which was designed to defend the Ottoman territorial integrity. In light 
of this, official discourse was named the ‘integrity discourse’ in this thesis..  
The integrity discourse also constructed its own reality, similar to the sick-man 
discourse. Certain constructions of the sick-man discourse was challenged by the 
proponents of the integrity discourse. Apart from the foreign policy the main points of 
debate was on describing the Ottoman state and the ‘Turks’ as they were the two 
identities that were closely related to the foreign policy.  
2.2.1) The Maronites  
In the press, the Daily News underlined different explanation for the Civil War that 
challenged the ones argued in The Times and by some MPs. The Daily News in 1860 
was a small newspaper with limited influence, with an estimated circulation around 
5000 copies/day and with an editorial line close the Liberals. Brown noted that ‘there 
were obscurities’ of their early editorial line, however, the analysis below shows that 
during the Civil War it was very close to Palmerston’s version of events. 65  
In some of its reports, the Daily News depicted similar stories which presented the 
Christians as the victims, similar to The Times. However, in contrast to The Times, the 
Daily News published many reports which argued that the Lebanese Civil War was 
not due to Muslim brutality on the Christians; both sides shared the responsibility. For 
example, in one letter sent to the editor of the newspaper, an unnamed individual 
noted that  ‘The Times, published an article leaving an impression on the mind of the 
reader that this [Civil War] is a religious movement directed against Christians’ and 
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then disputed the reports published in The Times.
 66
 
These sort of expressions were the main difference between the two papers; while 
The Times represented the event exclusively as a religious warfare against Christians, 
the Daily News produced reports where the Christians were both the victims of 
massacres and the perpetrators of the Crisis at the same time. For example, in one 
report it was noted that the ‘... Christians attacked Druzes at various points and have 
been thoroughly beaten’67 while in others ‘the siege and the sack of Zahle’ by the 
Druzes was presented as the ‘the natural reprisal’ to the actions of the Maronites. 68    
With these examples, the Civil War was presented as the joint responsibility of 
Maronites and Druzes in the integrity discourse. Moreover, the Maronites were 
blamed for toying with the ‘idea that, with the assistance of France, ’ they could 
‘establish themselves as the masters of Lebanon, to the exclusion of both Druzes and 
Turks’, which placed the blame of the Civil War on the Maronite Christians. 69 
Similar to the newspaper’s reports, Prime Minister Palmerston also noted in 
Parliament that the Maronites were responsible for the Civil War because there was 
‘little doubt that the Maronites commenced the disturbances.’70 In some other 
speeches, he insisted that the ‘[w]ar began with an attack by the Maronites for the 
purpose of expelling the Druzes’71 and the Maronites were supported by France, who 
encouraged them to attack the Druzes: 
It is well known that large supplies of arms were furnished to the 
Maronites—European arms, coming from Europe—I cannot tell 
whence they came—some of them were sold openly in Beyrout, and 
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beyond those I have reason to believe great numbers were supplied 
to the Maronite population.
72
 
 
Although the Prime Minister had stated on a few occasions that the Maronites were 
the instigator of the War, on some other occasions he preferred to give a more 
ambiguous explanation for the causes of the Civil War: ‘Individual outrages, I fear, 
were too common on both sides; and it is impossible to say that either the one or the 
other began those attacks.’73  
The common theme in all these explanations was his refusal to directly blame the 
Ottoman government or the ‘Muslims’ as the perpetrators. Similar to Palmerston’s 
words, a report published in the Daily News argued that the ‘War in Lebanon, then, is 
not a religious war, nor an attack on Christians as Christians’74 and added that the 
‘Christians of the Lebanon are not a race who show mercy to a vanquished foe.’75  
Blaming the Maronites was Lord Palmerston’s answer to William Munsell’s repeated 
questions on the government’s responsibility in the Civil War through their actions in 
the 1840s and 1850s, such as their responsibility in the fall of the Egyptian rule 
during Palmerston’s tenure at the Foreign Secretary. Munsell claimed that the British 
were responsible of the Civil War because they re-instated the Ottoman rule in 
Lebanon, which was believed to be the main cause of the War. In contrast, Palmerston 
argued that the War had happened because of the actions of the Maronites rather than 
the Ottoman government. In this way, Palmerston both defended his earlier alliance 
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with the Ottoman Empire against Mehmed Ali’s and constructed an alternative 
explanation for the Civil War.  
This view constructed a different perception of the Maronites and the Muslims. The 
proponents of the sick-man discourse victimised the Christians and argued that the 
barbaric Muslims slaughtered the Christians. In comparison, the government argued 
that the Maronites, or the Eastern Christians, were responsible for the War, the 
Muslims and the Ottoman Empire was not responsible for the violence that happened 
in Lebanon.  
2.2.2) The perceptions on the ‘Ottoman Empire’ 
The most significant aspect of Palmerston's parliamentary speeches was his efforts in 
separating the central and local Ottoman authority in order to shift the Ottoman 
responsibility from the massacres solely to the local administration. Palmerston 
argued that the Ottoman government had been ‘sincerely desirous of taking every step 
necessary to punish the guilty and to lay the foundation for future tranquillity between 
those hostile races’ in Lebanon.76 In this way, Palmerston  asserted the ‘antagonistic 
races’ were blamed for the Civil War rather than the Ottoman government, which was 
supported by the British Empire.   
Moreover, Palmerston argued that the Civil War happened because of ‘the weakness 
of the Turkish authority in Syria’, in a clear contrast to the explanations which blamed 
the Ottoman rule.
 77
 In answering Monsell’s motion, he noted that the Civil War was 
not due to ‘the tyranny of the Turks’, on the contrary, it was a result of ‘the absence of 
direct authority on the part of the Turkish empire’ in Syria and Lebanon. 78 By 
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emphasizing the weakness of the Ottoman central government in Levant, Palmerston 
moved the blame particularly on the ‘the Turkish authorities in Syria’79 and on ‘the 
two tribes’ which were freed of the ‘the direct dominion of the Porte’.80  
Fuad Pasha’s expedition from Constantinople to pacify the region helped Palmerston 
to demonstrate the difference between the Ottoman government and the Ottoman 
local authority. For Palmerston,
 
the Ottoman government was ‘far from … sheltering 
or protecting those miscreants [who committed violence]’ because  ‘Fuad Pasha ... 
immediately on his arrival proceeded to arrest 400 of the principal offenders’.81 
Palmerston added that Fuad Pasha not only arrested the civilian offenders but also 
sent  the local governors ‘Osman Bey and Kurschid Pasha to Constantinople to be 
tried.’82  
In addition to Palmerston, James Farley also argued for the innocence of the Ottoman 
government; in his words the ‘Osmanli Turks’ for the Civil War. 83 Different from 
Palmerston, Farley placed the blame not on the local governors, but on the local 
‘Muslims’ whose ‘hatred entertained towards their Turkish masters is scarcely less 
violent than the detestation felt towards Christians.’84 Although Palmerston 
acknowledged the responsibility of the local governors, Farley, who was an employee 
of the Ottoman Bank in Beirut, a joint venture between the British, French and 
Ottomans, placed the blame solely on the local Muslims avoiding any comment on 
the Ottoman administration. It was possible that Farley did not want to directly 
criticise the Ottomans with whom he was in good relation. Farley argued that the 
‘The Osmanli Turks, ‘are generally looked upon as degenerate Mohammedans’  by 
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the locals and thus ‘it would … be a very great mistake to suppose that this 
intolerance [against Christians] arises altogether from the fanaticism of the Turks.’.85 
Palmerston on the other hand, argued that the Ottoman Empire can be reformed 
under a strong Sultan and the authority of Tanzimat bureaucrats. In a letter he sent to 
the British Ambassador Henry Bulwar in 1861, he noted that ‘if the accounts we 
have heard of the new Sultan [Abdulaziz] are true, we may hope that he will restore 
Turkey to the proper position among the Powers of Europe.’86 Similarly, in another 
letter he wrote in 1860, he maintained his view that if the Russian Empire attacks the 
Ottomans, Britain should take necessary measures to prevent the dismemberment of 
the Ottoman Empire.
87
 Palmerston hoped that the reformed Ottoman Empire can be 
a bulwark against Russian expansionism, which was one of his chief concerns in 
foreign affairs.  
2.2.3) Government on the Eastern Policy  
The government’s foreign policy was condemned in Parliament and press alike by the 
proponents of the sick-man discourse. The government, on the other hand, countered 
these attacks by giving the rationale of the non-interventionist foreign policy, which 
was situated in the diplomatic relations created by the Eastern Question.  
Foreign Minister Lord Russell noted that ‘the position of the Turkish empire requires 
the utmost caution and the utmost delicacy in dealing with all questions that relate to 
it’.88 The delicate situation mentioned by Russell was firstly due to the diplomatic 
situation in Europe. Lord Russell and Palmerston had different point of views on the 
Lebanon Crisis, particularly in terms of the diplomatic action to be taken. France 
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started to press for a humanitarian intervention in July 1860. Palmerston opposed this 
idea, whereas Lord Russell was more conciliatory. He accepted Palmerston’s fear that 
the French might never leave Lebanon but still agreed to an international expedition 
as he thought that if Britain did not cooperate with France, it could lead to a Russo-
French alliance. Compared to Viscount Palmerston, Lord Russell proposed a 
moderate line on the issue, and the ‘delicacy’ referred to this weak balance of power 
between European Powers, which could be easily broken and would have detrimental 
effects on the British interests in the Middle East.
89
 Moreover, Lord Russell inclined 
towards a concerted action with other European Powers in the Eastern Question and 
noted that it would be problematic ‘if we or any other Power were to attempt to 
interfere directly in the administration of Turkey’ and thus ‘the only path of safety 
lies in concert’. 90 For Lord Russell the delicacy of the issue was due to the balance of 
power in Europe and due to his fear of a possible power vacuum that would be 
created with the collapse of the Ottoman Empire.  
The fear of a major European War because of the fall of the Ottoman Empire 
appeared as the main reason for the Cabinet’s decision to defend the Ottoman 
territorial integrity.  Both Lord Russell and Palmerston gave cautious messages that a 
unilateral action of one European Power against the Ottoman Empire ‘will be 
dangerous … to the stability of that Empire’ and ‘still more dangerous in its possible 
effects to the peace of Europe.’91 Palmerston, who was accused of having a Turkophil 
bias, clearly noted that the necessity to ‘maintain that empire’ was not stemmed from 
‘any predilection for the Turkish race’ but because that ‘the Turkish Empire could not 
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be partitioned without involving a general European conflict’ which would be to the 
serious detriment of the interests of this country [Great Britain].
92
 Similarly, 
Palmerston replied to John Bright’s earlier comments that Britain should not interfere 
to support the Ottoman territorial integrity by stating that ‘the political consequences’ 
of the partitioning of the Ottoman Empire will have a dangerous effect ‘on the 
balance of power in Europe.’93 
Although both Lord Russell and Palmerston agreed on the danger of a European War 
because of an imminent Ottoman collapse, their analysis still departed on the 
perception of the Muslims. Compared to Palmerston, Lord Russell insisted that there 
was a further ‘delicacy’ in the Eastern Question in addition to the danger of a 
European War; the risk of provoking Muslim hatred towards the Christians in the rest 
of the Empire. This narrative in the Muslim ‘religious’ fanaticism was a construct 
which pictured the local Muslims as a group ready to attack the Christians only 
because of their ‘Mahommedan fanaticism:’94 
If we or any other Power were to attempt to interfere directly in the 
administration of Turkey there is this great danger; that we should 
not only diminish the authority of the Sultan, but might awake the 
fanatical passions of the Moslems, who might think that they were 
betrayed, and might involve the whole empire in bloodshed and 
sedition.
95
  
 
Although Lord Russell or any other member of the Cabinet did not perceive the Civil 
War as a religious war, in the Foreign Secretary’s eyes, the fanaticism of the Muslims 
needed to be checked because of the attacks and murders happened in Damascus 
which were triggered by the Lebanese Civil War. Lord Russell made his point clear in 
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his analysis of the event in 1861, during which the French contingent was 
withdrawing from Syria and Lebanon. In this sense, his usage of the ‘religious 
fanaticism of Muslims’ was different than the usage of the sick-man discourse, which 
gave a central place to the alleged fanaticism in the explanation of the Civil War. For 
Lord Russell, a unilateral action of France or Russia might trigger the ‘Mahommedan 
fanaticism would have its full sway repeated in various parts of the Turkish Empire’ 
which would in turn raise ‘all the Powers of Europe against the maintenance of the 
Turkish Empire.’96  
3.) Conclusion  
An analysis of the British debates on the Lebanese Civil War demonstrated that two 
discernible British elite perceptions were formulated in 1860. These perceptions are 
best analysed with the help of discourse analysis, which enables us the capture the 
identity formation. Discourses creates the identity of the objects through a differential 
process. This theoretical outlook proves to be extremely useful in interpreting the 
public sources.These discourses interpreted the Civil War in a different way, enlisting 
different and, in some cases, contesting explanations as to the reasons for the War. 
These explanations presented different groups as the main perpetrator of the Civil 
War, and through this process the perceptions on these groups were constructed.  
The first of these discourses was the sick-man discourse which emerged as a 
‘popular’ discourse because it was constructed by newspapers, travellers and MPs. 
The proponents of this discourse argued that the Civil War was the attack of the 
‘semi-barbaric’ Muslims on the Christians; it was a war between ‘two half-savage 
tribes’ or it was because of the ‘barbaric’ Ottoman Empire. In this way, the debates on 
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the Civil War created the identity of the Muslim, Turk, Druze etc, in relation to each 
other and in difference to a common outsider. In each case, the sick-man discourse 
constructed a common outsider ‘civilized, Christian West’ as the ‘other’ of the 
‘Ottoman.’ 
The second discourse was the ‘official’ discourse which constructed a conflicting 
picture of the Civil War. In this picture, the Civil War was caused by the Maronites or 
the local Ottoman government whereas the Ottoman central administration, the Turks 
or the Muslims were not to be blamed of the violence. Therefore, in this discourse the 
same terms had a different meaning.  
The second outcome of the analysis is the emergence of two antagonistic foreign 
policy options constructed by these discourses. The government defended their non-
interventionist policy by arguing that the best way to defend the British interests in 
the region was defending the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire. The popular 
alternative to this was a more ‘imperialist’ policy which aimed to reshape the 
Ottoman realm in a more beneficial way to the Christians. In this way, two discourses 
developed an antagonistic relation with each other for defining the Eastern policy; the 
religious-humanitarianism of the one was against the pragmatism of the other.  
The final important result of the first case study is the visible difference in power of 
each discourse in capturing the public opinion. The sick-man discourse depended on 
categories that was popular in mid-Victorian thinking, such as Christianity, 
humanitarianism and progress. The Ottomans were perceived as inferior to the 
Europeans, as an ‘other’ of civilized Europe. The perceptions of the Muslims and the 
Turks were formulated by using this categories, which was easier to capture public 
interest. On the contrary, the official discourse articulated the meaning of the Muslim 
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and the Turks, without any reference to these categories; in the integrity discourse 
these identities were formulated from the perspective of their usefulness for British 
interests, which had a weaker appeal to the public due to its secular and pragmatic 
nature.  
These discursive formations demonstrated the first steps in the transformation in the 
construction process of the Ottoman perceptions in the 19
th
 century. It will be 
accurate to define the sick-man discourse in 1860 as an undercurrent; although its 
usage was widespread, its effect on the official policy was negligible. This was both 
due to the limited impact of the Lebanese Civil War in Britain and Palmerston’s 
strong position in the Parliament and policy making circles. However, its deployment 
by various sources demonstrated the existence of anti-Ottoman public opinion in 
Britain, and alternative policies revealed the pervasiveness of ‘imperialist’ discourse 
in the society.  
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1.) Introduction  
The debates on the Lebanese Civil War and the Ottoman Empire declined after 1861, 
and in the following 5 years, there were few mentions of the Ottomans in Britain. The 
public interest in the ‘Ottomans’ rekindled after the news about the Cretan Revolt 
spread in Britain. The number of articles and parliamentary speeches increased in the 
1866-68 period. This chapter will focus on how the Cretan Revolt influenced the 
perceptions established in the first case.  
Similar to the Lebanese Civil War, the Cretan Revolt was also a minor event in 
Britain; as can be seen from Chart 1 and Chart 2, the number of articles produced in 
British press was higher than the ‘peaceful’ years, but far lower than the Great Balkan 
Crisis (1875-78), where the final case study is located. 
1
 
1.1) Historical Background  
Crete, an island in the south Aegean Sea was conquered by Venice in the 13
th
 century, 
and had strategic importance for the Ottoman Empire’s security and trade in the early 
modern era due to its geographical position. During early 17
th
 century, it became a 
contested area between Venice and the Ottoman Empire as a part of the larger 
Venetian-Ottoman rivalry and was conquered by the Ottomans in 1669 after a lengthy 
siege.  
The background of the Cretan Revolt is dealt with in a few monographs and a number 
of articles.
2
 The first modern revolt against the Ottoman rule in Crete happened 
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simultaneously with the Greek Revolution in 1821, which was suppressed by the 
Ottomans with the help of Mehmed Ali. The island was invaded by Mehmed Ali in 
1831 and returned to the Ottoman Empire, similar to Lebanon, in 1840 following the 
European intervention. Crete, throughout the 19
th
 century, was an island of rebellion; 
there were 9 rebellions in the island, in 1821, 1833, 1841, 1858, 1866, 1878, 1889, 
1895 and finally in 1897 which led to a war between the Ottoman Empire and 
Greece.
3
  
The basis of these revolts was the peculiar condition of the island in the Ottoman 
Empire. The island was one of the final ‘conquests’ of the Ottoman Empire and 
populated entirely by the Greek Orthodox subjects. Some of these were converted to 
Islam in the 18
th
 century forming the ‘Creto-Turks’ in order to benefit from the 
privileged position of the Muslims in the Empire. Although the literature disagrees on 
the population estimates of the Cretans in the 19
th
 century, it agrees that the Christian 
population formed the majority in the 1870s. The Turkish sources note that of the 
210,000 residents in 1872-74, 90,000 were Muslims (42%) where the Greek sources 
note that the Christians in the same period held a majority of 62.5% to 77.5%.
4
  
This changing balance in favour of the Christians on the island was explained as 
being a result of the reconverting of the Creto-Turks to Christianity, which was 
mainly due to the loss of the Muslim privileges on the island after the economic 
reforms implemented during the short Egyptian rule from 1831-1840. The most 
important result of these reforms on the island was the transfer of land from the 
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Muslim landowners to Christian peasants. In 1866, before the beginning of the 
Revolt, the majority of the Muslim landowners sold their property and moved to the 
fortified towns in the east of the island. The Christian Cretans, on the other hand, held 
the 85% majority in the rural western part of the island, where the Revolt began.
5
  
In addition to the economic and religious transformation of the island, the emerging 
Greek nationalism also had an impact on the Revolt. Crete already revolted in 1821 
against the Ottoman Empire together with the mainland Greece, and the existence of 
an independent Greece a few hundred miles away created a desire for unification with 
Greece on the island. The organizers of the 1866 Revolt informed the representatives 
of the European Powers on their desire to unify with Greece.
6
  
1.2) The Cretan Revolt 
The Revolt began on May 1866, when a group of Christian Cretans convened in the 
western town Chania and submitted a list of demands to the Ottoman governor Ismail 
Pasha which included tax reliefs, better hospitals and judicial reforms. One of the 
more radical of these demands was self-governance through a local parliament and 
free elections.
7
 The group simultaneously despatched secret messages to the 
representatives of the Powers, demanding either unification with Greece or an 
autonomous rule in Crete.
8
 The Ottomans sent an official reply in July 1866 rejecting 
all of the demands. Consequently, in August 1866, the Cretans formed a ‘General 
Assembly’, declared the unification of the island with Greece and started the armed 
struggle.  
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The Revolt continued for the next three years. The Christian Cretans were supported 
by volunteers from Greece, USA and Europe and the Ottomans aimed to suppress the 
revolt using both the regular army and irregular forces formed by the Muslim Cretans. 
Most of the fighting took place in 1866-67 and left behind hundreds of burnt villages, 
thousands of deaths and tens of thousands of refugees.
9
 In order to find a political 
solution, the Ottoman Grand Vizier Ali Pasha, similar to Fuad Pasha’s Syrian 
expedition in 1860, arrived at the island in 1867 and drafted an ‘Organic Act’ 
agreeing to most of the Cretan demands which was ratified by the Sultan in February 
1868. The Act provided a new administration system for the island and brought the 
Revolt to an end, although minor skirmishes continued until spring 1869.  
1.3) Britain in 1866 
In the 5 years between the Lebanese Civil War and the Cretan Revolt, the most 
important change in Britain was the death of Palmerston, who was the most 
influential figure in British politics in 1860s. Parlmerston's death in 1865 paved the 
way for major changes in British politics, including British foreign policy. Palmerston 
was the chief policy maker in Britain and a staunch defender of the pro-Ottoman 
foreign policy.
10
  
Following Palmerston’s death, Lord Russell became the Prime Minister in the 
Cabinet, however, his government was short-lived. The major issue in Britain during 
the Cretan Revolt was the electoral reform which became a pressing issue; the 
Reform League as a non-Parliamentary pressure group organised two large meetings 
in Hyde Park and Birmingham in late 1866 and early 1867; 20,000 people attended 
the former and 150,000 attended the latter. Lord Russell’s initial reform bid led to 
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strong dissent in his party and as a result of this, his government fell in 1866. The 
succeeding Cabinet, formed by the Conservatives under Lord Derby’s leadership, 
passed the Reform Bill in August 1867. 
11
 
The debates and struggles for the Reform Act resulted with a change of leadership in 
the British politics. Lord Russell resigned from the leadership of the Liberals in 1867 
and was succeeded by Gladstone and Derby, who resigned in 1868 due to ill health, 
and replaced by Disraeli in the Conservative Party. Thus, during the three years 
following Palmerston’s death which coincided with the Cretan Revolt, three short-
lived Cabinets were formed and the balance in politics was established only after the 
Liberal victory in the November 1868 elections.   
1.4) European Diplomacy and the Revolt  
The foreign policy of Britain towards the Cretan Revolt was formulated first by the 
Foreign Secretary Clarendon in Lord Russell’s government, and then by Lord Stanley 
in Derby’s government; both preferred to stick with the Palmerstonian non-
interventionist policy.
12
 The general European situation during the Crisis also 
favoured the implementation of this policy; the Habsburg Empire or Prussia did not 
show a direct interest in the conflict, and in Greece where public support for the 
Cretan cause was high, the government, judging the overall European situation, 
initially refused to take direct action.
13
  
France and Russia, on the other hand, were more interested in interfering with the 
conflict although they could not coordinate their policy due to their differences on 
other European issues. British did their utmost to ensure that these two powers did not 
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cooperate in Crete.
14
 Russia and Britain occupied opposing positions in the Crisis and 
Napoleon’s France oscillated between these two camps.15 Britain was committed to 
non-intervention through three different Cabinets. Russia, on the other hand, was 
much less coherent; Gorchakov, the foreign minister was very conciliatory with the 
British, while Ignatieff, the Ambassador to Porte pursued an active policy to draw 
Greece to the Russian camp in the Near East.
16
 Although Russian policy carried 
inconsistencies, it was more pro-Greek and demanded an autonomous government for 
the island, which was deemed unacceptable by Britain.   
Two years of diplomatic manoeuvres between these powers did not have a significant 
impact on the course of events on the island; the revolutionaries continued to hope 
that European pressure would bring them a better result. The Ottomans, on the other 
hand, met some of their demands with Ali Pasha’s Organic Act and fended off 
Russian and French pressure for secession of the island with the help of the British. 
As noted earlier in this thesis, the perceptions of the Greeks also influenced the 
European decision making on the island; the poor condition of the Cretan refugees in 
Greece, and the overall poor image of the country in Europe due to its financial and 
administrative problems, helped the Ottomans to relieve some of the pressure.
17
 The 
Ottoman Sultan’s visit to European capitals in the summer of 1867 and Fuad Pasha’s 
diplomatic efforts during this visit also lessened the pressure on the Ottoman Empire 
to cede the island. Finally, the Ottoman decision to appoint a Christian governor with 
the Organic Act in early 1868 appeased the European public opinion in favour of the 
Ottoman Empire.  
                                                 
14
 Bourne, pp 80-2.  
15
 Robson p. 43 and Bourne p. 85.  
16
 Ibid. Ignatieff assumed a more important role in the Balkan Crisis of 1875-78 which would be dealt 
in the following chapter. 
17
 Bourne p. 91 
145 
 
 
 
In 1868, diplomatic relations between the Ottomans and Greece deteriorated due to 
the latter’s involvement in the Revolt, and then completely broke off in late 1868, 
signalling an imminent danger of war. European Powers intervened in this diplomatic 
crisis; British Foreign Secretary Clarendon proposed to settle the issue in a diplomatic 
conference in Paris.
18
 As a result of the conference, diplomatic relations between 
Greece and the Ottoman Empire were restored and the Revolt which had already 
collapsed militarily for the Christian Cretans had come to an end.  
2.) British Debates on the Cretan Revolt 
The British public was informed from the very beginning about events on Crete by 
both newspapers and the evidence presented to the Parliament. The interest shown to 
the Revolt was not greater than the Lebanese Civil War; there were over fifty lengthy 
reports in periodicals and magazines and a total of 420 newspaper articles within 
three years. The peak of the news and articles produced was in the year 1867 when 
the insurrection was at its height. The number of articles decreased after the 
declaration of the Organic Act. After the summer of 1868, the main theme of the news 
turned to the diplomatic crisis between Greece and the Ottoman Empire.  
Similar to the Lebanese Civil War, the Cretan Revolt was also debated in the 
Parliament and the British press using similar tools for both explaining the causes of 
the Revolt and constructing similar discourses on the various sections of the Ottoman 
society. The sick-man discourse, as in the previous case, was more popular; it was 
used widely by different sources in the British press and the Parliament.  
The previous case study focused on The Times and the Daily News reports as 
newspaper sources in addition to the Parliamentary debates. In comparison, this case 
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study analyses a wide range of daily, weekly, fortnightly and monthly publications as 
press source. This is because of two reasons. The first is to understand the continuities 
between the discourses constructed on the Lebanese Civil War and the Cretan Revolt, 
and to analyse the similarities and differences between the discursive constructions 
made on the two events. The second is to explore the ‘pervasiveness’ of the 
discourses in the British press and to answer how far these discourses permeated in 
different newspapers and periodicals towards the end of the 1860s. In this way, the 
chapter will provide a more complete understanding on the British discourses on the 
‘Ottomans’ in the 1860s. 
2.1) Perceptions of the Sick-man Discourse  
2.1.1) The Perceptions on the Muslims 
 
They [Christians] are without shoes and without clothes. The enemy 
[Ottomans] has burnt down houses, furniture and the crops of the 
last year that were in them... Even the old men, women, and 
children have had to be removed from the few villages that stand up 
to the mountains, because the Turks ruthlessly destroy these 
innocent victims.19 
 
In some reports, the Cretan Revolt was presented in Britain as above; as the ruthless 
attack of brutal perpetrators (Muslims) against the innocent and defenceless victims 
(Christians); a recurring theme from the first case study. As seen from the Lebanese 
case, religion was a central element of the sick-man discourse, which constructed the 
dichotomy of Christianity versus Islam. This dichotomy was used to explain the 
causes of the Revolt as well as demarcating the perpetrator from the victim.  British 
press reported and analysed the events in detail, sometimes in a picturesque style, by 
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identifying the insurgents as being the Christians; the revolutionaries were called as 
the Cretan (or Candiote- the old Venetian name) Christians, who were represented as 
the victims of Muslim tyranny. 
On the other hand, the Muslims were depicted as a united body, consisted of the 
government and the local population. It was argued that their ruthless oppression of 
the Christians, a state that had been ongoing for centuries, was the main reason for 
the Revolt. Similar to the Lebanese Christians, the Cretan Christians were presented 
as the ultimate victims of the Ottoman rule, before and during the Revolt. Examples 
of this argument were not confined to the news reports or letters published in the 
dailies; it expanded to the periodicals and traveller accounts.   
In an article on Crete in the Contemporary Review,
20
 a popular religious magazine, 
the conditions in Crete prior to the Greek Revolution were noted by a British traveller 
who argued that ‘the horrors and atrocities’ were ‘almost a daily occurrence in Crete’, 
which ‘had hardly a single parallel throughout the whole extent of the Ottoman 
Empire.'
21
 The ‘horrors’ reported by the traveller were heard from ‘a reliable source’ 
as the violation of privacy and property: ‘any Mohammedan might pass his 
[Christian’s] threshold, and either require from him money, or what was more 
commoner, send the husband and father out of the way, on some pretext, and himself 
remain with his wife and daughter.’ 22 Similar stories were found in the Good 
Words
23
, another popular religious magazine, which argued that the Christians had 
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been subjected to these kinds of extreme injustices in Crete for centuries and lived ‘at 
the mercy of the Mussulmans’ who could ‘enter houses both day and night, take what 
they want and behave as they will.’24 These traveller reports constructed a picture of 
mundane unbearable oppression of the Christians that included torture; one article 
noted that if a Christian ‘raise[s] an arm’ to a Muslim ‘or speak a word’ against him, 
this would ‘bring on death or loss of a limb’.25  
The arguments on the oppression of the Christians in Crete aimed to argue that the 
Revolt was a ‘justified’ reaction to oppression. Secondly, it argued that the Revolt 
was primarily a religious conflict. These arguments did not account for the economic 
conditions of the island; similar to the situation in Lebanon, Christians’ position 
gradually improved in the 19
th
 century at the expense of their Muslim neighbours. 
Although the economic transformation of the island was mainly due to the impact of 
Western trade, capitulations and Tanzimat reforms, it was presented by some papers 
as an example of the Muslim ‘indolence’. In an article published in the Fortnightly 
Review,
26
 a bipartisan, cultural and political magazine,  a small story of the famous 
European traveller Ubicini was published in which he argued that the Muslims 
effortlessly accepted their decline by saying ‘why not if God wills it? '
27
  
In addition, these depictions run counter to the general economic realities in the 
Ottoman Empire. The burden of conscription totally fell upon the Muslim villagers 
since Christians were exempt from the military service and taxation of the Muslim 
population was as heavy as their Christians neighbours. Commercial agreements 
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signed by the Porte with the Great Powers, known as the capitulations, further 
aggravated the economic disparity between the Christians and the Muslims and were 
left out of the picture in these depictions.
28
 The economic decline of the Muslims in 
the Ottoman Empire, which was a result of these socio-economic conditions, was 
presented as a result of ‘their cultural habits’ or the life style.  
 
2.1.2) Perceptions on Islam 
As the Revolt was presented as a justified reaction to the Muslim oppression on the 
island, the perceptions on the Islam, the basis of the Muslim identity, were affected 
negatively from the Cretan Revolt. In an article, the author argued that Islam was 
‘propagated solely by the sword’ and thus ‘must decline when the sword can be no 
longer employed’. 29 This was contrasted with the Christian religion which was 
defined as being ‘founded on reasoning and persuasive principles’, and thus, ‘must in 
the end, prevail over savage ignorance and merciless proselytism.'30  
Similar views were propagated in Britain by the Cretan residents’ letters sent to the 
editors of the periodicals. For instance a letter published in MacMillan’s Magazine,31 
a political and cultural magazine, declared that the ‘the antagonism of Moslem and 
Christian’ in the Ottoman Empire should be settled in favour of the Christian who 
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[was] the rightful inheritor [of the land].'
32
 In Parliament, William Gregory, an Irish 
Catholic MP, added that ‘wherever the Christianity was brought into contact with 
Islamism’ the result was ‘massacres and tumults’.33 Islam was presented as the 
obstacle to progress in an article published in the Daily News which argued that, in 
Crete, ‘the fair hopes and prospects of the Cretans to raise their country to the height 
of prosperity’ was ‘marred by an intrusive handful of Moslems’ for ‘whom exaction 
and the oppression become the inevitable conditions of their indolent life.'34 
Presenting the Cretan Christians as the victim of extraordinary injustice went hand in 
hand with the criticism of the British's non-intervention, similar to the first case 
study. The British government was accused of ‘put[ing] forth his hand to support the 
Moslem rule, the rule of Turk over Christian’35 . This argument was shared between 
the religious and non-religious papers; the London Review shared the Good Words’ 
perception in Crete and declared that they did not conceal their ‘entire and warm 
sympathy with the oppressed Christian populations under Turkish rule’ or their 
‘belief in the utterly hateful and contemptible character of the Ottoman 
government.'
36
 Liberal newspaper the Daily News also criticised the British 
government for not doing enough to ‘rescue the oldest Christian population of the 
world from the hands of their oppressors although it was the ‘English, who send 
hundreds of thousands to India, to China, and Australia’37 to spread the Christian 
cause. 
The political weekly newspaper, The Examiner
38
, which appealed to predominantly 
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liberal and higher social classes, also criticised the British government for the same 
reasons and accused the Foreign Secretary, Stanley, of losing ‘no opportunity of 
showing his indifference to Greek suffering, and to the hope of the further 
emancipation of the Greek race from the Mussulman yoke.'39 Similar to the examples 
in the Lebanese Crisis, ‘humanitarian reasons’ were articulated to defending the 
Christian cause in the foreign policy and offered as an alternative to the non-
intervention which allegedly supported the Muslim power against the Christians. A 
clear example of the alternative ‘humanitarian’ foreign policy was articulated in an 
article in The Examiner which argued that 'the triumph of Liberalism in England 
could not better inaugurate its foreign policy than by an act of humanity ... on behalf 
of Christianity and progress in the Levant.'40  
 
2.1.3) Perceptions on the Ottoman Empire  
During the Lebanese Civil War, British reports and the MPs already voiced their 
criticism of the Ottoman Empire, which was portrayed as an oppressive and backward 
Muslim power standing in opposition to the progressive and Christian Britain and 
Europe. These views were reproduced during the Cretan Revolt, and the scepticism 
on the success of the Ottoman reforms strengthened further in Britain.   
The debates on the Ottoman Empire demonstrated a similar pattern in the Crete 
Revolt with the Lebanese Civil War, through constructing an imagined golden past 
which was presented in contrast to the contemporary order. In the Lebanese case, 
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Mehmed Ali’s earlier rule in the region was presented as an example of good 
administration, which stood in contrast with the contemporary Ottoman rule. In the 
Cretan case, the situation of Crete  was described as being ‘heaps of ruins, villages 
half-peopled and country impoverished by war'41 which stood in contrast with the 17
th
 
century rule of the Venetians when ‘'there were castles and villas, well-peopled 
villages and cultivated fields.'
42
 The author of these words was a British journalist and 
traveller J.E. Skinner
43
, who published his book Roughing in Crete, as a traveller 
account in 1868 upon his return from the island.  
Skinner compared the situation of Scotland in the United Kingdom with the Ottoman 
conquest of Crete, drawing a contrast between the English who 'made roads where he 
marched, and brought a higher civilization to the conquered clans’ and the Ottoman 
rule ‘who have made no roads and brought no civilization.' 44 The Examine,r which 
published a positive review of Skinner’s work, further noted that 'when the Venetians 
gave place to the Ottomans, there were a million dwellers in Crete, which possessed 
fertile lands and well-to-do towns’ whereas Crete under Ottoman control ‘has not a 
quarter of a million of inhabitants; its towns are in ruins; its villages are half-
deserted...'
45
 
Skinner was already an influential figure in reporting foreign news in Britain when 
his book was published. He had established himself as a news correspondent in the 
1860s, reporting the Danish-Prussian war of 1864, and Austria-Prussia War of 1866, 
and thus his book commanded several book reviews in the British press, which 
                                                 
41
 J.H.E. Skinner, Roughing it in Crete in 1867, London, 1868, p. 20. 
42
 Ibid. 
43
 For more information on Skinner see Appendix 3 and T. Seccombe, Skinner, John Edwin Hillary, in  
S. Lee (eds) Dictionary of National Biography 1885-1900, Vol. 52, 1897, pp. 346-7.  
44
 Skinner, Roughing, p. 19. 
45
 Roughing it in Crete in 1867', The Examiner, 4 January 1868, p. 6.  
153 
 
 
 
published excerpts from his work. For example, the Aetheneum,
 46
 a well-established 
literary weekly with a relatively high circulation of 15,000 copies/week, criticised 
Skinner for not giving enough account of the 'Turkish and Mussulman barbarity' in 
his book.
47
 On the other hand, the Saturday Review, the bestselling political-literary 
paper of the time, was more positive in its review and recommended it as a good 
literary reading.
48
  
Similar arguments were produced in the religious press as well; the Contemporary 
Review noted that the once prosperous Venetian island ‘gradually died away’ as it 
‘sank under the lethargic rule of the Ottoman despotism.'49 This constructed dichotomy 
between the good Venetian Crete v. the bad Ottoman Crete was not only used by the 
British authors; the Cretan revolutionaries who appealed to the President of the 
United States described their island as ‘the Greek island of Crete …, glorious in the 
ancient times and happy, insignificant to-day [sic] and unhappy’. According to the 
Cretans, this situation was because of the ‘heavy yoke of the Mussulman’.50 The 
appeal of the Cretan Christians brought together the nostalgia for the past and the 
impact of Christian identity together. Similar examples of this articulation were 
evident in articles published in Britain; the New Monthly Magazine,
51
 a literary paper, 
argued that the Greek Revolution ‘delivered a Christian nation from subjection to 
Muhammedanism … and extended the advantages of civil liberty to regions where 
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despotism had for ages been indigenous.
'52   
The nostalgic approach was used to create an imagined golden-age in Cretan history 
prior to Ottoman conquest, which served the purpose of defining the Ottoman epoch 
as a continuous Muslim tyranny over the Christian peoples, which finally collapsed 
with the Greek emancipation. The alleged deterioration of Crete under Ottoman 
tyranny was taken as an evidence of the contemporary ineffectiveness and the 
backwardness of the Ottoman rule. The Ottoman regime was described as the most 
‘degraded and corrupt’53 of its time, because ‘the political system, the social system, 
the religious system, the military system- all alike [were] tainted with irremediable 
corruption.'54  
Nostalgia was used to construct a historical narrative in which the Ottoman Empire’s 
identity was shaped. The extension of this perspective into the future was the 
argument that the Ottoman Empire’s collapse was imminent and inevitable; there was 
no future left for the Ottoman Empire. An article in New Monthly Magazine noted that 
the ‘the Turkish Empire shall, and inevitably will, crumble to pieces’ and the ‘old 
Christian races shall arise from its ruins.'55 In the monthly Saint Paul’s56, a literary 
magazine, it was concluded that ‘the present states of things in Turkey is only 
provisional, and that the Ottoman rule in Europe must fall, sooner or later.'57 Similar 
fatalist views on the Ottoman Empire were produced in the religious papers as well as 
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the aforementioned secular papers. The London Quarterly Review
58
, a Methodist 
publication, noted that the collapse of the Ottoman Empire was ‘irremediable'59. 
Similarly, another article in The Examiner noted that the ‘sick-man is failing faster 
and more fast[sic]’ and when he collapses ‘none will say, God Bless him.'60 In 
Parliament, Earl Grey, the Liberal ex-Minister of War and ex-Minister of Colonies, 
noted that ‘Empire of Turkey bore on its face the unmistakable signs of approaching 
dissolution’ and no efforts which Britain ‘could make would be effective in keeping it 
together for any long time’.61 The Earl of Kimberly, who had been the Undersecretary 
of Foreign Affairs during the Lebanese Crisis and a defender of the British policy, 
added that ‘the fall of the Ottoman Empire was approaching’ and the fall of the 
Empire ‘would not occur without a bloody war throughout Europe.’62  
The expectation that the Ottoman Empire could not survive these subsequent crises 
constituted the basis of the criticism of the British foreign policy in the East, which 
was argued to be ‘strained too far’ to defend the Ottoman territorial integrity.63 
According to views advocated in the press, the British government should abandon 
defending the status quo and ‘encourage and hasten, if it be possible, the renovation of 
the Greeks as a nation’64 instead, because the Greeks sympathised with Britain ‘in 
most of those things that form the elements of modern civilized existence.'
65
 The 
Ottoman Empire as a state was perceived as ‘the reason’ of backwardness and 
desolation, and thus according to this view, redirecting the British support from them 
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to ‘those who are his legitimate and predestined successors' 66 was presented as the 
only logical option for British to pursue in the East.  
The alternative foreign policy in the Lebanese case advocated for an ‘imperialist’ 
course to be taken; Britain was called to act on behalf of the Eastern Christians. The 
analysis demonstrated the emergence of clear alternative policy option in the Crete 
case. Britain was called to ‘support the emerging Christian nations’ rather than 
defending the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire.  
2.1.4) Perceptions on the ‘Turk’ 
The Ottoman Empire’s ‘otherness’ to Europe was presented as a result of its historical 
position as the traditional adversary of Christianity, which linked the contemporary 
understanding of the Ottoman Empire to the hostile historical perceptions. Similar to 
the Lebanese Civil War, the perceptions on the ‘Turk’ and the ‘Ottoman Empire’ was 
intertwined. The term ‘Turk’ who was used to denote the ruling members of the 
Ottoman administration, and thus the perceptions of the ‘Turk’ was closely related to 
the perceptions on the Ottoman state. 
In an article, the political magazine, The Examiner, gave a historical account of the 
‘Turk’ as being ‘once an enemy of a dangerous and determined character. Fierce and 
barbarous…’ whom was stopped by the ‘house of Hapsburg during the 16th the 17th, 
and the commencement of the 18
th
 centuries’ who ‘prevented western civilization 
from being overrun by Oriental despotism.'
67
 Similar to the Lebanese case, some in 
Britain blamed the ‘Turks’ for the Cretan Revolt. For William Gregory, ‘the iniquitous 
mis-government of the Turks was the sole cause of the outbreak’ and the ‘Turks 
committed outrages upon the Christian population of Crete, especially upon 
                                                 
66
 The Turkish Triumph in Crete', London Review, 3 August 1867, p. 118. 
67
 Austria and Turkey, The Examiner, 27 March 1869, p.194. My emphasis. 
157 
 
 
 
women’.68 In the House of Lords, Duke of Argyll, a Liberal Scottish peer, noted that 
‘the Turks mercilessly chopped off the heads of the unfortunate wounded’ and 
behaved atrociously against the Cretan Christians.
69
 The Ottoman army, the main state 
institution in Crete was also presented as committing crimes on the island against the 
Christians by the same MPs.  
Although the Turks were perceived to be the ‘Ottomans’ per-se, in some limited cases 
they were defined as a peculiar race of their own, which was a minority view during 
the 1860s. For instance, in the House of Commons, William Gregory argued that the 
Turks ‘lay at the feet of the most brutal and ignorant race of conquerors that ever 
weighed upon the earth’, which classified the ‘Turks’ as a distinct Asiatic race. 70 
Similar to the usage of the term ‘race’ in the Lebanese Crisis to define the Maronites 
and the Druzes, it denoted the ‘inferiority’ of the ‘Turk’ from the European.  
2.1.5) Perceptions of the Eastern Christians  
In the 19
th
 century, the perceptions of the Ottomans developed within the political 
context of the Eastern Question in relation to the British perceptions of the Greeks 
and the Russians. The perceptions on the latter was especially significant as Russia 
symbolised the backwardness and autocracy in Europe, similar to the Ottoman 
Empire, in the eyes of the liberal British elite. All of these states were labelled as the 
‘Orientals’ and considered to be ‘unfitted for any species of government that is not 
autocratic.'
71
 For instance, in an article published in the Fraser’s Magazine72, a liberal 
monthly, Russia was placed behind Western Europe and ahead of the Ottoman Empire 
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in terms of civilization, due to its autocratic regime.
73
  
One of the most popular terms used in the debates during the Cretan Revolt was 
‘civilization.’ The terms ‘civilized’ and ‘civilization’ had nuances which affected the 
meaning produced by these terms; this renders an analysis of the terminology 
necessary. For instance, the administrative problems of the Ottoman Empire were 
argued to be because of its ‘state of civilization’, and thus, these problems could not 
be addressed with reforms: 'The misgovernment which prevails in the East depends 
mainly on a state of civilization, which cannot be materially altered by political 
changes.'
74
 In a different example, The Saturday Review, the paper which was the 
strongest supporter of the non-interventionist policy in British press, argued that 
although the Ottoman Empire introduced the Tanzimat Reforms ‘under the pressure of 
civilized Europe.’ However, the reforms had not been successful because the Ottoman 
Empire was ‘unwilling or unable to extend the equal justice to all classes of its 
subjects because of their civilization.'
75
  
Historically, the term ‘civilization’ appeared more or less simultaneously in France 
and Britain in the 18
th
 century and gained prominence in the 19
th
 century.
76
 Levin 
notes that ‘the whole point of the term at least from 18th century onwards was bound 
up with the Western idea of itself as in advance of the rest of the world; that it had 
developed and others hadn’t’.77 In the 19th century, meaning of the term civilization 
acquired a double meaning denoting both ‘moral and material’ values as civilization 
was accompanied with a supplementary term ‘culture’.78 In this context, ‘being 
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civilized’ not only meant to be superior in material progress; it also meant to possess a 
superior culture which was the reason for the material progress. From the beginning 
of the 19
th
 century, being civilized signified being a member of humanity’s elite 
which had ‘collective life of a period or a group’79; it was a sign of superiority. Only 
certain elite nations and peoples were labelled as civilized, while the rest of the world 
was reduced to the status of ‘semi-civilized’ or ‘barbarian’. Therefore, the term 
civilization was primarily used to ‘differentiate’ the civilized from the uncivilized; the 
West from the rest, or in the Ottoman context, the European from the Oriental.  For 
the Ottomans, the term ‘uncivilized’ not only indicated the backwardness of the 
Ottoman Empire in comparison to the Great Powers, it also pointed to its ‘otherness’ 
of the European civilization.  
The term civilization was not only used to differentiate the European from non-
European, it was also used as a yardstick to compare societies with each other, and 
with ‘civilized Europe’, the highest ranking society. For example, one article in the 
Saturday Review, demonstrated the variations of the level of ‘barbarity’ between the 
Ottoman regions: ‘…the most barbarous section of Turkey in Asia, then from 
Constantinople to scarcely less barbarous and much more corrupt provinces of 
European Turkey and finally half the States of Europe...'
80
 The Asian part of the 
Empire, which consisted of both Anatolia and the Arabic lands, were populated by a 
Muslim majority and deemed ‘more barbaric’ than the European parts, where the 
majority were Christians. In addition, the ‘European Turkey’ was geographically 
closer to Western Europe.  
Religion was the main element which played a part in determining the degree of 
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‘civilization’; the Christians were more civilized than the Muslims, although they 
were still inferior to the European societies and the Western parts of the Empire 
populated by the Christians was deemed to be more civilized than the ‘Asiatic’ 
Eastern parts, which were populated by the Muslims.  
The perceptions of the Greeks were poor in the 1860s due to the financial and the 
administrative crisis the country faced.
81
 As a result of this, the Greeks were also 
defined as being ‘little better than barbarian’ ‘and as a country who were 'labouring to 
emancipate itself from the state of barbarism … cast by the Turks.'
82
 According to the 
Saturday Review, Islam was ‘ill-suited to Europe’ although it ‘satisfies Asiatics and 
raises African nearer to humanity’; in comparison, ‘even Greek Christianity is more 
reconcilable with civilization’ because ‘its character would alter with the moral and 
intellectual condition of its votaries.'
83
 The Greeks were perceived to be close to the 
European civilization only because of their religion, which demonstrated the 
importance of religion in drawing the frontiers of Europe; except for their religion, the 
Greeks were perceived as equally backward and barbarous as with the Ottoman 
Empire.  
The centrality of Christianity in defining civilized was demonstrated also by the 
perceptions of Islam, which was seen as suitable to Africans and Asians who were 
farther behind in terms of civilization than the ‘Turks’84. In another example, a 
traveller who arrived Greece from Europe noted that he has found ‘everything in a 
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state of infancy- of semi-barbarism’. However, the same traveller who travelled to 
Greece from ‘the interior Turkey, Syria, or Egypt’ claimed that he ‘reached a region of 
almost refined civilization.'
85
 Similarly, ‘the Cretans’ were regarded to be ‘more 
barbarous than the Western islanders’ due to the Civil War, and 'the Christian subject 
races’ of the Ottoman Empire were perceived to be ‘more capable of improvement 
than the Turks’, although ‘at present’ they were ‘scarcely more competent to establish 
civilized governments.'
86
 Similar arguments were made for the Greeks who although 
‘allow[ed] anarchy to prevail in their own country, are more capable of improvement 
and civilization than their rivals [the Turks].'
87
 
Concepts of Christianity, humanity and civilization was equated in the sick-man 
discourse in the Cretan Revolt, similar to the Lebanese case. This articulation 
constituted the basis of the imperialist foreign policy in the British elite; similar to the 
Lebanese example, debates on Cretan Revolt demonstrated that Britain was seen as 
the Power which could reform and restructure the backward regions for ‘their own 
good’. Proponents of the alternative foreign policy criticised the non-interventionist 
policy of the British government and proposed instead to ‘take Christian populations, 
from under Mahometan rule.'
88
 Although the article did not propose a clear alternative 
on where and how the Christians could be taken, it nonetheless argued for 
establishing independent Christian nations as Islam was blamed for the backwardness 
of the region: the 'Christian societies and governments may be slow to attain our 
status of civilization: so they proved in the middle ages’ whereas the ‘Mahometan 
societes and governments can never reach that in any amount of ages’ regardless of 
                                                 
85
 Ibid.  
86
 Turkey, The Saturday Review, 16 November 1867, p. 618. The Cretan Insurrection, The Saturday 
Review, 23 February 1867, p. 225. 
87
 Greece and Turkey, The Saturday Review, 20 July 1867, p. 71.  
88
 Candia, The Examiner, 6 April 1867, p. 210. My emphasis. 
162 
 
 
 
the ‘degree of wisdom in their rules’.
89
  
In this way, the identities of the Greeks, Turks and Muslims were articulated to the 
concept of civilization in the sick-man discourse, which perceived them as an ‘other’ 
of European identity. The Ottoman Christians, albeit having a superior position vis-à-
vis the Ottoman Muslims, were still labelled as such due to their affiliation with the 
Ottoman Empire; they were related to the European civilization only minimally. The 
perceptions of the Eastern Orthodox Christians as ‘semi-civilized’ demonstrated on 
one hand their perceived inferiority against Western Christians, and on the other hand 
demonstrated their superiority to the Ottoman Muslims.  
An article published in The Saturday Review on the unification of Romania, an 
ongoing process in the 1860s, argued that '[t]here is no reason to suppose that the 
Romanians are more barbarous and anarchical then the Christian inhabitants of the 
provinces which are still attached to Turkey.'
90
 In a similar vein, the Cretan Christians 
were described in the same paper as ‘half-civilized dependencies of a semi-barbarous 
Government’ that were ‘easily provoked by local grievances to insurrection.'
91
 Other 
Balkan nationalities, such as the Serbians, were treated similarly and labelled as 
‘partially civilized’; it was argued that 'the prospects of Ser[b]ia would be brighter if 
European politics gave uncultivated races time to rise gradually into civilization.'
92
 
All these examples demonstrated that the Eastern Christians were not perceived as 
‘real’ Europeans; they were still Orientals. 
2.2) The Integrity Discourse  
Similar to the Lebanese Crisis, the Cretan Revolt was not analysed through the prism 
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of a singular discourse. The government’s discourse was significantly different than 
the popular discourse and reproduced only by a few magazines in the press. The 
Saturday Review distinguished itself as the defender of the non-interventionist policy 
and government.  In order to defend the government’s policy, an alternative 
explanation on the causes of the Revolt was constructed. The paper published over 
twenty articles during the course of the Revolt contesting the dominant discourse in 
the British press and supported the official policy primarily by placing the blame of 
the Revolt on the Greeks and Russia rather than the Muslims or the Turks.  
2.2.1) Perceptions of The ‘Eastern Christians’ 
 
'The success of the insurrection was from the first entirely 
dependent on foreign intervention. It was, therefore, the chief 
object of those who directed it to persuade foreigners that 
intervention was the only means of re-establishing peace.
'93
 
 
Victimisation of the Oriental Christians had played a vital role in the sick-man 
discourse in explaining the causes of the Civil War. According to this view, the Crete 
Revolt was a fair Revolt because the Christians fought to liberate themselves from the 
Muslim oppression. The proponents of the government’s policy argued against the 
‘fair Revolt’ perspective by arguing that the Revolt was designed to instigate a foreign 
intervention, as exemplified in the quote above. According to this view, the British 
press presented the Revolt as a ‘fair Revolt’ mainly because of ‘the feeling or 
prejudice which condemns an alien religion’, Islam, in Britain. 94  
According to this alternative view, the prejudice in the Britain against Islam was 
important in reflecting the Revolt, and the Cretan Revolutionaries’ chief aim in 
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uprising was to use this prejudices to provoke a Great Power intervention. In an 
article published in The Saturday Review, the petitions sent by the Cretan Assembly 
in 1866 were defined as being ‘marked by obvious insincerity. '95 Moreover,  it was 
argued that ‘the grievances which were alleged [by the Cretans] at the outset, were 
purely conventional, nor is there any reason to suppose that the people of Crete had 
been recently subjected to peculiar oppression
.'96
 In Parliament, the Prime Minister 
noted that ‘the slightest symptom of armed intervention on the part of the Western 
Powers was looked for by these insurgents.'
97
 
The Cretan Assembly despatched appeals to different addressees in 1866. The 
Assembly met  before the armed revolt began and forwarded a petition to the Sultan, 
where the demands of the Cretans were listed. The British Consul in the island, Mr. 
Dickson, has translated and sent this document to Constantinople, which was 
presented to the House of Commons by the government.
98  
The Assembly then 
addressed a second, secret letter to the representatives of the Great Powers, and 
continued to send similar letters several more times once the armed struggle began. 
The demands of the Cretans differed in the despatches sent to the Sultan and the Great 
Powers; the former stated their main demand as the establishment of a better 
administration under the Ottoman rule. In comparison, the latter demanded to be 
liberated from the Ottoman rule. This difference between the demands was underlined 
in an article published in The Saturday Review to question the ‘true intentions’ of the 
revolutionaries: ‘The Cretans felt assured that their petition would obtain them the 
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direct intervention of the Powers that signed the Treaty of Paris.'
99
 
According to this view, the petition of the revolutionaries was sent to the Sultan, 
although it actually aimed to provoke a Great Power intervention by creating 
disturbances in the Empire's territory. This view challenged the perception of the 
Cretan Revolt constructed by the sick-man discourse as a revolt against an unjust 
regime. The Saturday Review also argued that the victimisation of the Christians was 
as an imaginary scenario which was ‘intended to arouse the sympathy of 
Christendom'.
100
 According to this view, if the Cretans achieve their goal of obtaining 
Great Power intervention, this would set an example for other Christian groups in the 
Balkans: 'The evacuation of Crete, by the Turkish army, and the grant of 
independence to the islanders would only serve as a pretext for the promotion of 
disturbances in the Continental provinces.'
101
  
In parallel to this view, Liberal MP Austen Layard noted that the ‘the unhappy people 
[Cretan Christians] were led to believe that some intervention would take place on 
their behalf’ and this was behind their decision to continue the Revolt which ‘could 
only lead to fresh disasters.’102 Prime Minister Earl of Derby argued in a House of 
Lords Debate that all Consular reports received by the government ‘have shown that 
the complaints of the Christian population have been greatly exaggerated’, or were 
‘without foundation.’103  
In addition, both the government and the articles published in the Saturday Review 
argued that the Cretan Christians were not the ‘victims’ of oppression; on the contrary 
they perpetrated crimes against the Muslims on the island. These arguments were 
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similar to the ones made during the Lebanese Civil War on the Maronite Christians, 
who were deemed as being equally, if not more, responsible for the Civil War by the 
government. In the same speech noted above, the Earl of Derby argued that the ‘there 
is evidence equally strong of atrocities on the part of the Cretans against the 
Mussulmans’ together with the atrocities committed by the Muslims. 104 In a 
Commons debate, Austen Layard also noted that ‘barbarities had been committed … 
by the Christians as well as by the Turks’ and ‘the former perhaps being the more 
ingenious in their tortures.’105 For Layard, the violence were perpetrated by ‘both 
races’ of Crete who ‘were equally barbarous’.106  
Some MPs and newspaper articles during the Lebanese Civil War argued that both the 
Druzes and Maronites were equally barbarous and warlike ‘races’. Lord Stratford, 
who was labelled by other MPs as the ‘master of Turkish question’ argued that there 
was the ‘habitual state of antagonism subsisting between the two separate races’ in 
Crete, analogous to his description of the reason of the Lebanese Civil War.
 107
 
Similarly, Prime Minister Derby stated that ‘the fanaticism on the one side and the 
other, the feelings of mutual hostility and exasperation’ rendered it difficult to govern 
the island by anyone.
 108
 Hence, in various debates, the blame for the Revolt was 
distributed equally among both groups; an explanation which was in continuity with 
the Lebanese case. Lord Stanley stated the Cabinet’s view on the Revolt by saying 
that the ‘blame must be pretty equally allotted to either side’ and these kind of ‘wars 
of religion and race’ ‘will always happen, in a country which … is described as semi-
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barbarous’.109 
In contrast to the arguments of the sick-man discourse, the integrity discourse argued 
that the Christians who were ‘treated as inferiors’ ‘appear to suffer little from 
oppression’ and their oppressors were their ‘own chiefs, and especially their bishops’ 
who were ‘more corrupt and more tyrannical than their alien masters[Turks].'110 In 
some articles, it was noted that the Christians paid more taxes than the Muslims to 
escape from the burden of conscription, and ‘Lord Lyons [British Ambassador to the 
Porte] and the majority of his informants assert[ed] with unhesitating confidence that 
the condition of the subject races has been greatly improved during the present 
generation.'
111
 
The Tanzimat reforms were the cornerstone of the pro-Ottoman arguments in Britain. 
Layard noted that ‘since he first knew Turkey, an incalculable improvement had taken 
place’ because the Ottoman Empire was ‘now under the influence of the public 
opinion of Europe.’112 Gladstone supported the non-intervention policy and noted that 
although he did not believe that the Tanzimat Reforms were successfully 
implemented, the government should support the reforms in the Ottoman Empire and 
persuade them that the ‘the true policy of the Ottoman Empire was to do full justice to 
the principles of the Hatti-Humayoun [Tanzimat Charter]’ and obtain equality 
between the Christians and the Muslims.
 113
  
2.2.2) Arguments on Foreign Policy  
The foreign policy emerged as the main contested practice of the two discourses, 
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similar to the first case study. Defenders of the non-interventionist policy such as 
Layard noted that the position of the ‘Turks in Europe were very much like what the 
English were in Ireland’ and the British were in ‘in the habit of treating Turkey very 
unfairly’. 114 Directly comparing the Ottoman Empire with the British Empire was a 
rare argument, which opposed one of the main presuppositions of the sick-man 
discourse, which described the Ottoman Empire as an ontologically different place 
than the ‘Christian West’. In the same speech, Layard reminded the MPs that the 
British ‘held many millions of Mahomedans in India’ under their control, and thus the 
British policy towards the Ottoman Empire should take the British position in India 
into account: ‘We and they might say, "If Mahomedans have no right to govern 
Christians, Christians have no right to govern Mahomedans" and if they found us 
backing up the Christians in murdering the Turks, who would guarantee the security 
of affairs in India?’115 
Layard’s reminder on India demonstrated that the ‘rationality’ of the non-
interventionist foreign policy in calculating the ‘British interests’. In the Lebanese 
case, the chief British interest in the region was presented as averting the possibility 
of a European War due to the Eastern Question. In the Cretan case, Layard’s speech 
on India added a further dimension to this realpolitik calculations.  
In addition to Layard, an article in The Saturday Review argued that the 
dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire would be ‘dangerous and impracticable’ 
because of the large Muslim populations living in the Balkans. The article argued that 
‘the rights and interests of the 80.000 to 90.000 Mahometans in the island [Crete]’ 
were not taken into consideration by the ‘intolerant’ Christian philanthropists. The 
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paper argued that if the Cretan Revolutionaries are supported, this might encourage 
more revolts and thus result with the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire. In such 
a scenario, the emerging Balkan nations would drive the vast Muslim population of 
the region from their homes, which ‘would be cruelly unjust, and still more to the 
purpose that the attempt would be dangerous, if not impracticable.'
116
  
The critics of the non-interventionist policy during the Lebanese Civil War argued 
that it was not a humanitarian policy as it does not take the civilising ‘duty’ of Britain 
into account. In this way, the concept of humanitarianism, which was defined as a 
mixture of ‘the duty to protect Christians’ and ‘bring civilization to the rest of the 
world’ became the basis of the alternative policy. In comparison, during the Cretan 
Revolt, the defenders of the government’s policy articulated ‘humanitarian reasons’ in 
their discourse as well; supporters of the integrity discourse used humanitarianism as 
a reason to support the Ottoman territorial integrity. For instance, in one article the 
author suggested that the ‘philanthropist habitually confines their regards to 
Christians’, and in order to settle the Eastern Question in accordance with the 
‘sentimental theory’, according to which ‘[t]hree millions of Turks’ living in the 
Balkans ‘have to be killed, or driven beyond the Bosphorus’ in the lack of an 
‘indigenous successor’ which is ready to take Ottoman’s place.117 The probability of 
an Ottoman collapse was thus presented as a possible ‘humanitarian catastrophe’ for 
the Balkan Muslims, and thus the contemporary Eastern policy was presented also as 
a ‘secular humanitarian’ option, which differed from the ‘Christian humanitarianism’ 
of the proponents of the sick-man discourse.   
The government and its supporters attempted to counter the victimisation of the 
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Christians in order to redefine the causes of the Crete Revolt, from an emancipatory 
movement based on just demands to an insurrection aiming at provoking a foreign 
intervention for the purpose of dismemberment of the Empire. The blame of the Civil 
War was placed upon the Ottoman Empire by the sick-man discourse through the 
victimisation of the Christians. Once this victimisation discourse is challenged, the 
proponents of the integrity discourse needed to shift the blame to another party, and in 
this case, these were the ‘foreign powers’ such as Russia and Greece. As noted in 
Chapter 2, the perceptions of the Ottomans in the 19
th
 century Britain were connected 
to the perceptions of the other Eastern Powers, especially Russia and Greece, who 
were seen as the ‘enemies’ of the Ottoman Empire, and in the case of the former, 
enemy of Britain.   
2.2.3) Perceptions on the Russia and Greece  
 
'Tolerable government and civil equality would sooner or later be 
established in Turkey if reforms were allowed time to ripen; but 
before the Crimean War Russia always resisted the internal 
improvement of Turkey, and at present the same influence is 
exercised in the cultivation of disaffection and revolt.' 
118
 
 
Britain fought alongside the Ottoman Empire in 1856 against Russia which 
represented a peak moment in Anglo-Ottoman relations. Russophobia, although not 
as strong as its heyday in the 1830s and 1840s, was still influential in shaping the 
perceptions of Russia in Britain. The integrity discourse linked the anti-Russian 
discourses in Britain in the 1860s to the discourses on the Ottoman Empire to point to 
the ‘real culprit’. 
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Proponents of the integrity discourse depicted Russia as the main threat to the 
Ottoman territorial integrity and, consequently, to the British interests. Russia, as seen 
from the quote above, was both presented as a major obstacle to tranquillity in the 
Ottoman realm and as a Great Power waiting to dismember the Ottoman Empire by 
intervening in the local conflicts. Articles in The Saturday Review noted that ‘the 
demands of Russia’ from the Ottoman Empire were ‘vague and insidious’ as the 
‘Russian Empire would accept no concession in full satisfaction of the supposed 
claims of the Christian population.'
119
 In another article, Russia was blamed for 
looking for ‘a plausible pretext for intervention on behalf of a Christian community 
supposed to be oppressed by a Mahometan government.'
120
  
The Ottoman Empire was presented as the main culprit of the Revolt by the defenders 
of the sick-man discourse. In comparison, pro-government circles claimed that the 
responsibility of the Revolt laid with ‘Emperor Alexander and his Ministers’ who 
‘constantly announced in menacing language their entire sympathy with the cause of 
the insurgents'
121
 and encouraged the ‘rebellion’ in Crete. Russia’s conduct in the 
Revolt contrasted with the British policy which ‘wisely abstained from incurring the 
responsibility of promoting civil war and anarchy by encouraging a hopeless 
rebellion.’122 
Even the opponents of the non-interventionist policy in Parliament, such as William 
Gregory, argued that the Russian policy was ‘one of pure self-interest and 
aggrandizement’ and thus ‘had no desire to see’ the Balkan nations ‘rise, thrive, and 
become strong, self-governing, and satisfied.’123 Instead, it was argued that the object 
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of the Russian policy was ‘to keep the Eastern Christians united … in constant 
discontent and turbulence.’124 Similarly, another opponent of the government in the 
House of Lords, Duke of Argyll, stated that the ‘Western Nations of Europe’ should 
act as the protectors of the Eastern Christians and the British government should show 
its ‘determination that Russia should not exercise the protectorate’ in the Balkans. 125  
The general perceptions on Russia was linked to the European political context; in 
1863, a few years before the Crete Revolt, the Russian Empire had crushed an 
uprising in Poland, which intensified the anti-Russian sentiments in British public 
opinion. The impact of this event was evident in the debates on the Cretan Revolt. An 
article in The Saturday Review argued that 'Russia treated Poland more cruelly than 
the Turks are likely, if they succeed, to treat their revolting subjects.'
126
 Another 
article referred to Layard’s speech in the Commons and concluded that ‘the Turks 
have never assailed the national existence of subject Slaves or Greeks with the 
systematic cruelty which Russian government displays at Poland.'
127
  
Russia’s treatment of the Polish revolutionaries raised questions about their aims in 
the Cretan Revolt; one article claimed that ‘Russia is only anxious to protect the 
Christians subjects of Turkey’ after ‘they disposed of Poland.’128 Russia’s behaviour 
during the Cretan Revolt was labelled as ‘hypocrisy’, and Russia’s sympathy towards 
the Cretan revolutionaries were thus interpreted as an anti-Ottoman conspiracy. 
Following Ali Pasha’s visit to the island in 1867 and his proposal to end the rebellion, 
Russia’s role in the uprising was further questioned. According to one article, the 
Ottoman territorial integrity should be defended by Britain because the ‘Russian 
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influence [in the Empire] became gradually more and more evident’ and the best 
demonstration of this influence would be the continuation of the Cretan Revolt:  ‘if 
the insurrection should be continued after the late concessions of the Sultan, it will be 
because of Russia and not Greece, gives the word of command.’129 
Greece was the second state that was attributed the blame for the Cretan Revolt. In 
Parliament, Layard was a vocal critic of Greece, which was blamed for not only to 
‘encourage the insurgents’, but also for being the main cause of it with the aim of 
annexing the island.
 130
 Layard argued that the ‘movement for independence and 
annexation to Greece was instigated, directed, and supplied with money and 
volunteers from Athens’, and if ‘the insurrection had not been countenanced and 
supported from Greece, tranquillity would have been long since restored.’131 
Layard’s arguments were supported by the Prime Minister in Parliament. In 
answering to William Gregory, Lord Stanley stated that ‘for no doubt, the centre of 
the movement was in Greece.’132 Similarly, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, the Earl 
of Derby, noted in the House of Lords, that ‘the leading men in the Greek Ministry 
were among the most active agents in forwarding of supplies’, and he agreed with 
Layard that it was this constant supply of weapons which prolonged the conflict in 
Crete.
 133
 Articles published in The Saturday Review also claimed that the 'Greek 
agents seized the opportunity of working on the minds of the Cretan Christians' 
through ‘two great delusions of the modern Greek mind’; Greek nationalism and 
religion, which were ‘operating as incentives to revolution in the Ottoman Empire.'134 
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The overall perceptions of Greece in the 1860s suffered after the British decision to 
transfer the Ionian Islands from Britain to Greece in 1862. The takeover of the island 
was completed in 1864, and although only three years had passed from the transfer of 
the Ionian Islands, it was argued that the islands ‘degenerated into anarchy as soon as 
they were deprived of the mild and regular administration of England’ and ‘have 
suffered from the union [with Greece]’.135 The paper did not substantiate why and 
how the conditions of the islands ‘degenerated’ and argued that the Ionian example 
demonstrated the inability of the Greek state to govern; if Crete was given to Greece, 
it would govern the island ‘on nearly the same principles which have been adopted in 
practice by successive Pashas.'
136
  
The perceptions of Greece resembled the sick-man discourse’s perceptions on the 
Ottoman Empire. Greece was placed in opposition to Britain, where the latter was an 
example of ‘good government' and ‘just and liberal administration’ and the former 
was represented as a ‘practical anarchy.’137 The case of the Ionian Islands was used 
against Greece, similar to the relationship between Poland and Russia, in order to 
argue that the Cretan Revolt, in essence, aimed the secession of the island to Greece 
and, therefore, was instigated and directed by the Greek state. In this way, Russia and 
Greece were presented as the main culprits of the Revolt in place of the Ottoman 
Empire or the Muslims.  
2.2.4) Perceptions of the Ottoman Empire  
Presenting the foreign actors as the main reason for the Cretan Revolt paved the way 
for a different perception of the Ottoman Empire. As the blame was shifted to other 
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actors, pro-Ottoman MPs such as Layard argued that ‘allowance must be made for the 
Turkish Government’ because they needed to contend the ‘feelings and prejudices of 
a dominant race’ as well as putting down the Revolt. 138 Similarly, Lord Stanley 
argued that there was ‘not the slightest evidence to show that the atrocities were 
‘sanctioned or even tolerated by the Turkish government.’139 In the House of Lords, 
Derby articulated the government’s view that the Consular papers submitted to 
Parliament disproved ‘any barbarity on the part of the superior officers’ of the 
Ottoman Army and there were ‘numerous cases’ which had shown that ‘prisoners 
were treated with the greatest possible kindness.’140 The Prime Minister stated that 
although the desire of the Porte was ‘to deal equitably and impartially between the 
Mussulman and the Christian populations of the Crete’; the fanaticism and mutual 
hostility of the local population rendered it difficult to put down the Revolt.
 141
 
In the Lebanese case, the Ottoman government was defended by the British 
government, especially by Prime Minister Palmerston, and the blame was put on the 
local Ottoman governors, who were removed from their positions by the Porte 
simultaneously. The Cabinet continued to defend the Ottoman central government in 
the Cretan case, although with less intensity. The death of Palmerston resulted in the 
loss of the staunchest defender of the non-interventionist policy and also a respected 
expert whose command on the Eastern affairs was accepted by everyone. The Foreign 
Secretary Derby articulated arguments similar to those of Palmerston’s by stating 
‘there have been excesses committed on both sides’ which were ‘committed against 
the wishes of the Turkish government’, and thus removed the Ottoman government’s 
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responsibility from the Revolt.
 142
  
The chief aim of the government in constructing an alternative perception of the 
Ottoman Empire was to provide moral support for the public on the British foreign 
policy. The primary goal of the non-interventionist policy in the East was to protect 
the British interests, which were defined in the Cretan case to counter the Russian 
influence on the Ottoman Empire. In both cases, the government’s policy lacked the 
‘popular appeal’ such as defending Christianity or protecting victims of oppression, 
which the alternative policy possessed. This necessitated the construction of an 
alternative vision of Cretan Revolt in which Russia, a popular enemy figure in 
Britain, emerged as the main reason of the Revolt. In this way, the Ottoman Empire 
was presented not as a barbarous Muslim power, but as an ally fighting against the 
common enemy.   
3.) Conclusion 
The second case study focused on the debates made on the Cretan Revolt to capture 
the perceptions on the ‘Ottomans’. The first outcome of this chapter is the 
‘pervasiveness of the discourses’ underlined in the Lebanese Civil War. The various 
periodicals examined in this chapter revealed the reproduction of the perception on 
the ‘Ottomans’ in close proximity to the ones constructed in the first case study.  
The government’s discourse and the popular discourse differed from each other. The 
official discourse in Britain cross-cut party differences as both Liberal and 
Conservative Cabinets pursued non-interventionist foreign policy. However, as in the 
Lebanese case, only one main paper in the press was aligned with the government, 
while the rest reproduced the ‘popular’ discourse.  
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The second important outcome was the increased usage of the term ‘civilization’ in 
defining the ‘Ottomans’ such as the Muslims, Turks and the Eastern Christians. The 
British press' perception of the Ottomans and Muslims was primarily shaped in 
relation to the ‘civilization’, which was an example of the ‘articulatory process’ as 
defined by Laclau and Mouffe. Although the term was used in the first case study as 
well, it assumed a more central position in the Cretan case. The proponents of the 
sick-man discourse defined the Ottoman Empire as an ‘uncivilized’ Empire; the 
‘other’ of Europe. Similarly, various social groups were labelled as ‘semi-civilized’ or 
‘semi-barbarous’, marking their inferiority to Europe and their differences from each 
other.  
Although the integrity discourse differed from the sick-man discourse in identifying 
the underlying causes of the Cretan Revolt, it shared the belief of the latter on the 
European supremacy. Two opposite discourses in the public level appealed to 
different solutions, but they shared the view that the Eastern Question should be 
solved either as dismemberment or as preservation of the Empire by the 'civilized' 
Europe.   
Religion was used as one of the key concepts to explain the Cretan Revolt, similar to 
the Lebanese Civil War in British press. During the Cretan Crisis, a variety of 
different journals, from religious press to Liberal press and political journals, 
analysed the Cretan Revolt within the religious context based in the Christian v. 
Muslim dichotomy. These explanations constructed the popular perception of the 
Muslim which was defined as ‘barbaric and indolent’. In a similar vein, the 
perception of the ‘Turk’ was ‘fierce and barbarous’.  
Discourses on civilization revealed two crucial points for the purpose of this research. 
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On one hand, since the precondition of these discourses was the unshakeable belief in 
the Western supremacy over the East, the British press hegemonized the meaning of 
civilization and equated it to the Western political institutions and economic system. 
Moreover, defining the ‘Ottomans’ as ‘semi-barbarous’ people had an impact on the 
British foreign policy towards the Ottoman Empire. Since the Ottoman society was 
not perceived as an equal of Britain and 'civilized' Europe, their fate became decided 
in the West.  As the sick-man discourse became more radical in arguing the Ottoman 
‘otherness’, the proposed foreign policy became more ‘forward’ which insisted on 
breaking with the non-interventionist neutral policy.  
As a result of the Cretan Revolt, the sick-man discourse became more widespread in 
the British press, although it did not accumulate enough power to alter the British 
official discourse. This ‘living’ rivalry between these two discourses continued to 
dominate the political scene in the following decade, and reached its climax during 
the Bulgarian Atrocities Agitation, which will be analysed in the following chapter.  
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Chapter 7: Bulgarian Atrocities 
Agitation of 1876 
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1.) Introduction 
The previous chapters analysed the British perception of the Ottomans during 1860s, 
and concluded that the political crises in the Ottoman Empire was explained through 
two different discourses; the official and the popular discourse. The final case study 
analyses the Balkan Crisis (1875-78), one of the major diplomatic events of the 
1870s. 
The Balkan Crisis of 1875-1878 was consisted of three main phases. The first phase 
started with a peasant revolt in Bosnia, which was followed by an unsuccessful 
uprising in Bulgaria in 1876. The Bulgarian atrocities campaign in Britain started in 
mid-June 1876 and ended in 1877 which aimed at protesting the Bulgarian civilian 
causalities as a result of the Ottoman efforts to suppress the revolt. The third and last 
phase of the Crisis started when the Russian Empire declared war on the Ottoman 
Empire in April 1877. The war resulted with a decisive Russian victory in March 
1878 which paved the way for post-war diplomacy in the summer of 1878 in order to 
put an end to the Crisis. 
The Balkan Crisis, in comparison to the Lebanese Civil War and Cretan Revolt, was 
discussed in much more detail in Britain. Four figures provided in the Appendix 1 
reflects on the significance of the Balkan Crisis for the British public and Parliament. 
Figure 1 presents an account of the number of journal articles published on the 
Ottoman Empire between 1860 and 1882 in various British periodicals. The average 
number of articles in British periodicals was around 600 per year until throughout the 
1860s. However, this figure was more than doubled between 1876-78; at the height of 
the crisis, British periodical press produced nearly 1400 articles.  
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Similarly, Figure 2 analyses the number of news reports published on the Ottoman 
Empire and Figure 3 enlists the number of Parliamentary debates made on the 
‘Ottomans’ in the 1860-1878 period. Both figures demonstrates a huge surge in the 
number of news reports and parliamentary debates made on the Ottoman Empire. 
Figure 4 presents a comparative analysis of the foreign policy debates in the British 
Parliament; other relevant foreign policy issues like Italian unification and relations 
of China follows a rather stable pattern throughout the decade, whereas during the 
Balkan Crisis years, debates on the Ottoman Empire and Russia constituted a much 
larger percentage compared to the other countries. In addition, Figure 4 shows that 
there is a positive correlation between the debates on the Russian Empire and the 
Ottoman Empire, which demonstrates the close relationship between the perceptions 
of the two.   
 
A final graph, Figure 5, represents the number of speeches given on Bulgaria and 
shows the relevance of the Bulgarian atrocities campaign to the overall debate on the 
Ottoman Empire and foreign policy. Bulgaria was not mentioned at all in the 
Parliament until 1876 and then quickly became the focal point of foreign policy 
debate in 1877 and 1878, where around 150 speeches were made in the Parliament.   
2.) Historical Background 
1
 
The Balkan Crisis started with a revolt in Herzegovina in July 1875 and ended with 
the Treaty of Berlin, signed in June 1878 between Russia and the Ottoman Empire 
under the auspices of the other European Powers. The three years long Crisis 
unfolded on two cards; the diplomatic one where the European Powers rivalled with 
each other to increase their influence in the region, and the local one where nationalist 
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groups were at the forefront. The Crisis had major impacts on Britain, the Ottoman 
Empire and Europe. Three new Balkan countries, Serbia, Montenegro and Romania 
were formally established alongside an autonomous Bulgaria; Anglo-Ottoman 
relations severed and never recovered from the Crisis, and in Britain, a major public 
protest shook the government. 
The Herzegovinian revolt was caused by a mixture of socio-economic reasons, Pan-
Slav nationalist sentiments and foreign support to the revolutionaries.
2
 Different 
scholars had given different importance to these three elements. Shaw, points out that 
the rebellions beginning was ‘due to’ foreign agitation, while Jelavich singles out the 
‘extreme discontent of the Christian peasants working in the lands of Muslim Slavic 
landowners’ as the major reason of the Revolt. Turkish scholar Aydin, on contrary, 
argues that Pan-Slavist organisations were the major power behind the uprising. A.J.P. 
Taylor, different from all, argued that the insurrection was a ‘true national revival’. 
Although the exact reasons of the outbreak are disputed, both the majority of 
historians and contemporary Foreign Office agree that the revolt was primarily an 
‘agrarian uprising’ of the Christian peasants who used to cultivate the lands belonging 
to the Muslims, and had been subjected to extremely harsh taxation. The taxation 
reforms was one of the main reforms of the Tanzimat period. Ottoman attempts for 
direct taxation failed in 1860s and during the time of the revolt, state lands were 
cultivated by large landowners who paid an annual sum to the Ottoman state and then 
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taxed the peasants living under near-serfdom conditions.
3
  
From the beginning of the Herzegovinian uprising in 1875, Montenegro, Serbia and 
Three-Emperors League (Austria-Hungary, Germany and Russia) were involved in 
the revolt in various degrees. The impact of Montenegro, Serbia, Russia and Austria 
on the continuation of the revolt has been debated in the literature. Some, like Sumner 
and Millman underline that the Russian influence through their agents, volunteers and 
money was highly significant. In his recently published essay Kovic notes that 
recently published Russian material shows that the Russians were suspicious of 
Austrian influence. Stojanovic on the other hand asserts that the insurrection was ‘the 
result of’ Serbian propaganda and preparations.4  
The Ottoman Empire in the 1870s was in complete financial disorder due to the debt 
crisis that hit the Ottoman economy following the global recession of 1873.
5
 The 
heavy borrowing from the European bond markets during the 1860s and 1870s in 
highly unfavourable terms was the major cause of the deterioration of the Ottoman 
economy.
 6
  The economic crisis deepened in 1876 and affected the Ottoman army 
funding, which impeded their ability to organize successful military campaigns to 
quell the Revolt. Moreover, the complex nature of the revolt, due to this mixture of 
socio-economic reasons and foreign interference, lowered the chances of a ‘military 
solution’. As a result, the revolt spread to Bosnia in August 1875.  
The Herzegovinian-Bosnian Revolt generated European diplomatic interest from its 
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beginning in the summer 1875. The League of Three Emperors convened in Berlin 
with the aim of ‘assisting the Ottoman Empire’ to put an end to the disturbances. In 
August 1875, the Russian Ambassador to the Porte Count Ignatiev proposed to 
mediate between the Ottomans and the rebels to the Porte on behalf of the League. 
The outcome of the consultation was the Andrassy Note of December 1875, which 
was accepted by the Ottomans in February 1876 but rejected by the rebels.
 7
 The 
Andrassy Note, named after the Austrian Foreign Minister Count Andrassy, proposed 
reforms which were similar to the Tanzimat reforms in the areas of taxation and 
religious equality in exchange for an immediate ceasefire. As a further guarantee to 
the rebels, the Consuls of the Powers were empowered to supervise the 
implementation of the reforms. Although the Andrassy Note was proposed on behalf 
of the League, the French, British and Italians were also included to the supervision 
process. The Note was rejected by the rebels as they demanded nothing less than 
autonomy for Bosnia and Herzegovina.  
A second attempt, the Berlin memorandum, which was similar to the Andrassy Note 
was issued in May 1876 and was flatly rejected first by Britain, who responded by 
sending its fleet to the Dardanelles to demonstrate the British interest in protecting the 
Straits. Disraeli’s motives in his move were partly stemmed from the omission of 
Britain from the Berlin Memorandum process since the Memorandum was discussed 
and agreed by Dreikaiserbund alone without involving Britain or France and partly 
for his desire in continuing the Palmerstonian Eastern policy.
 8
 The Memorandum 
proposed a two months ceasefire during which the reforms would be implemented 
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and the Ottoman government would assist in rebuilding houses and providing relief. 
The point which triggered Disraeli’s negative reaction was the ambiguous statement, 
which noted that ‘if the armistice should expire before an agreement as to the 
necessary reforms, it would be necessary to take “efficacious measures in the interests 
of peace”.’9 The threat of a European –which was read as Russian in Cabinet- 
intervention was perceived negatively by Disraeli and his cabinet. Moreover, Disraeli 
was reluctant to grant autonomy to Bosnia, which was one of the conditions of the 
Memorandum because he related the condition of Bosnia to Ireland.
10
 He explained 
these points in a note addressed to the Cabinet, and his suggestion to decline the 
Memorandum was accepted unanimously.
11
    
One impact of the deep economic crisis in the Ottoman Empire was the political 
turmoil. Sultan Abdulaziz was deposed with a palace coup in May 1876 by an 
alliance of his reformer Grand Vizier Midhat Pasha and his chief of staff Hussein 
Avni Pasha. Following Abdulaziz’s deposition, his brother Murat V ascended to the 
Ottoman throne. However, Murat’s poor mental health exacerbated the political crisis; 
Abdulaziz was found dead in his room on 4 July, and by then, it became clear that 
Murat was unfit to rule the Ottoman Empire. It was then decided to place Abdulhamid 
II on the throne, who promised to promulgate the constitution and open the 
parliament, and he became the new Sultan on 31 August 1876.   
While the diplomats were working on a solution, two important events escalated the 
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Crisis; an uprising in Bulgaria which started at the end of April 1876, and Serbia’s 
and Montenegro’s declaration of war on the Ottomans in June 1876. The literature 
agrees that the Bulgarian revolution, nationalist in character, was weak and 
disorganised and even a failure. Paradoxically, what made the Revolt achieve its goals 
was not its success but its failure; it was suppressed by the Ottoman auxiliary troops 
with considerable brutality. The number of casualties in Bulgaria is debated in the 
literature, estimates vary from 4,000 to 100,000, which included a large number of 
civilian deaths. Shaw noted that around 4,000 Christians were killed against ‘much 
more’ Muslim death which were gone unnoticed. Contemporary official report by 
Consul Dupuis mentioned 12,000 deaths while Times correspondent Edwin Pears 
reported 30,000.
12
  
The news of the massacres committed by the Ottomans in Bulgaria was influential 
enough to provoke Pan-Slav anger and led to Serbia’s and Montenegro’s declaration 
of war. The war between the Ottomans and Serbia and Montenegro resulted in a quick 
defeat for both countries at the hands of the Ottomans in August 1876. Consequently, 
Russia intervened on their behalf and demanded an armistice to be signed, which was 
agreed by the Ottoman Empire on October 1876.
  
Russian position was strengthened 
with mutual non-intervention agreement signed between Russia and the Austria in 
July 7. According to this agreement, if the Ottomans defeated the rebels, they would 
act to make sure the Ottomans would not benefit from the victory. If the Ottomans 
had lost, Russia would acquire Bessarabia while Austria-Hungary invade part of the 
Bosnia.  Russian position throughout the crisis swing between the interventionist Pan-
Slavist party and the non-interventionists. Tsar Alexander, after great reluctance, gave 
way to the war party in November 1876 following the defeat of Serbia and 
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Montenegro at the hands of the Ottomans. 
The British Foreign Secretary, Lord Derby, proposed another conference in 
Constantinople, which was convened in December 1876 as a final attempt to put an 
end to the Crisis.
 13
 The Great Powers suggested harsh terms to the Ottoman Empire 
to conclude the Crisis, which included the creation of large and autonomous Bulgaria. 
The Porte, under the leadership of the reformist Midhat Pasha, decided to refuse the 
terms and promulgated a constitution which established the first parliament in the 
opening day of the Conference. Consequently, the Ottomans proposed a new reform 
programme which was rebuffed both by the Great Powers and the rebels.  
The Conference ended without any success, and following a few months of 
diplomatic efforts, Russia declared war on the Ottoman Empire in March 1877, which 
ended with the Ottoman capitulation in January 1878.
 
The two states signed the 
Treaty of San-Stefano in April 1878 which created a large and autonomous Bulgaria, 
designed to maximise the Russian sphere of influence in Balkans. This was strongly 
objected by Britain and Austria-Hungary, and another European conference to discuss 
the peace conditions was convened in Berlin, in which Bismarck acted as the ‘honest 
broker’ between conflicting Powers. Germany was the least interested party in this 
affair alongside France, who was recently defeated by Germany and in political 
turmoil.  
The Treaty of Berlin (1878) depended primarily on the secret agreement signed on 30 
May 1878 between Salisbury, the recently appointed British Secretary of Foreign 
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Affairs, and Shuvalov, Russian Ambassador to Britain.
14
 The Treaty included 69 
clauses divided into 9 headers. Bulgaria, who was envisaged as a unified state in San 
Stefano Treaty, was split in three, one autonomous, one semi-autonomous and one 
under direct Ottoman rule. Bosnia-Hercegovina was occupied and administrated by 
Austria-Hungary. Serbia, Montenegro and Romania’s became independent, and 
Russia’s territorial gains were limited to three towns in Eastern Anatolia and 
Bessarabia. The Ottoman Empire promised to implement reforms for religious 
equality.  
The Balkan region with its populations, wealth and culture was very significant for 
the Ottoman Empire and it was one of the most economically developed part of the 
Ottoman Empire. Following the Treaty of Berlin, the Ottoman Empire lost control of 
the considerable portion of its Balkan territories encompassing two-fifths of the 
Empire's total land, and 5.5 million of its citizens of whom a significant portion were 
Muslims.
15
 Consequently, the large exodus of Muslim masses into the Ottoman 
Empire from the Balkans (the population of Constantinople doubled in 1877 with the 
flow of Muslim refugees from Bulgaria) had a significant effect on the Empire, its 
ideology and daily life for the next three decades. 
2.1) The British Foreign Policy 
In terms of the British Eastern policy, the ten years from the end of Cretan Crisis of 
1866-68 and the beginning of the Balkan Crisis of 1875-78 witnessed rapid and 
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significant transformations in both British domestic politics and foreign policy.  
An important event, which influenced the British Eastern policy, was the opening of 
the Suez Canal in 1869. Following its opening, the canal's share of British trade with 
the Far East rapidly increased, making the defence of the Suez Canal and Egypt a top 
priority for Britain.
16
 Particularly after the purchase of the Canal's majority shares by 
Britain in 1875, the focus of the British strategic defence in the Near East started to 
shift to the Red Sea and Egypt. The Straits and the Eastern Mediterranean, which 
during Palmerstonian years, were the invaluable locations, lost their position. The 
increasing British commitment to the Suez Canal and Egypt's protection was declared 
by Lord Derby, in December 1877, at the peak of the Russo-Ottoman War when he 
communicated to Gorchakov, the Russian Foreign Minister that an attack on the Suez 
Canal and Egypt would be considered as casus belli by Britain.
17
 The security of the 
Canal was established with consequent moves, by acquiring Cyprus from the 
Ottoman Empire in 1878 (in exchange of supporting the Empire at the Berlin peace 
conference) and finally with the invasion of Egypt in 1882.  
The balance of power established in the Near East after the Crimean War was altered 
by the increased power of Germany in late 1860s; the Prussian army defeated France 
in 1870, which led to the collapse of Napoleon III’s rule in France. The unification of 
Germany in 1871 and the defeat of France had an impact on the international 
relations. Russia repudiated the Black Sea Clauses of the Paris Treaty (1856), which 
demilitarized the Black Sea region in 1870, and although Gladstone protested against 
it, this change was confirmed with the London Treaty in 1871. Two direct results of 
this Treaty affected the Near East for the next ten years; Russia reacquired the right to 
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build a Black Sea fleet which was detrimental for British interests, but conceded to 
the British demand that the international treaties could not be changed by unilateral 
action.
18
 The latter was the legal basis of the Berlin Conference (1878) with which 
Russia accepted to lay San Stefano Treaty under European examination. 
The collapse of the French Empire in 1870 and the unification of Germany were the 
most serious threats to British influence in the East. Germany under Bismarck 
engineered a triple-alliance with Austria-Hungary and Russia in 1873. Even though it 
lasted only three years and collapsed due to the differences between the latter two 
Empires over East Europe, the alliance demonstrated the increasing influence and 
power of Germany in the East. Bismark’s increased influence was proven by his 
‘honest broker’ position, which he assumed firstly in the London Treaty (1871), in 
main Anglo-Russian diplomatic conflicts.  
Finally, a new wave of European colonialism, known as the ‘new imperialism’, began 
to rise in the 1870s. Between 1875 and 1914, one quarter of the world’s land surface 
was partitioned between several nations, and Britain acquired over 4 million square 
miles in this period, leading the process in front of France and Germany, who 
acquired 3.5 and 1 million sq. miles respectively.
19
 This demonstrated the rising 
tensions and rivalry between ‘industrial’ European nations which disturbed the careful 
balance of power in Europe preserved until the 1870s, especially when the Ottoman 
Empire was under question. New imperialism triggered implementation of ‘forward’ 
foreign policy in Britain, which was based on military power. This policy shift made 
the conciliatory, non-intervention policy less popular and more difficult to implement 
because the rivalry between the European Powers became more intense.  
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2.2) British Public and the Events on the Balkans 
In terms of home politics, a highly significant factor which had an impact on British 
policy formation was the Reform Act of 1867, which enlarged the franchise and 
popularized the politics in Britain.  The transformations of 1860s and 1870s were not 
confined to party politics in its strict sense. The enlargement of the franchise also 
paved the way for the evolution of non-party politics through two important 
mediums, free press and pressure groups. The abolition of stamp and paper duty by 
the Liberals in 1860s resulted in the creation of penny dailies, newspapers which were 
remarkably cheaper than their predecessors and thus, with a much higher circulation 
figures. The most important of the penny dailies was the Daily News, whose 
circulation had been around 5,000 for most of 1860s and hit 150,000 in 1871 
following the reduction of its price to 1d. The Daily News was one of the most 
influential papers during the Balkan Crisis and Bulgarian atrocities agitation with the 
Telegraph; the circulation of both papers increased (Figure 6) as the two papers’ 
position on the events of Bulgaria opposed each other. Wadsworth notes that during 
1870s and 1880s ‘the chief penny mornings in London ranged from 300,000 to 
90,000 or less; the principal provincial dailies from 40,000 to 20,000 … The Times at 
3d came in between.’20  
The increase in circulation also brought important changes to the style of journalism. 
During the 1860s, the foreign news was confined to specialist periodicals with small 
and London based ‘gentlemanly’ readership. The popularisation of the daily 
newspapers, new technological advances in printing and utilisation of the telegraph, 
meant that in the 1870s, the newspapers were not confined to London or the 
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aristocratic class any longer. The rise of the provincial press meant rise of the middle 
class readership in Britain.  
As the enlargement of the franchise ‘democratised’ the elections to a certain extent, 
the institutionalisation of the party politics in Britain was the second factor in this 
process. The death of Palmerston in 1865 paved the way for the transformation of 
politics in Britain and a new balance in British politics emerged in late 1860s, 
following the retirement and death of the older generation of politicians who had 
dominated the British elite, such as Lord Russell and Lord Derby. The retirement of 
Russell resulted with Gladstone’s21 ascendance to the Liberal Party leadership. 
Gladstone’s main rival was Benjamin Disraeli who became the leader of the 
Conservatives after Derby’s death in 1869, and on the surface, the two leaders 
dominated the British politics as the heads of their parties until Disraeli’s death in 
1881.  
Gladstone won the first elections after the Reform Bill in 1868 and lost the elections 
in 1874 to Disraeli’s conservatives. Following his defeat, Gladstone announced his 
retirement from politics, although he was elected as an MP, and relinquished his 
position as  leader of the Liberal Party. Gladstone’s return from retirement was partly 
attributed to the Atrocities Agitation in 1876, his first active and passionate 
contribution to a public debate after his retirement. As Disraeli’s health and power 
waned, Gladstone’s increased; he returned to politics in 1879 and won the 1880 
elections.  
During the Cretan Revolt, consequent British governments of Liberals and 
Conservatives deployed the ‘non-interventionist’ policy and thus pursued a common 
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policy towards the Ottoman Empire. The increased rivalry in the 1870s between the 
two parties contributed to the emergence of a more intense opposition to the 
Conservative government’s ‘Palmerstonian’ Eastern policy by the Liberals.  
Lastly, the same period witnessed a proliferation of non-party interest groups 
campaigning for every single important political issue. The Bulgarian Atrocities 
Agitation was created and developed in this atmosphere as a result of the popularity 
of non-party political campaigning in the 1870s Britain, where the ‘public’ protests 
against the policies of the state was widespread.  
3.) The Bulgarian Atrocities Agitation 
All these transformations in British newspapers, the rise of interest groups and the 
increase of franchise democratised the British society in 1870s, and it was this 
atmosphere that made the Bulgarian Atrocities Agitation possible. The Agitation was 
a political campaign as a response to the massacres committed by the Ottoman forces, 
and developed into a series of public meetings across Britain in protest of the 
Ottoman crimes and British government’s policy, during September-December 1876. 
The Foreign Office documents contain a total of 455 petitions addressed to Lord 
Derby, protesting government’s pro-Ottoman foreign policy. 90% of these documents 
were dated between 1 September and 9 October; the Agitation in October and 
November lost momentum in terms of the meetings organised.
 22
 This was because of 
the Russian war ultimatum to the Ottomans in November 1876 and waning public 
interest. The final meeting of the Agitation nevertheless was the ‘National Conference 
for the Eastern Question’, convened in London in December, parallel to the 
diplomatic conference organised in Constantinople.  
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The Agitation started with the reports of the Daily News on massacres committed 
against the Christian civilians in Bulgaria by the Ottoman irregular forces on and after 
June 1876. The Ottomans, because of the financial chaos, deployed a large number of 
irregular troops, formed by the Circassian immigrants among others, known as 
basibozuks, instead of regular troops, who crushed the Bulgarian uprising with 
brutality and attacked civilians alongside the Bulgarian revolutionaries. 
23
 
Simultaneously, The Times reproduced reports of the same kind and a parliamentary 
debate started in July and August 1876 on the conduct of the British Foreign Office 
on these crimes.  
This thesis analyses the Bulgarian Atrocities Agitation campaign in three distinct 
phases. The first phase of the Agitation was the journalistic phase: started in 23 June 
and lasted until 7 August and was the period when the Agitation was driven forward 
by the Daily News and supported by The Times. The second period started in August 
when W.E. Stead, the editor of the Northern Echo, joined the Agitation in the North 
and started to call for mass demonstrations against the British government to protest 
their support to the Ottoman Empire.
 24
 The third phase started in September with 
both Gladstone's intervention with his pamphlet, the Bulgarian Horrors, where he 
attacked the government’s policy during the Crisis in September 1876. This period 
witnessed the multiplication of the public meetings on the Bulgarian atrocities. The 
majority of public meetings were organised in September. The most active groups in 
the agitation were non-conformists and various working men’s associations; 75% of 
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all petitions were sent to the Foreign Office by the former, 21% by the latter. 
25
 
The newspaper reports published in Britain in the first phase of the Agitation 
constituted the basis of the Atrocities Agitation. The reports conflicted with each 
other in terms of the civilian deaths in Bulgaria. The Daily News correspondent Pears 
estimated 30,000 deaths,
26
 the US Ambassador to the Ottoman Empire Schuyler 
20,000 deaths, whereas MacGahan, Daily News special reporter who had travelled to 
Bulgaria with Consul Schuyler, estimated around 8,000 deaths in just a single town, 
Batak, alone.
27
 The official British report from Bulgaria prepared by Mr. Baring, the 
second secretary to the British Ambassador in Constantinople, estimated the total 
casualties to be around 12,000 people, considerably less than Schuyler and 
MacGahan.
28
 Albeit the validity of the reports published in Britain can be debated, 
their impact on public opinion was significant. 
The Bulgarian Atrocities Agitation has been discussed in several monographs, mostly 
as an episode of the 1870s Balkan Crisis rather than being on its own. The majority of 
the studies were published in the 1930s and the interest in the subject waned in the 
post-war period.
29
 Two studies which were exclusively on the Bulgarian Atrocities 
Agitation were published in the post-War era, by Richard Shannon in 1963 and by 
Ann-Pottinger Saab in 1991.
30
 The former, by far the best available work analysing 
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the Bulgarian Atrocities Agitation, focused on Gladstone’s role during the Agitation, 
and the latter attempted the same in a larger period, going back to the 1850s. This 
chapter differs from both works on scope and methodology. It follows Shannon’s 
chronological scope by analysing the Agitation proper, which was between July-
December 1876, but differs completely by deploying a discourse analytical approach 
to unravel the language of the Agitation. The scope of this paper is, thus, not the 
writing of a history of the Bulgarian Atrocities Agitation, but to analyse it in order to 
understand the construction of the Ottoman/Turkish/Muslim identities in Britain at a 
period when the public attention was on the East.   
3.1) The First Phase of the Agitation 
The Agitation began with the news reports published in British press on the 
‘atrocities’ committed in Bulgaria. The first phase built the Agitation from the top; the 
newspapers not only informed the public about the crimes, but also constructed a 
view of the situation in Bulgaria, to an uninformed public. The underlining theme of 
the news was the concept of ‘atrocity’ or the crimes committed on the civilians. The 
whole of the Agitation was developed in relation to this concept, which had a 
significant influence on the perceptions of the ‘Ottomans’.  
3.1.1) Perceptions on the ‘Turk’ 
The first news was reported in the Daily News by its Constantinople correspondent 
Edwin Pears about the ‘atrocities’ committed in Bulgaria, which did not led to much 
interest in British press.
 31
 Pears reported  that on April 23 ‘the Turks killed and cut 
into pieces a merchant … Mukhtar Pacha the commander of the Turks in Herzegovina 
lured a Montenegrin named Torica Kavalevich into his camp, and then cut off his 
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head...’32  
The first example was similar to the arguments developed in the first two case studies 
which presented the Christians as the victims and the Muslims or the Ottoman Empire 
as the oppressor. However, the difference between the Agitation and the Lebanese and 
Cretan Crisis was not in the content or in the arguments; it was in the presentation of 
the news. The new journalistic style which was labelled as the ‘New Journalism’ led 
to the ‘sensationalisation’ of the news reports. Similar arguments were made with 
much more intensity; victims presented as more innocent and the perpetrators as more 
villainous.  
New Journalism was a term coined in 1887 by the English poet Matthew Arnold. For 
Arnold, New Journalism was ‘full of ability, novelty, variety, sensation, sympathy, 
generous instinct.’33 Arnold’s conception of ‘New Journalism’ was to capture the 
W.E. Stead’s impact on British press during his editorship of the Pall Mall. New 
Journalism was both a reaction to the expansion of the newspaper market towards the 
lower classes ‘who were considered to be less politically aware and concerned, and 
less intellectually rigorous’ and also a general demand of readers for a more lively, 
less formal newspaper.
34
  
The first signs of the turn from ‘traditional’ news reporting to sensationalist New 
Journalism was evident in the reporting of the Agitation. Although Stead played a 
significant role in this turn, especially in and after the Agitation, this transformation 
cannot be attributed solely to him. In June 1876, Pears’ reports already demonstrated 
the turn towards a more sensational reporting which aimed to ‘create’ interest. The 
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clearest examples of this situation were the reports which focused on the atrocities 
committed on the most vulnerable of the society, such as the babies, children, women 
and the old; there were picturesque details of the crimes which aspired to shock the 
British populace.  
Similar to the earlier cases, the dichotomisation of pure victim v the villain was used 
during the Agitation. However, different from the earlier constructions, the 
sensationalist style caused radicalisation of the discourse, which became more overtly 
‘anti-Turk’. The Daily News correspondent Pears consistently reported on the victims 
who were subjected to extreme violence by the Ottoman forces or auxiliaries: ‘the 
burning of the houses and villages of peasantry ... and the almost indiscriminate 
slaughter of old man, women and children.’35 These examples were not only confined 
to Bulgaria; when Serbia and Montenegro declared war on the Ottoman Empire at the 
end of June 1876, the Daily News started to publish reports of similar crimes 
highlighting that ‘[T]he victims are miserable women, and hapless children’ and the 
‘officers and soldiers who come down from the front’ told ‘the tales of mangled 
bodies of children lying in the gutters of debris, headless trunks of Servian soldiers in 
places...’36 
Edwin Pears’ reports from Bulgaria did not only indicate the violence; they also 
elaborated on it through explicit horror stories, which were specifically added to 
address to the emotions of the readers: 
 ‘Her cottage had been burnt before eyes, of three children she had 
seen one, her baby, tossed about from soldier to soldier, and then 
flung into the flames; of the second she knew nothing, the third, the 
lad who was now with her, had made his escape timeously...’37 
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Like the Daily News, The Times also published extensively on the massacres in 
Bulgaria. Correspondent of the paper in Constantinople, Gallenga was slow to report 
the events, however, Delane, the editor of The Times, filled the gap by publishing 
letters sent from Bulgaria which shared the depictions of the Daily News reports. 
Most of the letters were anonymous signed by pseudonyms such as ‘a Bulgarian’ or 
‘a witness’. The main focus of the letters was to demonstrate the use of extreme 
violence in Bulgaria. In one letter, the author noted that ‘about 500 persons, mostly 
old men, women and children, were killed’ by the Bashibozuks who ‘then rushed into 
the village and pillaged it thoroughly.’38 The focal point of the reports were the 
atrocities committed by the Ottoman irregulars, Bashibozuks, against the vulnerable 
civilians: ‘On 27th [April]the Bashibozuks attacked the village, murdered two priests 
enslaved all girls and young women they could find, and then set the village on 
fire.’39 The accusations against the Bashibozuks were ‘extreme acts of violence’; they 
were accused of ‘violating women, burning houses, destroying churches, cutting into 
mincemeat little children, and crucifying and roasting priests.’40  
This sensationalist style had an immediate impact as the first question in the House of 
Lords was asked on 26 June, only three days after the first report with a specific 
reference to the Daily News. As Pears continued to report on indiscriminate Ottoman 
war crimes, the Parliament started to react and demanded an official inquiry, which 
was sent to Bulgaria on 21 July. Mr. Baring, a diplomat from the British Embassy in 
Constantinople was sent to Bulgaria with Lord Derby’s order. At the same time, US 
Consul Schuyler, who was in close contact with Bulgarian students at Constantinople 
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who were studying at a US missionary school, was already on the way to visit 
Bulgaria in order to investigate the alleged massacres. In Consul Schuyler’s company 
was a newspaper reporter, who was recently employed by the Daily News, Januarius 
MacGahan, whose first report from Bulgaria was published on 7 August and created 
an immediate sensation. 
41
 
MacGahan was already an established war reporter well known in the elite circles 
with his works on Russian Central Asia expedition. MacGahan’s reports were similar 
to the Pears’ both in content and style; however, his status as an ‘eye-witness’, 
reporting from the region, gave him a more important role. MacGahan’s position in 
the Agitation was similar to Lord Stratford’s position in the previous decade; both had 
the advantage of talking from an ‘expert’ point of view which allowed them to 
position their views as ‘the truth’ on the subject.  MacGahan’s horror stories were 
both more detailed and more literary than Pears’ ones and thus contributed in the 
popularisation of the ‘atrocities’ in Britain.  
MacGahan built his reports on the victim v villain dichotomy that was used in 
explaining both the Cretan Revolt and Lebanese Crisis. However, the striking 
difference of MacGahan’s reports was the ‘literary detail’ which created the 
sensational style. In his most famous report on 7 August 1876, MacGahan explained 
his eye-witness account of the extreme atrocities committed in the Bulgarian town 
Batak as such:  
‘I have just seen the town of Batak with Mr. Schuyler … On 
approaching the town, on a hill, there were some dogs. They ran 
away and we found on this spot a number of skulls, picked and 
licked clean; all of women and children. I counted from the saddle a 
hundred skulls, picked and licked clean; all of women and children. 
I entered the town... there were skeletons of girls and women, with 
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long brown hair hanging to their skulls… I saw many little hands, 
heads and foot of children of three years of age, and girls with heads 
covered with beautiful hair… The church was still worse. The floor 
was covered with rotten bodies quite uncovered.’42  
 
The impact of the sensationalism was evident in the report, which exclusively 
focused on the details of violence in order to present the barbaric, cruel nature of the 
‘Turks’ who oppressed the Bulgaria civilians. The examples of violence included 
ranged from death to torture and hunger, which further contributed to the image of a 
cruel administration who was unable to help the innocent victims, who were depicted 
as ‘homeless and starving.’43 The most frequent images reported from Bulgaria were 
those of the ‘children’, especially ‘young girls’ who ‘had been carried off’ by the 
‘Turks’ who ‘refused to restore them to their parents.’44 The victims of atrocity 
included not only young girls or women, but also disabled people; MacGahan 
reported that a villager showed him the place where his ‘blind little brother had been 
burned alive’. Similarly, MacGahan noted that he had ‘counted a hundred  skulls, not 
including those that were hidden behind the other’ which belonged to the ‘beheaded 
women and children.’ 45 
MacGahan’s ‘horror stories’ from Bulgaria was one of the reasons behind the 
Agitation’s success as these reports grasped public interest, which was demonstrated 
by the increased sales of the Daily News in these months. The scenery in Bulgaria 
was pictured in such detail that it would have been impossible not to condemn the 
perpetrators if one believed in the authenticity of the reports:  
‘As we approached [to Batak] our attention was directed to some 
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dogs … when looking down I perceived we had stepped on a human 
skull partly hid among grass … As we ascended, bones, skulls, 
skeletons, and skulls became more frequent but they had not been 
picked so clean, for there were fragments of  half-dry flesh still 
clinging to them.’46 ‘It was a heap of skulls, intermingled with 
bones from all parts of the human body, skeletons nearly entirely 
rotting, human hair and putrid flesh lying there in foul heap … and 
it was here the dogs had been seeking a hasty repast when our 
untimely approach interrupted them.’47  
 
The reports represented the ‘Turk’ as the brutal villain, the perpetrator of the crimes. 
According to these reports, there was ‘no proof yet that a single Turkish women or 
child was killed or violated’ in the conflict’ and thus, they were the only party in 
Bulgaria committing the atrocities.
 48
 MacGahan specifically added that all casualties 
were from one side, which contradicted with the government’s contemporary 
discourse, which was claiming that the atrocities were committed by both sides. The 
Daily News reports appealed for the British public to create ‘urgent relief for the 
starving and helpless families’ in Bulgaria. 49 MacGahan’s report made an immediate 
impact in Britain; the first public meeting protesting against the Bulgarian atrocities 
took place in Manchester, on 9 August, just two days after the publication of the first 
report. 
During the Agitation, depiction of violence was not confined to mass killings. One 
specific crime that was widely reported, albeit never confirmed in later official 
reports, was the issue of slavery. Britain had established itself as an anti-slavery 
nation from the beginning of the 19
th
 century, and by the 1870s, slavery was 
recognized as a serious crime in the eyes of the British public. Publication of specific 
slavery stories led to further deterioration of the perceptions of the ‘Turks’ in the eyes 
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of the British public, especially in the liberal and religious circles, which were the 
most anti-slavery sections of society.  
For instance, Pears reported that, ‘the average price of a Christian child is ten 
francs.’50 In another article, he noted that ‘great numbers of Bulgarian children have 
been captured by the Circassians, and have been sold or are now on sale as slaves’ 
and the Bulgarian ‘girls were sold for three or four liras’ in Constantinople. 51 Similar 
reports were produced in The Times as well; a letter sent to the paper from a resident 
in Adrianople stated that ‘all the men have been killed and women who escaped the 
massacre have been led into slavery beyond Balkans’ and the ‘little girls those who 
were pretty, have been taken to Constantinople to be disposed of in the secret 
markets.’52 The claims on slavery were probably the only inaccurate aspect of the 
news produced from Bulgaria. None of the reports including Schuyler's, confirmed 
the existence of slavery during the Bulgarian atrocities and the slavery story was 
probably fabricated by Pears' sources to provoke public anger in the West. 
The perceptions on the ‘Turks’ were influenced greatly from the atrocities committed 
in Bulgaria. Similar to the Lebanese and Cretan cases, the ‘Turk’ was presented as the 
main culprit behind the crisis in the first phase of the Atrocities Agitation.  
3.2) Perceptions of the Ottoman Empire 
In the previous cases, the Ottoman Empire was presented in the sick-man discourse as 
a ‘barbaric tyranny’ which oppressed the Eastern Christians and, thus, was the main 
culprit of the crises. There was a continuity between the discourses of the 1860s and 
the discourse of the Agitation in terms of the representation of the Ottoman Empire. In 
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the first phase of the Agitation the difference between the Ottoman Empire and the 
Christian West was articulated clearer by the newspapers through depicting the 
Ottoman Empire as the ‘Asiatic barbarians’. For example, in one report, the Christian 
Bulgarians were described as ‘the wealthiest, most labourous, and most honest 
peasants’ who ‘had to suffer the full ferocity, inhumanity and rapacity of the Asiatic 
barbarians.’53  
The civilized v. barbarian dichotomy that had been constructed in the previous 
decade, which was used to demonstrate that the ‘Ottomans’ were outsiders to the 
civilized Europe, was reproduced during the Agitation. Gallenga, The Times 
correspondent from Constantinople, noted that ‘ the state of things which now 
prevails in Bulgaria’ were ‘nothing but an intensification of the … tyranny which 
prevail throughout the whole of the Turkish Empire.’54 Similarly, Edward Freeman55, 
who was one of the active members of the Agitation, sent a letter to the Daily News 
calling the British public to act against the ‘bloody despotism of the barbarian 
Turk’56. Freeman was one of the first to call for an action ‘outside the walls of the 
Parliament’ by the ones ‘who are not willing that England … should be branded in 
the pages of the history as the accomplice of the foul.’57 
MacGahan's reports constituted the backbone of the Daily News' reports and the 
Agitation. The sensational reports from Bulgaria informed the British public in a 
novel and peculiar way by appealing to the emotions of the readers through depicting 
unacceptable horror stories such as the death and assaults on the innocent women and 
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little children sold as slaves. The sensationalism connected with the main political aim 
of the sick-man discourse: the salvation of the Christians from the Muslim rule 
through forcing the Government to abandon the traditional Eastern policy.  
Foreign policy became the focal point of the debate starting from the first phase of the 
Agitation, similar to the earlier case studies. However, as the crimes were presented in 
a more sensational way, the defenders of the alternative policy became more open in 
their attacks to the government, which constituted the main difference of the 
Agitation. For example, in a letter sent by an anonymous British merchant from 
Constantinople to the Daily News, the British government was criticised because they 
have sided with an Islamic power and was openly blamed for the atrocities: ‘would 
England be surprised to learn that she, of all European nations, is looked upon by 
most Christians in these countries as jointly responsible for these massacres?’58   
The initial US report compiled by Schuyler was published at the end of August. 
Schuyler estimated the total number of deaths to be around 15.000 for Bulgaria, a 
substantially lower estimate than that of MacGahan's and Pears’ estimations. 
Although Schuyler, who travelled to Bulgaria with MacGahan, estimated far less 
deaths, the figures were still enough to create a moral outcry in Britain. The Agitation 
gained momentum as the provincial press started to reproduce Daily News' reports 
from July onwards; Leeds Mercury reproduced the exact copy of Pears' letter, 
published on 8 July by Daily News, on July 10. Similarly, the Sheffield Independent 
published a small note on 15 July on the Bulgarian atrocities in the middle pages of 
the paper stating: ‘The Atrocities in Bulgaria: 190 villages burnt by the Turks, fearful 
massacres of men and kidnapping women. Tatar villages are burnt in retaliation.’59 
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Similar examples were found in many provincial newspapers, although one provincial 
paper differed from the others in its handling of the atrocity reports. The Northern 
Echo reproduced MacGahan’s report on 8 August in full and vigorously aimed to 
create a mass protest movement against the government’s Eastern policy for the rest 
of the month. The editor of that paper, W.E. Stead, was to become influential in 
transforming the Agitation from a journalistic work to a mass movement in weeks, 
which constituted the second level of the Agitation.  
3.3) The Second Phase of the Agitation: the Northern Echo and Public 
Meetings  
‘Ghastly Scenes of Slaughter’, ‘Dogs Praying on Human Bodies’, ‘Horrible Details 
of Turkish Ferocities’ were the sub-headings of an article the Northern Echo's article 
published on 8 August  which demonstrated the importance given to the atrocity news 
by the paper.
 60
 The Northern Echo did not pay much attention to the Eastern 
Question or the Bulgarian atrocities in the earlier months; there was very little 
published about these topics before 8 August. The first piece they published was the 
reprint of MacGahan’s report published in the Daily News on 7 August.  Stead’s 
Northern Echo depended on the news brought to Britain by the Daily News; in most 
of the cases, they reproduced the same material.
 61
 Therefore, Stead's contribution to 
the Agitation was not in content, it was in turning the Agitation to a political 
campaign. He was the first in British press to consistently denounce the British 
government’s stance in handling the Bulgarian Crisis. Stead used the Daily News 
reports to convince his readers to organise meetings and protest against both the 
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‘Turks’ and the British Government which supported them.  
Non-conformists in Britain played an important role in the Agitation, as demonstrated 
by the number of petitions sent to the Foreign Office by the non-conformist 
organizations. Stead was a ‘dedicated Non-conformist and militant radical’ who 
believed that the press should be ‘the greatest agency influencing public opinion in 
the world.’62 Stead argued that the ‘public opinion could be utilized by the press to 
determine government policy or compel the government to abandon unpopular 
policies’.63 The Bulgarian Atrocities Agitation was the first case which enabled Stead 
to put his ideas on New Journalism in action. Stead was inspired by ‘strong religious 
fervour and Russophilism’ and his role in the Agitation demonstrated his belief in the 
‘Christian duty’ of Britain to defend the rights of the Christians abroad. 64 He had 
seen the Agitation as ‘his work’ which was taken forward by Gladstone’s ‘more able 
hands’ following the publication of the Bulgarian Horrors.65 
MacGahan’s horror stories provided Stead the necessary content to construct an 
emotional appeal to mobilise the people. He published the full material from 
MacGahan's two reports, and following the publication of the Batak report, Stead 
announced that a ‘public meeting will be held on Friday [26 August], in Darlington’; 
he hoped it to be the first of many meeting to be hold in the North in order to ‘to 
express sentiments with which truehearted Englishmen regard affairs in the East.’66 
This opened the second phase in the Atrocities Agitation as the first of the many 
public meetings organized in the North began on this date. Stead specifically referred 
to MacGahan's Batak report and noted ‘[w]e do not envy the man who can read it 
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without tears.’67 A report published in the Northern Echo about first public meeting 
organized at Darlington noted that the Daily News was enthusiastically applauded by 
the audience for their contribution in ‘revealing the massacres.’ Therefore, for Stead, 
the issue was no longer on the veracity of the reports, which constructed the 
perception of the ‘Turks’ as brutal perpetrators, but on penalizing them:   
‘It would be a sheer waste of valuable opportunity, if the meeting 
merely expressed its regret that the Turks had massacred 
Bulgarians. Even the Earl of Beaconsfield will say that now … The 
practical question is what is to be done with the murderers, and 
what is to be said of their aiders and abetters?’68  
 
The ‘aiders and abetters’ were directly pointed to in the article: the British 
Ambassador to the Porte, Henry Elliott, and the British Prime, Minister Disraeli. The 
sick-man discourse contested the British support to the Ottoman Empire and 
demanded the withdrawal of the support from the Ottomans from the previous decade 
onwards. However, the news on atrocities, which were published in the first phase of 
the Agitation, had radicalised these demands. The main demand in the Atrocities 
Agitation, different from the 1860s, was to force the government to recognise ‘the 
expulsion of the Turk from Europe as one of the leading objects of English policy’  
‘in the name of Humanity, Civilisation and Christianity’. 69 
Similarly, the report published after the first meeting noted that the audience was split 
in two groups; one proposed only the withdrawal of British support from the 
Ottomans while the other group demanded a direct military intervention for the 
Ottoman Empire on behalf of the Bulgarian civilians,  and similar demands were 
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vocalised in the consequent meetings as well.
70
 
In some Agitation meetings, such as the first Darlington one, the speakers were local 
MPs; in many others it was the members of the local non-conformist clergy. For 
example, the main speaker of the Darlington meeting, Edmund Backhouse, 
71
 was a 
noteworthy figure because he was the most prominent member of the non-
conformists businessmen in Darlington, a group that was among the most active 
supporters of the Agitation.
72
 Backhouse’s speech reflects not only the radicalisation 
of the political demands, but also the use of the sick-man discourse, to refute a major 
claim of its rival integrity discourse. Backhouse noted that ‘England had nothing to 
fear whoever ruled at Constantinople, so long as she preserved the independence and 
neutrality of Egypt’ which elicited a passionate outburst of enthusiastic applause from 
the audience.
 73
  The official discourse in the previous decade emphasised the 
pragmatic reasoning for defending the Ottoman territorial integrity, which was used 
to convince the public for the continuation of the policy.  
This new argument was a serious challenge to the official discourse, which argued 
that protection of Constantinople and Straits were vital for the ‘British interests’. The 
opening of the Suez Canal, Egypt’s importance increased at the expense of 
Constantinople and Straits, which challenged the discourse that marked the Ottoman 
territorial integrity as the cornerstone of British interests in the East. In this way, it 
became more plausible within the sick-man discourse to argue against the necessity 
of defending the Ottoman territorial integrity against the Russian Empire.    
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In addition, Backhouse also noted that ‘England owed something to the Christians for 
her support of Turkey in 1854 [Crimean War]’. 74  Similar ‘religious’ arguments were 
also made by the second speaker of the meeting, a non-conformist clergyman, who 
stated that the ‘Eastern Christians had flown to arms to rid themselves of cruel 
tyranny of the Turk’ in Bulgaria, and thus, they should not ‘stand on one side when a 
strong bully was kicking a boy into death.’75 Similar to Backhouse, reverend Neman 
also noted that the support of the Ottoman Empire was not necessary anymore: ‘our 
hold on India did not depend on the support of the Turk.’76 This first meeting 
reflected the character of the public meetings during the Bulgarian agitation, which 
was a coalition of Liberal politicians, even before Gladstone's intervention, and non-
conformist clergyman. Two resolutions were accepted in the meeting: the first 
demanded Sir Elliott's withdrawal from his post and the second demanded the 
declaration of Britain’s neutrality in the Crisis, which were both achieved in the 
following months. The resolutions also demonstrated both Pears' and MacGahan's 
success in their journalism; whenever their name was mentioned in the meetings the 
crowd cheered in support of them and in some cases passages from their reports were 
fully orated.
77
  
In the three weeks period before the publication of Gladstone's pamphlet, Stead 
succeeded in organising public meetings in the North; the region that should take the 
lead in this moral duty in Stead's opinion.  Indeed, within just one week, Stead 
managed to mobilise Northerners, and by 1 September 14, meetings were held in 
Britain.  
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3.4) The Bulgarian Horrors and the Third Phase of the Agitation  
The mobilisation of the British public started with the efforts of Stead, but it was 
Gladstone’s intervention that defined the politicisation of the agitation. At the time of 
his publication, Gladstone was in his voluntary retirement, withdrawn from 
leadership of the Liberal Party, but he continued to participate in the House of 
Commons’ debates. Gladstone decided to write a pamphlet on 29 August without 
great enthusiasm.
78
 He wrote the Bulgarian Horrors and the Question of the East in 
several hours on 4 September, which was published on 7 September, with 24,000 
copies which was sent across Britain.
79
 The outcome of the pamphlet was a great 
success for both Gladstone and the Agitation; 200,000 copies were sold in one month 
and Gladstone, a major political figure, committed himself to the Atrocities Agitation 
and became the political representative of it. Furthermore, it forced Lord Derby to 
defend the government’s position in a newspaper article on 12 September, which was 
followed with a reply letter from Gladstone, adding to the political debate on the 
Bulgarian massacres.  
The Bulgarian Horrors was a 32 pages long detailed pamphlet which mainly 
criticised the British Government over their conduct of the Bulgarian massacres. The 
publication of the pamphlet was followed by Gladstone’s public speech in Blackheath 
on 9 September. Gladstone noted in his diary that the meeting in Blackheath was ‘the 
most enthusiastic by far I ever saw’ and The Times recorded an audience of 10,000 
people in the meeting.
 80
 The pamphlet and the speech were his most notable 
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contributions to the Agitation; he turned down the offers of more speeches since he 
‘did not want to seem as rogue and impostor’.81 Gladstone preferred to ‘contribute’ to 
the Agitation rather than leading it.  
Gladstone’s interpretation of the Bulgarian massacres was in line with the sick-man 
discourse developed in the first two phases of the Agitaiton. He was truly horrified at 
the news printed in the British press, and he labelled the massacres as ‘unprecedented 
atrocities’. In his pamphlet, the Bulgarian massacres were defined as ‘the basest and 
blackest outrages upon record within the present century, if not within the memory of 
man’ and this definition was carried throughout the pamphlet: he described the 
atrocities as ‘the unexampled wrongs’ and being ‘so vast in scale as to exceed all 
modern examples’82. Similarly, in his Blackheath speech, he noted that Britain also 
committed certain atrocities in the 19
th
 century, such as the siege of Badajoz or the 
revolt in Jamaica. However, for Gladstone, ‘to pretend to compare these proceedings 
with what we are now dealing with [in Bulgaria] would be an insult to the common-
sense of Europe.’83  
Gladstone defined the Daily News’ reports as the ‘attested fact’ which demonstrated 
the success of the sensationalist news on atrocities in grasping British public opinion.
 
84
 In most cases Gladstone refused to reiterate the examples of the atrocities since he 
regarded them ‘dreadful beyond description.’85 In other cases he simply repeated the 
Daily News reports: ‘... the wholesale massacres, the elaborate and refined cruelty- 
the only refinement of which Turkey boasts!-the utter disregard of sex and age- the 
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abominable and bestial lust- ...’ 86 
Gladstone’s involvement in the Agitation was a result of his politico-religious 
existence, defined by his ‘Catholic Christianity, Liberalism, European sense and 
democratic sympathies.’87 All of these elements were used in the sick-man discourse 
to define the Bulgarian crisis and an alternative foreign policy. The perception of the 
Ottoman Empire, as constructed in the journalistic stages of the Agitation, which was 
in line with the perceptions formulated in 1860s, was an alien, anti-European, anti-
Christian, despotic power; all of which stood in sharp contrast to Gladstone’s political 
views. The important distinction here was the difference in Gladstone’s position in 
1876 compared to the 1860s. He was not interested in the Lebanese Civil War or the 
Cretan Revolt and he hardly made any contributions to the debates on these issues. 
Moreover, he supported Palmerston’s non-interventionist policy throughout the 
1860s.  His involvement in the Agitation in 1876 was partially a result of the 
‘atrocities’; like Stead and Non-conformist North, he was moved by the degree of 
suffering, which far exceeded the ‘minor’ crises of the 1860s. However, Gladstone 
did not join the Agitation in the first phase; his speech in Parliament on 31 July 
hardly made any contributions and his pamphlet came nearly 3 months after the 
publication of the first reports, 1 month after MacGahan’s influential Batak report. 
Gladstone decided to join the Agitation only after he was convinced that the Eastern 
Question had presented him ‘elements of a ‘moral crusade.’88 Gladstone was moved 
by the impact of the atrocities on the public, which triggered a moral reaction, rather 
than the atrocities themselves.
89
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Gladstone’s ‘sense of moral duty’ was at the root of his attacks on the Conservative 
government. For Gladstone, the Ottoman government was responsible for the 
atrocities, and as the British government supported the Ottomans, thus they shared 
the responsibility. Gladstone attacked the Disraeli government and stated they had 
‘not understood the rights and duties, in regard to … particularly the Christian 
subjects’ and ‘they have been remiss when they ought to have been active’ in 
Bulgaria to protect the life of the Christians.
 90
 Most of his arguments defended a 
policy to ‘protect the Christians from Muslim fanaticism’. Gladstone argued that 
protecting the Christians in the East was a humanitarian issue as he accused the 
Government of being ‘moved too little ... of the broad and deep interests of 
humanity.’91  
Proponents of the sick-man discourse in the 1860s linked the humanity and 
Christianity, and this provided a moral high ground the sick-man discourse compared 
to the pragmatism of the official discourse. Gladstone highlighted this point by 
stating that the chief object of the policy should be ‘humanity, rationally understood, 
is the first and highest’ and the ‘this great aim need not to be compromised…by 
maintaining the territorial integrity of Turkey.’92 By proposing the interests of 
humanity as the guiding principle behind the British policy, Gladstone also distanced 
himself from the traditional British Eastern policy based on the British interests, 
which for Gladstone was nothing but ‘the selfish leanings’ which ‘set up false lights’ 
and  ‘disturbed the world.’93 This was one example of the anti-imperialist element in 
Gladstone’s discourse, which was not upheld by Gladstone’s actions in his later Prime 
Ministry, especially with the invasion of Egypt in 1882.  
                                                 
90 
Ibid. 
91 
Gladstone, Bulgarian Horrors, p. 13. Emphasis added.  
92 
Ibid. 
93 
Gladstone, Bulgarian Horrors, p. 28.  
218 
 
 
 
The second element in his foreign policy discourse was the myth of the ‘United 
Europe’ as the civilising and balancing force in foreign affairs. Gladstone was a 
known proponent of concerted European action in Eastern affairs and he envisaged 
the ‘civilized Europe’ acting together to overcome the problems of non-European 
societies, such as the Ottoman Empire. Gladstone argued that he had known ‘of no 
case in which Turkey has refused to accede to the counsel of United Europe’ and thus, 
Britain should act with the other European Powers in the Eastern Question.
 94
  
Concerted action was Gladstone’s basic policy for the Eastern Question; he was 
disillusioned with Ottoman Tanzimat reform programs which aimed to improve the 
Ottoman administration. Gladstone’s idea of concerted action towards the Ottoman 
Empire was, in effect, an imperialist policy which argued that it was the ‘duty of 
Europe, and of the several Powers of Europe, to stop’ the atrocities by ‘obtaining the 
extinction of the Turkish power in Bulgaria.’95 Gladstone’s position was in 
continuation of the fatalist views on the Ottoman Empire, which argued that the 
Ottoman Empire would collapse if Britain did not support it. For Gladstone, the 
atrocities were the turning point which would trigger a new policy, which included re-
drawing the Balkan map.  
Gladstone argued that ‘United Europe’ could fill the power vacuum created by the 
withdrawal of the Ottoman administration from Balkans. Gladstone’s most famous 
quotation in the Bulgarian Horrors, demonstrated the perception of the ‘Turk’ as 
constructed in the Atrocities Agitation: ‘Let the Turks now carry away their abuses in 
the only possible manner, namely by carrying off themselves. ... one and all, bag and 
baggage, shall, I hope, clear out from the province they have desolated and 
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profaned.’96 Gladstone’s phrase demonstrated the turn in the alternative policy; 
Gladstone demanded the expulsion of the Ottoman administration from the Balkans. 
This was a new demand for the alternative policy and it was also significant in that it 
was vocalised by Gladstone, who was a supporter of the non-intervention for the 
1860s.  
Gladstone’s use of the term morality was not confined to Eastern policy; according to 
him, as  Parliament stayed in recess until February 1877, the task of preventing 
further atrocities in Bulgaria was on the British working men who ‘in the first 
instance raised the flag under which we [Agitation] are now marching.’97 Gladstone 
noted that the duties of the working men have just begun with attending the meetings, 
and they needed to keep working since the issue was primarily on the interests of 
humanity and justice transcending the protection of the interests of their nation: ‘I 
rejoice to think there is much that you can do for the purpose of serving the interests 
of humanity and justice.’98 
3.4.1) Perceptions of the ‘Turks’, ‘Muslims’ and the Ottoman Empire in 
Bulgarian Horrors 
Gladstone’s interpretation of the Bulgarian massacres as ‘unparalleled crimes’, and 
his moralism on the Eastern policy, affected his views of the Turks and Muslims. 
Gladstone’s perception on the Turks and Muslims demonstrated radicalization of the 
image of Turks/Muslims during the Agitation under the influence of the massacre 
stories. In the pamphlet, Gladstone devoted only three of the 32 pages on describing 
his object, the ‘Turk’, which to him was different than the ‘Muslim’: ‘It is not a 
question of simply Mahometanism, but of Mahometanism compounded with the 
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peculiar character of a race.’99 
The concept of race was rarely used to define the ‘Turk’ in the previous case studies. 
It was used to define the Maronites and the Druzes in the Lebanese Civil War; these 
two groups were defined as ‘savage races’ which signified their inferiority. Gladstone 
distinguished the ‘Turk’ from the ‘Muslim’ in order to argue that it was the ‘Turkish 
race’ who perpetrated the atrocities. This statement was in line with Austen Layard’s 
speech during the Cretan Revolt, where he argued that Britain ruled Muslims in India 
and therefore needed to be careful about its policy towards the Ottoman Muslims. 
Gladstone constructed a ‘good Muslim v. bad Muslim’ dichotomy claiming that the 
‘Turk’ was ‘not the mild Mahometans of India, nor the chivalrous Saladins of Syria 
nor the cultured Moors of Spain’, but the ‘one great anti-human specimen of 
humanity’.100 The Turks were represented as the ‘anti-human specimen’, the opposite 
of the civilized European: ‘as far as their dominion reached, civilisation disappeared 
from view. They represented everywhere government by force, as opposed to 
government by law.’101 This demonstrated that the concept of race was used to point 
out the ‘savage, uncivilized nature’ of a group which placed that group at the bottom 
of the hierarchy of civilisations.  
Gladstone preferred to represent the Turk as ‘the barbarian’ by depicting the Ottoman 
administration as lawless despotism in order to construct it as the diametric opposite 
of the 19
th
 century civilized Europe. The Bulgarian atrocities were explained within 
this perspective; they were committed by the Turks who knew no other way of 
governing than ‘despotism’, the enemy of the liberal European values. For Gladstone, 
the Ottoman Empire was ‘a tremendous incarnation of military power’ whose ‘curse 
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menaced the whole of Europe’ in the Middle Ages.102 In Gladstone’s view, the 
advance of the Ottoman Empire was stopped ‘by the heroism of the European 
population of those very countries, part of which form at this moment the scene of 
war’ such as Bulgaria. 103 
The view that Ottoman power had spread in Balkans only as a result of military 
conquest was largely a myth; current scholarship largely refutes these claims by 
showing that the Ottoman administration spread due to a mixture of reasons, and 
mostly in cooperation with the local noble families in the Balkans.
104
 However, by 
depicting the Ottomans as an invading military power, the Ottoman Empire could be 
depicted as the ‘other’ of Europe. Gladstone further underlined the otherness of the 
‘Turks’ by arguing that the ‘Turk represented force as opposed to law’, and the lack 
of ‘intellectual element’ of the governing race was compensated by the ‘race of 
Greeks’ who ‘was attracted to Constantinople’ in order to make up for ‘the 
deficiencies of Turkish Islam.’105  
Defining the Turk as an evil military power devoid of any intellectual capacity and 
the enemy of European civilisation both provided an explanation for the atrocities 
and paved the way for defining the Ottoman Empire as a weak power, a burden on 
Britain, or with the famous analogy, the ‘sick-man’ of Europe. In the words of 
Gladstone, the Ottoman Empire historically ‘stood only upon force’ and the 
contemporary Ottomans ‘has lost that force’; as the ‘power is gone, and the virtues, 
such as they are, of power; nothing but its passions and its pride remain.’106 In this 
way, the Ottoman Empire was represented as a brutal military power, without any 
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civilisation of its own.   
The powerless pride of the Ottomans was at odds with the idea with the 19
th
 century 
belief in rationality; in contrast with the rational Christians, the Muslims were 
represented as ‘fanatical’. For this reason, Gladstone stated that the ‘condition of the 
Christians in Turkey is now eminently critical’ because, should the Ottoman Empire 
lose the war against Serbia and Montenegro, the ‘consequence might be, in various 
provinces, a new and wide outbreak of fanaticism, and a wholesale massacre’ of the 
Ottoman Christians by the ‘Turks’. 107 
These arguments made on the Ottoman Empire in the Bulgarian Horrors were not 
original. They were reproductions of the perceptions constructed in the 1860s by the 
perpetrators of the sick-man discourse. British Foreign Secretary Lord Russell 
already warned MPs of the possibility of further attacks on Christians by Muslim in 
the Ottoman Empire in the Lebanese Civil War. Churchill noted that Islam and 
Christianity were at odds with each other, and the former imposed its rule on the 
latter in the Ottoman Empire through military methods. Therefore the contribution of 
Gladstone’s pamphlet was not its content, but its popularity; its immense popularity 
disseminated these ideas to large numbers in Britain.  
Gladstone identified the major perpetrator of the atrocities as the ‘Turks’, a fanatical 
Muslim race. The Ottoman Empire was perceived as a visibly collapsing military 
power that had lost its might. The Christians were represented as the pure victims 
oppressed in their own land, which was similar to the arguments of the sick-man 
discourse in all three case studies.  In his pamphlet and speech, Gladstone underlined 
that no Muslim was killed or violated during the Bulgarian revolt and the Muslims 
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of the Ottoman Empire were already recessing compared to the Christians; all of 
these arguments had been constructed in the Cretan Crisis as well.  
Gladstone’s speeches demonstrated that the main explanations for the Crises and 
identities of each Ottoman group constructed in the sick-man discourse were in 
continuity. However, it also showed the transformation of the alternative foreign 
policy under the impact of the Atrocities Agitation constructed by the Daily News. 
Moreover, the perceptions of the ‘Turk’ was radicalised during the Agitation under 
the impact of the atrocities. For instance, for Gladstone, the atrocities committed in 
Bulgaria had been perpetrated by the ‘Turk’, the ‘anti-human specimen’. The 
Ottoman Empire was perceived as the enemy of European civilisation which needed 
to be forced out of Bulgaria and Bosnia-Herzegovina by the United European 
pressure.  
One of the practical problems this perception overlooked, however, was the fact that 
there was no Bulgaria or Bosnia as a pre-defined space belonging to a single ethnic-
religious group. Hence, imagining Balkans as an ‘essentially Christian area under 
Islamic occupation’ was in contradiction with the realities of the area and also 
ultimately paved the way for further conflicts and human rights abuses caused by 
aggressive nation building attempts.
108
  
Gladstone's speech in the House of Commons was significantly different than his 
Blackheath speech and his pamphlet.
109
 Although there were similar elements in his 
speech, the most remarkable difference was its lack of emotion; Gladstone did not 
mention the Bulgarian Atrocities in this speech and made no significant proposal to 
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end the Balkan Crisis. He was content with supporting the amendment proposed by 
Forsyth, which was the basis of his solution to the Crisis in his later work as well. 
The lack of emotion in his Parliamentary speech supports the Shannon’s view that 
Gladstone was at best a ‘reluctant leader’ of the Agitation; far from being a creating 
force of it. This hints that Gladstone's contribution to the Agitation in September was 
mainly due to Stead's successful campaigning and the existence of a public reaction 
to the government's handling of the issue, which was manifested in protest meetings. 
Gladstone's views on the Ottoman Empire, his arguments on Russia and Balkans and 
Europe were all already set in his July speech, and they remained unchanged in his 
later writings and speeches. His main discursive addition in his pamphlet and speech 
in the following month was the ‘humanitarian’ element, which was consistent with 
the general public mood of late August. His time of intervention and his addition of 
the humanitarian element demonstrate his reasons for intervention; Gladstone 
committed himself to the Agitation only after he was convinced that the public was 
decidedly against Disraeli’s policy in an essentially ‘humanitarian’ issue where he 
will take the upper-hand against Disraeli due to his ‘dirty and anti-humanitarian’ 
policy. The Bulgarian Atrocities Agitation provided the perfect cause for Gladstone to 
impose his undisputed leadership on a political issue, which can remedy his 
devastating electoral defeat in 1874.  
The Agitation after Gladstone’s pamphlet and speech continued to grow. The 
credibility of the agitator’s claims on the atrocities was shaken by Baring Report, the 
official British inquiry, which was published on 19 September as a supplement to the 
London Gazette. The report was a disappointment for the agitators, since it asserted 
that some of the newspaper reports exaggerated the facts and put the death toll 
considerably lower than Schuyler’s report, which appeared earlier. Disraeli started to 
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build on this report and attack the Agitation, which was articulated in the counter-
discourse constructed by Conservative papers such as Morning Post. One of the 
weakest points of the Agitation discourse was the ambiguity about Russia, which was 
portrayed as an imperial threat to Britain since the Crimean War. Gladstone and Stead 
tried to construct a fresh view on Russia together with his idea of United Europe by 
proposing that Britain and Russia can and should work together. However, the sick-
man discourse failed to articulate a convincing view about Russia’s policy and 
intentions, and Russia’s ultimatum to the Ottoman Empire in October 1876 put the 
Agitation in a difficult position as a result of this ambiguous position. The best 
platform which demonstrated the weakness of the sick-man discourse because of 
Russia was the Punch cartoons as drawings of the magazine both deployed the sick-
man discourse and anti-Russian point of view at the same time.  
3.5) Depiction of the Ottoman Empire and Britain in the Cartoon Press  
British cartoon magazines did not show any interest to the Lebanese and Cretan 
Crises. However, these magazines were far more active in the Bulgarian Atrocities 
Agitation and published a number of cartoons which visualised the perceptions of the 
‘Ottomans’ and the British government in relation to the Ottoman Empire. The Punch 
and the Fun were the two magazines especially active in the Agitation, and their 
cartoons included the clearest depictions of the ‘Ottomans’ in line with the sick-man 
discourse and the integrity discourse.  
The Punch was the most important cartoon magazine in the British press, and it 
published its first weekly issue on 17 July 1841. Initially, the paper leaned towards 
the Radicals; however, from 1850s onwards, the editorial policy of the paper changed 
and became more pro-Conservative. In 1874, Tom Taylor became the editor of the 
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paper and he steered the paper back to its radical position.
 110
 During his editorship, 
which lasted until 1880, the paper had a strong anti-Disraeli position drawing tens of 
cartoons satirising Disraeli and his policies. Spielmann defined the political position 
of the paper during Taylor's editorship as ‘decidedly Radical, anti-Beaconsfield 
[Disraeli], anti-Imperial’ and, as noted, it became a ‘heavy political partisan’ against 
the Conservative government. The Punch was also highly critical of the official 
Eastern policy. 111 
The Punch's drawings in principle visualised the sick-man discourse. However, the 
paper was different from the mainstream anti-Ottoman press in one aspect; it was 
both anti-Ottoman and Russophobic at the same time. The magazine drew numerous 
cartoons in 1876 on the Balkan Crisis, and most of these cartoons were the full-page 
main cartoon of the week. The number of cartoons on the ‘Ottomans’ started to 
decline after the spring of 1877; during the second half of the year, there were only a 
few drawings on the ‘Ottomans’.  
The Punch used a few recurrent themes in the drawings; the Ottoman Empire were 
presented mostly as untrustworthy, because of failed reform attempts; murderous, due 
to the Bulgarian atrocities and as a sick-man. Furthermore, it was also presented as 
subject to European pressure for disintegration and under the attack of numerous 
enemies at the same time. The Russian Empire emerged as the main enemy of the 
Ottoman Empire and was depicted as a menace in the Near East. Disraeli and the 
British government was criticised in the Punch for being ineffective and silent in the 
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face of the atrocities committed in the Ottoman Empire.  
The Fun, which was set up as a rival to the Punch, also drew cartoons and published 
satirical poems about the Ottoman Empire and the Balkan Crisis. The Fun had a 
lower circulation than its rival, but their editorial policy on the Bulgarian Atrocities 
was identical. For this reason, the drawings of the two magazines can be analysed 
together since they shared similar themes, although Punch published more on the 
issue. Similarly, 1876 was the only period when the papers devoted significant 
interest on the issue by publishing numerous cartoons, which is further evidence for 
the success of the sensationalist strategy of the British press in capturing the interest 
of the society.  
3.5.1) The cartoons depicting the Ottoman Empire   
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Cartoon 1 
112
 
 
The Ottoman Empire was referred as ‘Turkey’ in the cartoons which made a word 
play possible: the Ottoman Empire was represented as a ‘turkey’ ready to be shared or 
split by different Great Powers. Cartoon 1 and Cartoon 2 demonstrate the persistent 
view of the Ottoman Empire in the sick-man discourse, which perceived them as a 
weak power which was kept alive by the support of British diplomacy. In both 
cartoons, Britain was pictured as an outsider who refused to split the Ottoman 
Empire. This depiction was in line with the sick-man discourse which constantly 
portrayed the Ottoman Empire as a crumbling entity throughout three case studies.  
Both cartoons also highlighted the Russian Empire’s role in the possible Ottoman 
disintegration, which revealed the doubts of the cartoon press of a possible Russian 
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expansion. Anti-Russian images were visualisation of the Russophobia, which 
became more acute during the Agitation by the opponents of the Agitation. After the 
war broke out between the Ottoman Empire and Russia, Gladstone’s residence in 
London was attacked by an anti-Russian mob, which was a further evidence of the 
strength of Russophobic thinking. Russian Empire was portrayed as the main power 
inviting Britain to split the Ottoman Empire up. Alexander II was far more 
conservative than Catherine or Nicholas I, however in the eyes of the press he was 
seen as a direct inheritor of the expansionist Russian policy of the earlier decades.   
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Cartoon 2 
113
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Cartoon 3 
114
 
The most important impact of the Bulgarian Atrocities Agitation on the perceptions of 
the ‘Ottomans’ was its role in the radicalisation of the perception of the ‘Muslim’ in 
Britain. The Christians were depicted as the ‘victims’ in the sick-man discourse in the 
Lebanese and Cretan Crises, while the Muslims were represented as the oppressors of 
the Oriental Christians. The Agitation further radicalised this view by presenting the 
Turks as the villains because of the atrocity news. Cartoons explicitly depicted the 
horrible crimes against humanity such as murdered babies and hanged civilians, 
proving that the sensationalist strategy succeeded in penetrating the public 
imagination. Cartoon 4 Cartoon 5 and Cartoon 6 were also published after 
MacGahan’s reports appeared in the press, which proves the impact of MacGahan on 
capturing public imagination.  In these cartoons, the atrocities against the civilians 
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were clearly depicted and the damage it has caused on the Ottoman image in Britain 
was explicit. All cartoons had a subtle message alongside the explicit messages. 
Cartoon 3 depicted Britain as a Roman, possibly to signify its ‘civilized’ nature in 
comparison with the ‘Oriental’. Cartoon 4 portrayed the Ottomans as a British 
protectorate massacring the Christians under Britain’s auspices and Cartoon 5 depicts 
Britain as desperately trying to establish peace in the East while the Ottomans were 
killing their victims. Cartoon 3, 4, and 5 were published in August and September 
1876, at the peak of the Agitation, demonstrating the radicalisation of the Turkish/ 
Muslim image in Britain.  
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Cartoon 4 
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Cartoon 5 
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Cartoon 6 
117
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Cartoon 7 
118
 
One of the common depictions of the Ottoman Empire in cartoon press was as the 
‘sick-man’, which became the hegemonic view in 1876.  In Cartoon 6 and Cartoon 7 
the Ottoman Empire was pictured as a sick-man in bed surrounded by the European 
Powers, which underlined the inferiority of the ‘sick’ Ottoman Empire against the 
‘healthier’ European states. These two cartoons were published within one week in 
October at a time when the European Powers were attempting to establish the peace 
in the Eastern Europe.  
Anti-Russian sentiments are also visible in these cartoons; in Cartoon 6, Russia and 
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Serbia cheats on a poker game with the sick-man and were watched over by Britain. 
In this way, the Russian Empire was represented as the main culprit, backing Serbia 
against the Ottoman Empire, while Britain is depicted as the fair player in the game of 
diplomacy.    
Apart from the sick-man, the Ottoman Empire was also depicted as ‘unreliable’ due 
to the Ottoman default on European loans and British distrust in the Ottoman reform 
programmes. In the Cartoon 8 an angry Britain, represented by John Bull, declined 
the sponge and balloon offers, which represented loan demands, of an Ottoman Pasha 
and the Egyptian Khedive. The angry reaction from the British to these demands 
demonstrates the impact of the City on the Ottoman perceptions; the cartoon was 
published on May 20, at the height of the financial crisis in the Ottoman Empire, 
which led to Ottoman government’s decision to default on its debt to City creditors. 
The Ottoman decision to default resulted with strong protests from the City, which 
was captured in the cartoon.  
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Cartoon 8 
119
 
 
In addition, the Ottoman Reform programmes were another source of the ‘unreliable’ 
image as the reforms were no longer taken seriously by the British press. A Punch 
caricature published on January 1876, Cartoon 9 shortly after the proclamation of the  
Constitution during the opening ceremony of the Constantinople Conference, 
depicted the Constitution as another futile Ottoman attempt, a bubble. The examples 
of the other ‘bubbles’ were the previous Ottoman reform programmes of 1839 
(Tanzimat) and Edict of 1856, among others. This depiction ran parallel with the 
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European perception of the Ottoman constitution which was hastily declared on 
December 1876 during the Constantinople Conference.  
Cartoon 9 
120
 
 
The smaller bubbles read ‘irade’, which were the local reform application attempts of 
the Ottoman Porte following the Crimean War to address the problems in Balkans and 
Crete. Although each programme caused significant changes in the Ottoman society, 
they were overlooked in the sick-man discourse and were presented as an Ottoman 
tactic aiming to lift the European pressure off the Ottoman government.  
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The depictions of the Ottomans as a weak, sick-man, untrustworthy and murderous 
were all examples of the perceptions created by the proponents of the sick-man 
discourse. In the cartoon press, the impact of the atrocities was clearly visible, which 
caused deterioration of the Ottoman Empire’s perception in general.  
3.5.2) The Cartoons Depicting the British Government 
The magazines also published number of cartoons figuring Disraeli and his 
government's conduct on the Eastern affairs. These drawings support the literature's 
view that Tom Taylor's Punch was significantly anti-Beaconsfield and anti-
Conservative. The Punch depicted Disraeli as ineffective from the beginning of the 
Crisis as he either completely ignored or downplayed the atrocity stories published in 
the Daily News. For this reason, Disraeli was either portrayed as the Sphinx or as a 
sleeping character, which singled out his silence and inactivity in the face of the 
atrocities. A secondary perception was developed during the Russo-Ottoman War and 
the aftermath. Disraeli’s contemplation to send British warships and troops to support 
the Ottoman Empire was perceived as a move that threatened the European peace. In 
general, the outlook of Punch on Disraeli was highly critical, which reflected the 
view of the proponents of the sick-man discourse during the Agitation period.  
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Cartoon 10 
121
 
A Punch caricature published in July 1876 (Cartoon 10) criticised Disraeli's scorn of 
the Daily News’ atrocity reports. Disraeli was pictured as the Sphinx, a sign of his 
apathy for the atrocities during the first two stages of the Agitation, by the cartoon 
press. Disraeli and his cabinet spoke little about the atrocity reports until the Agitation 
meetings started in late August. Cartoon 11 was published in November, after the end 
of the atrocity meetings. Disraeli was depicted as a sphinx on a background which 
pictured the atrocities committed in Bulgaria, such as the heads on a stick which 
demonstrated the link between the atrocity reports and Disraeli’s stance. The text 
under Cartoon 11 clearly demonstrates the political situation Disraeli found himself 
in; the lion which symbolised the British army refuses to fight for the Ottoman 
Empire, due to the atrocities committed in Bulgaria. This refusal is another reason 
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why Disraeli was pictured as a sphinx; he was pushed into inactivity because of the 
public pressure.  
Cartoon 11 
122
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Cartoon 12 
123
 
Similar to the sphinx image, other depictions of Disraeli which criticised his pro-
Ottoman policy depicted him as sleeping or indifferent to the Bulgarian suffering. 
These cartoons revealed the foreign policy aspect of the sick-man discourse. The 
discourse always produced its own alternative policy option for the East, and with the 
radicalisation of the perceptions on the Ottoman Empire as a result of the sensational 
reports during the Agitation, the demand for a change in policy became more vocal. 
Although the proponents of the sick-man discourse produced their own policy during 
the Lebanese and Cretan crises, neither Palmerston nor other leaders were not 
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targeted as much as Disraeli was during the Agitation. This was partly because of 
Disraeli’s perception in press as the ‘most’ pro-Ottoman politician, and also his 
general unpopularity in the cartoon press as both cartoon magazines pictured him in 
the exact same way in Cartoon 12 Cartoon 13 and Cartoon 14. In Cartoon 12, the 
Ottoman atrocities were drawn at the background while Disraeli was searching for 
those in the ‘official papers’. British public, again painted as the Roman in order to 
signify their civilized nature, points the atrocities to him. This cartoon was published 
in August 1876 during the second phase of the Agitation, proving that the verity of 
the news were accepted by the majority of the media. In Cartoon 13 published in 
September 1876, British public, this time depicted as John Bull, calls Disraeli into 
diplomatic action to prevent the ‘bigger crash’, which would be a general European 
conflict similar to the Crimean War. In a Fun cartoon published at a similar time, 
Disraeli was pictured as a sleeping merchant who was closing his shop down. This 
clearly symbolised the demands that Disraeli should resign and even retire from 
politics.    
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Cartoon 13 
124
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Cartoon 14 
125
 
Compared to Disraeli, Gladstone’s image in the cartoon press was far more positive. 
In the cartoon press, the former was the symbol of the existing Eastern policy, and the 
latter was the symbol of the alternative policy developed by the proponents of the 
sick-man discourse. In both magazines, Gladstone was depicted as the ‘saviour’ of 
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Bulgarians civilians and Britain which was in contrast with Disraeli’s image.  
Cartoon 16 published on 13 September, just a few days after the publication of 
Gladstone’s pamphlet, depicted him as a ‘rescuer’, demonstrating the approval of 
Gladstone’s stance by the cartoon press. In comparison, Cartoon 15 depicted Disraeli 
and Foreign Secretary Derby as the supporters of the Ottoman Empire and their 
atrocities, which demonstrated the sharp contrast between the perceptions of the two 
leaders and the two policies they represented. The Fun was even sharper in their 
criticism of the government compared to the Punch. Cartoon 15 depicted the 
Conservative government’s two leading politicians as clowns on whose support the 
Ottomans built their atrocities. The Ottoman figure standing on the heads of Disraeli 
and Derby had a bloody sword hanging from his belt, which was drawn to point out 
to British government’s role in Ottoman war crimes. This cartoon was in sharp 
contrast to the Cartoon 16 in where Gladstone was pictured as whipping the 
‘Ottoman’ in order to punish him for the atrocities he committed.  
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Cartoon 15 
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Cartoon 16 
127
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Cartoon 17 
128
   
 
Cartoon 17 published in May 1877, months after the Agitation ended, demonstrated 
the perceptions of Disraeli, Gladstone and the Ottoman Empire in relation to one 
another. Although the Ottoman-Russo War had already started by this time, and the 
public opinion swung against Gladstone and the Russian Empire, the image of the 
Ottomans as decadent and murderous and Gladstone as the saviour and Disraeli as the 
supporter of the Ottomans still persisted, which demonstrates the success of the sick-
man discourse of the Agitation period. The cartoon depicted the Ottoman Empire as a 
rotten empire, Disraeli as the protector of said empire and Gladstone as the rescuer 
who would bring an end to the Ottoman rule.  
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3.5.3) The Depictions of the Russian Empire 
 Cartoon 18 
129
 
The cartoon press had a clear anti-Russian stance during the Crisis. The 
official discourse presented the Russian Empire as the source of the revolts in the 
region in Lebanon, Crete and Bulgarian Crises. Although Gladstone and some Liberal 
MPs attempted to formulate a more pro-Russian discourse, the dominant view on the 
Russian Empire continued to be negative in the Agitation. Russia was depicted as the 
power which controlled smaller Balkan states such as Serbia and Montenegro, and 
hence was embarking on a proxy war with the Ottoman Empire. These arguments 
were in contrast with the alternative proposed view by Gladstone, and although the 
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two cartoon magazines were strictly pro-Gladstone in their Eastern policy, they did 
not adhere to Gladstonian view on Russia. Russophobia became more explicit in 
time, especially after the Russian Empire gave an ultimatum to the Ottoman Empire 
in late 1876. The two cartoons, Cartoon 18 and  
Cartoon 20 , which were drawn in October and November 1876 after the rapid 
deterioration of the Russo-Ottoman relations, depicted Russia as the main instigator. 
Cartoon 18 made a clear reference to the perceived hypocrisy of the Russian Empire. 
Serbia was drawn as a sitting character next to the Russian Czar which symbolised 
the power relations between the two. Standing and stronger Russia was controlling 
the sitting, childish Serbia although in the text under the cartoon Russians claimed 
that they exerted no power on Serbians. Similarly in Cartoon 20, Russia was pictured 
as in full control of the smaller Balkan states, such as Serbia, Montenegro and 
Herzegovina which were prepared to attack the Ottoman walking in front. The 
smaller states were drawn as dogs, the Ottoman Empire as an old man while the 
Russian Empire and Britain, who was looking over the fence, as younger and able-
bodied man. This was another symbolism used to distinguish the ‘Great Powers’ from 
the rest.  
In Cartoon 21, which was published in July 1876 when the Ottoman-Serbian war 
broke out, the same dogs were pictured in fight with the Ottoman man while the rest 
of the European Powers were looking on the situation from far.  
 
Cartoon 19  published in November 1876 during the Constantinople Conference, also 
underlined the Russian role in the crisis. The puppet Russian man holding in his hand 
was Serbia and Russia was in complete control of the situation comfortably playing 
with the Ottoman Empire. The Conference was drawn as a Russian design, who 
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already decided to push the Ottomans aside in the Balkans.  
 
Cartoon 19 
130
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Cartoon 20 
131
 
These cartoons demonstrated two perceptions of Russia as the main troublemaker in 
the region and as attempting to break up the Ottoman territorial integrity. For this 
reason, Russia was always portrayed as the Great Power who was controlling the 
smaller Balkan states, which transferred the partial blame of the Eastern Crisis to 
Russian interventionism. Different cartoons published in various times persistently 
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demonstrated examples of these perceptions, which were used by adherents of the 
integrity discourse from 1860s onwards. The penetration of the anti-Russian line in 
the cartoon press demarcated the cartoon press from the newspapers and was partly 
shared by the Liberal MPs in Hansard debates as well.  
 
Cartoon 21 
132
 
 
Overall, the Punch and the Fun had drawn various cartoons depicting the Ottomans, 
the British government vis-a-vis the Crisis and the Russian Empire. The basic 
Ottoman perceptions was the sick-man, or the murderer, which were widely 
reproduced in the Punch drawings.  The cartoons also reflected an aspect of 
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sensationalism by drawing heads on sticks, dead babies or hanged civilians rather 
than drawing conventional armed insurgents of warring bands or armies against each 
other. This preference was also a direct impact of the transformation of the sick-man 
discourse during the Balkan Crisis as a result of the Agitation. The cartoons also 
demonstrated the weakness of the sick-man discourse against the integrity discourse, 
which was the anti-Russian element. During the Agitation, the sick-man discourse 
was unable to articulate a new identity for Russia, which has been exploited by the 
integrity discourse since the previous decade. Although the Punch and the Fun 
visualized the sick-man discourse’s image of the Ottomans, it also reproduced the 
susceptible image of the Russia as well. This was one of the major signifiers of the 
integrity discourse during the Agitation.  
4.) The Integrity Discourse during the Agitation Period  
The Atrocities Agitation was developed by the proponents of the sick-man discourse. 
Similar to the Lebanese and Cretan cases, the official view differed from this 
‘popular’ view. The integrity discourse was constructed in the British press mainly by 
the Telegraph and The Morning Post, which were criticised by Gladstone for their 
pro-Ottoman stance in his Blackheath speech. The Morning Post was the most 
outspoken paper in the Eastern affairs as it published the most number of articles, 
double than that of the Daily News, on the Ottoman Empire during the Agitation, but 
it had less impact on public opinion due to its low circulation, which was around only 
5,000 copies per day compared to the Daily News' 90,000. Moreover, its news were 
not reproduced in the provincial press, which reprinted the Daily News and The Times 
much more frequently. The Telegraph, on the other hand, was a far more important 
newspaper. It was the best-selling paper of the day with over 150,000 copies per day, 
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and was accepted as the mainstream conservative newspaper. It was one of the three 
major London dailies of the 1870s with the Daily News and The Times.  
The first reaction of The Morning Post and The Telegraph on the news of massacres 
in Bulgaria completely ignored these news; while the Agitation was being built by the 
Daily News and The Times, The Morning Post and The Telegraph preferred to focus 
on the war between the Ottoman Empire and Serbia and Montenegro and published 
short telegraphic news on this war. However, as time progressed and the Agitation 
began to grow in the press, these papers also started to publish articles, analysing 
both the Bosnian and Herzegovinian revolts and the Bulgarian massacres. Their 
depiction of these events was in line with the arguments of the Disraeli government’s 
official discourse, which was in continuity with British official discourse during the 
Lebanese and Cretan Crises.  
4.1) The Integrity Discourse in the First Phase  
Parliamentary debates on the Bulgarian Atrocities started on 26 June and ended at the 
beginning of August, and it took place entirely during the first phase of the Agitation. 
The debates in Parliament demonstrated the success of the sick-man discourse that 
was built by the Daily News and The Times in the first phase of the Agitation in 
influencing the MPs' opinions. Both the Liberal members and the government 
members referred to these papers as reliable sources of the evidences of the massacres 
committed in Bulgaria. The immediate success of the reports was both due to the 
sensational style of news, as evidenced from the questions raised in the Parliament, 
and the increased circulation figures of newspapers, which increased the influence of 
British press.   
The first question was raised in the Commons on 26 June by the Liberal MP William 
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Forster.
133
 He specifically questioned the government on the authenticity of the news 
which ‘described with much detail the total destruction of many villages and the 
massacre of their inhabitants, men, women, and children, by Turkish troops’ and asked 
Prime Minister Disraeli to give information ‘with regard to the truth of the statements 
which have recently appeared in the public papers, and especially in the ‘Daily News’ 
of June 23
rd
.’ 134 
Forster submitted a similar question on 10 July, when the issue was debated for the 
second time, and made a motion, demanding an official explanation on the 
authenticity of the reports published in the Daily News. As Disraeli declared that they 
were yet to confirm the allegations, other Liberal MPs also joined the debate, forcing 
the government to examine the authenticity of massacre news by sending an official 
representative to Bulgaria. For example, George Anderson, a Liberal backbencher 
from Glasgow, made a short speech in the Commons which demonstrated the impact 
of the sensational news on the MPs. Anderson noted that the Daily News, ‘on the 23rd 
of June, showed that the Foreign Office appeared to be in ignorance of the atrocities 
committed by the Turks in Bulgaria’ where ‘20,000 to 30,000 people had been 
brutally murdered.’135 He further added that the British ‘blood curdles’ on the 
‘atrocities upon women and children’ and stated that the atrocities committed in 
Bulgaria were ‘a disgrace to humanity’ and ‘will form one of the bloodiest pages of 
history.’136 
The debates in Parliament were connected to the newspaper discourse, and as the 
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sensationalist news in the press were reproduced, the opposition’s condemnation of 
Disraeli’s policy became more explicit. On the day of the publication of MacGahan’s 
massacre news on 7 August, a motion was put in the House of Commons by 
Anderson who stated that the British people would not consent ‘any longer to be on 
any terms with Turkey either of friendship or alliance’137. The reason for this motion 
was explained by him where he phrased numerous examples of the sensational news 
produced in the press:  
‘At Pavics 12 women were cut to pieces and thrown to the dogs. At 
Ratklovo 60 children were stoned by the Turks ... At Sokelovo 180 
young girls taken from the neighbouring villages were penned in a 
field, and after the prettiest had been picked out for the harems of 
Fechim and Stocsvic, the others were abandoned to the soldiery, and 
violated and murdered.’ 138 
 
In replying to these claims, Disraeli noted that the atrocities were ‘normal’ 
occurrences of insurrections. He contested both defining the Bulgarian atrocities as 
‘unparalleled crimes’ by stating that the ‘wars of insurrection [were] always atrocious’ 
because they are carried on by the ‘armed population’ instead of the ‘regular 
troops’.139 For Disraeli, the atrocities were normal and not even very different from 
the scenes that had happened in Jamaica, ‘the ancient Colony of England’ which ‘no 
one can look back upon without horror.’140 Disraeli’s comparison of the Bulgarian 
Revolt with the Jamaican Revolt of 1865, which created a great controversy in 
Britain, was significant; Disraeli was the first Prime Minister to compare Britain and 
the Ottoman Empire on equal level.
141
  In addition, Disraeli also questioned the 
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authenticity of the reports and stated that although he could not ‘doubt that atrocities 
have been committed in Bulgaria’, some stories such as the ‘girls were sold into 
slavery, or that more than 10,000 persons have been imprisoned’ were doubtful. 142 
The official discourse placed the blame of the Cretan Revolt mainly on the foreign 
agents such as Russia and Greece. Disraeli reproduced similar claims for the 
Bulgarian Revolt and stated that the atrocities ‘appear to have begun by strangers 
entering the country and burning the villages without reference to religion or race.’143 
For him, these outsiders were ‘pursuing the same atrocious policy… in Herzegovina 
by burning and ravaging all villages, whether Mussulman or Christian’ and hence 
were the main culprits behind the atrocities.
 144
  
In Disraeli’s view, the Bulgarian Revolt was a war between the Slavic fighters who 
came to Bulgaria from Bosnia, Herzegovina and Serbia and Muslim Circassians who 
were settled in Bulgaria decades before the revolt by the Ottoman authorities. The 
Telegraph also pointed out that the Bulgarian Revolt was because of the ‘Servian 
intruders’ who ‘were really responsible for the grave crime of initiating an 
indefensible mode of conflict which brought ruin and misery upon peaceful and 
industrious communities.’145  
This interpretation considerably reduced the Ottoman government’s responsibility in 
the massacres, since the revolt was portrayed as an armed struggle ‘between the 
invaders and the Bashi-Bazouks and Circassians’ and the two parties ‘carried on with 
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great ferocity.’146 Moreover, the Prime Minister stated that the Circassians, contrary 
to the newspaper reports which described them as the irregular troops of the Ottoman 
government, were in fact ‘not irregular troops of the Turkish Government, or of any 
other Government.’147  
4.2) The perceptions of the Muslims and the Eastern Christians  
This interpretation articulated a different image of Muslims and Circassians which 
stand in opposition to the sick-man discourse’s portrayal of the Muslims as barbaric, 
fanatical subjects. Similar to The Morning Post’s representation, the Circassians who 
were Muslim were portrayed as ‘a courageous and an armed population’ who avenged 
themselves because ‘their villages were burnt and their farms ravaged.’148 In 
comparison, the Bulgarians were represented in some articles as ‘mere savages’, ‘who 
were in reality not much civilized thans the Indian Americans.’149  
Blaming the ‘foreign intruders’ led to presenting both the Christians and the Muslim 
civilians as the victims of the Balkan Crisis. According to one article, the ‘Christian 
and Moslem alike fled their [rebel fighters] approach and sought refuge in towns and 
fortresses.’150 In another article, it was argued that Bulgaria suffered greatly from the 
fighting ‘both Christian and Mussulman alike’ and the ‘Moslem homes were burnt to 
the ground, the man murdered or mutilated, the women outaged, the children 
trampled underfoot, and in some instances, young girls pitched screaming for mercy 
upon the blazing ruins.’151 In this way, the Muslims were also presented as the 
victims of the fighting which contradicted the accounts produced in the other 
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newspapers that victimised the Christians and presented the Muslims as the villain.  
Although some reports underlined the ‘equal suffering’ of the Christians and the 
Muslims, some others depicted the Muslims of Bulgaria as the real victims. For 
instance, an article published in The Morning Post argued that ‘the Christians were 
the aggressors and the Mussulmans had to spring to arms for bare life’, which caused 
‘great animosity against the Christians’ among the Muslim population. 152 According 
to the author, the atrocities took place because ‘the outrages committed upon peaceful 
Mussulmans, especially women and children, provoked a spirit of revenge and 
retaliation.’153 The Morning Post reported that the Muslim ‘cruelties paraded as the 
acts of beasts; while those equally atrocious acts of the Christians are passed over as 
scarcely deserving of censure’ in the British press. 154 
The official discourse also portrayed a ‘balanced’ position of the Christians and the 
Muslims in the Ottoman Empire outside the context of the Bulgarian atrocities. In the 
case of taxation, which was one of the causes of the Herzegovinian revolt, The 
Morning Post contested the dominant view which focused only on the Christian 
peasants' suffering: ‘The taxes, upon which so much has been written, weighed as 
heavily on Moslem as Christian and were evaded by both when possible.’155  
Similar to the newspaper discourses, Parliamentary debates on the causes of the 
Bulgarian Atrocities were explained on a religious axis, which depended on the 
dichotomy of Christianity versus Islam. The longest debate on the Bulgarian 
Atrocities was held on 31 July when both major representatives of the two parties, 
such as Gladstone and Disraeli as well as the backbenchers of the two parties, 
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participated in the discussions.
 156
 The split between the Conservative and Liberal 
MPs perception of the Christians and Muslims of the Ottoman Empire became more 
evident in this debate.  
Robert Hanbury, another conservative backbencher claimed that ‘both the Christian 
and Mussulman were to blame’ for the atrocities and ‘hostilities were carried on by 
both sides with the greatest barbarity.’157 Moreover, for Hanbury the ‘insurgents’ or 
Christians were to first to commit atrocities ‘in the earlier stages of the war’ which 
were ‘retaliated’ by the ‘Turks in return.’158 Similarly, The Telegraph reported on 28 
July that the ‘cruelties practised [in Bulgaria] were begun by the Christians’ and the 
Muslims ‘revenged themselves afterwards.’159 The paper published articles and news 
reports in this vein continuously in August 1876, claiming that the Christians in 
Bulgaria ‘began a wholesale massacre of Moslems wherever found and did not fail to 
ill-treat both woman and children’, resembling the sensational reports of the 
Agitation.
 160
  
For the Conservative MPs, the cause of the Bulgarian Revolt was not ‘religious’ or 
‘civilizational’ but economics; ‘The poor Christians and poor Mahomedans lived in 
peace and unity together, but poor men were persecuted equally by rich Christians 
and rich Mahomedan.’161 Similarly, Ernst Bruce, a Tory backbencher, claimed that 
there ‘there was not a very great difference between the state of the Christian peasant 
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and the Mahomedan peasant’ in the Ottoman Empire, who ‘were subject to all the 
evils of the Turkish Government—its arbitrariness, its exactions, its monstrous 
system of taxation’ equally. 162 All these examples demonstrated the continuity of the 
official discourse in explaining the cause of the revolt which also constructed an 
alternative perception of the Muslim and the Christian.  
The Conservative perception of the Muslims was different than the Liberal 
perception because it did not argue for the supremacy of the Christians in the 
Ottoman Empire, which was a key element of the sick-man discourse. This belief 
was constructed by presenting the Christians as the pure victims and the Muslims as 
the culprits in all three cases. In contrast to this view, Bruce and Hanbury noted that 
the Muslims also have good qualities such as ‘sobriety, honesty, and regard for truth 
were almost universally practised’ in contrast with ‘the Christian population of 
Turkey’ who ‘lamentably failed in these qualities.’163 Bruce set out that the 
‘fanaticism’ of the Muslims and the Turks, a common theme used by the sick-man 
discourse throughout the two decades ‘took a far less active shape than in a good 
many countries in the West’ when ‘the Turks is left alone’.164 An article published in 
The Telegraph pointed out that the Muslims of the Balkans ‘would require strong 
guarantees against Christian fanaticism.’165  
The rejection of the Christian superiority against Muslims in the integrity-discourse 
became more visible once it was compared with the sick-man discourse’s 
construction of the two identities. For example, in the same session, Gladstone 
stressed that the Muslims in Balkans were ‘a dwindling’ ‘and likewise a backward 
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race’ with ‘no element of progress among them’.166 For Gladstone, this was a reason 
to propose an autonomous or independent government for the Balkan Christians, a 
view which was shared by other Liberals, such as Fitzmaurice, who added that 
supporting an Islamic power had no impact on Indian Muslims, thus did not have any 
visible benefit to the British Empire.
 167
 Similar to the discussions during the Lebanon 
and Cretan Crises, Indian Muslims were not of a major concern for the British MPs. 
The Muslims of the Ottoman Empire were perceived on their own, without any link 
to the Muslims living under the British Empire.  
Disraeli's cabinet was highly divided on the Ottoman policy, and the disagreement 
between the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary resulted in the latter's, Lord 
Derby's, resignation in 1877. The basis of the disagreement in the Eastern policy was 
rooted in the Conservative discourse, and already in July 1876, an opposition to 
Disraeli's policy and discourse was emerging within the ranks of the Conservative 
Party. William Forsyth, a long time MP for the Party disagreed with Bruce and 
demanded an amendment to his proposal by suggesting that Serbia and Montenegro 
should be made independent.
168
  
This amendment proposal was wholeheartedly supported by Gladstone and other 
Liberals in the same session. The difference between two Conservatives proposals of 
Bruce and Forsyth to end the conflict was caused by their opposite views on the 
causes of the revolt; in contrast with Bruce, Forsyth believed that the main cause of 
the Balkan Crisis was the Ottoman Empire’s oppression of its Christian population. 
Forsyth proposed to ‘put a stop to the barbarities of an oppressive Power’ and 
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‘alleviate the sufferings of an afflicted and unhappy people’ with his motion which 
was supported by a Liberal MP, Edmond Fitzmaurice, who stated that ‘the reign of 
violence, tempered by corruption, is complete’ in the Ottoman Empire, and hence the 
Christian populations should be freed from the Ottoman rule.
 169
 
This similarity between some Conservative MPs and Liberals, as well as the split of 
opinion between the MPs of the Conservatives, demonstrated the internal pressure 
Disraeli faced to continue with the status-quo by hanging on to the ‘traditional’ 
official discourse.  
4.3) Perceptions on Russia  
The ‘foreign intruders’ were presented as one of the main culprits of the Bulgarian 
Revolt by the official discourse. The Russian Empire emerged as the ‘enemy of the 
Ottoman Empire’, as the ‘major’ foreign instigator of the Balkan revolts, which was 
blamed for the atrocities. This was a persistent perception of Russia in all three 
Crises in which the Russian Empire was portrayed as the main culprit. The integrity 
discourse depicted Russia as the foreign instigator of the revolt and, thus, the major 
threat to the British interests. The Conservative MPs argued that if the Balkan 
provinces acquired self-government, as proposed by the proponents of the sick-man 
discourse, the Russian Empire would become more influential in the region and pose 
a great danger to British strategic interests.  
Pan-Slavic sentiment in Serbia, Montenegro and Russia contributed both to the revolt 
and the consequent Russo-Ottoman War of 1877-78. The Russian Ambassador to the 
Porte, Ignatieff, was also known to be working for the Pan-Slavic cause during the 
Balkan Crisis, which made him the enemy of the moderates in the Russian Empire 
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like the Foreign Minister Gorchakov and the Ambassador to Britain Shuvalov, which 
in the end resulted in his dismissal from his post in Constantinople following the 
Berlin Treaty. However, Pan-Slavic impact on the Crisis did not feature in the sick-
man discourse; there was hardly any mentioning of it in the Agitation.  The integrity 
discourse, on the other hand, focused mainly on Russia and other foreign influences 
as the main reason for the Crisis. The two discourses clashed on the ‘cause’ of the 
revolt which also impacted their perceptions of the Muslims and Christians. As the 
integrity discourse focused more on the foreign factors rather than the internal 
antagonisms of the Ottoman society, it became possible to contest the victimisation of 
the Christians within the integrity discourse. 
For some Conservative MPs, Bulgaria was quiet for centuries and ‘different races 
lived together in comparatively tolerable harmony’ in the past, which was upset by 
the Christian population who were under the power and influence of Russia.’170 
Articles published in the pro-government newspapers also supported this view by 
stating that the Balkan Revolt was ‘indeed, an attack upon Turkey by Servians, 
Montenegrins and Dalmatians, with whom the Herzegovinan Christians were obliged 
to cast in their lot’ and the ‘vast numbers of lawless and idle men poured in from 
neighbouring countries’ to Bosnia, where the revolution started, in order to 
‘plunder.’171 The Russian Empire was portrayed as the imperial power behind this 
influx of foreign fighters to Balkans, whose aim was to undermine the Ottoman 
integrity in the end:  
‘This assistance and patronage [by Russia] confirmed the insurgents 
in their belief that Russian bayonets would sooner or later flash in 
their cause … the ulterior intentions of Russia, her attitude and 
Austria's, undoubtedly contributed greatly to the spread of the 
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insurrection and the more decided hostility of Servia and 
Montenegro.’172  
 
Similarly, Conservative MPs argued that the disintegration of the Ottoman power in 
Balkans would be a threat to the British interests specifically because the outcome 
would be a stronger Russian influence in the region. For the MPs if the Ottoman 
Empire collapsed, ‘20 different nationalities’, which would become ‘stepping stones 
to Russian ambitions’ would ‘emerge in the Balkans.’173  Therefore, Bruce, a 
Conservative MP, declared that ‘Turkey was, at the present moment, the only Power 
to which we were prepared to trust the keys of Asia’ because any other Power, 
particularly Russia, ‘would not only keep them for her own purpose, but might use 
them to break into the house.’174 These arguments demonstrated the ‘traditional’ 
mistrust towards Russia, which was perceived as the main threat towards the 
Ottoman Empire and the British interests.  
Although Russophobia was prevalent in Parliament, especially among the 
Conservatives, some Tory MPs disagreed with it. The dissident Conservative MP 
Forsyth was one of the first in Parliament to conclude that his fellow MPs 
exaggerated the Russian threat: ‘It is impossible that we should ever allow Russia to 
seize on Constantinople, but Russian ambition is a great bugbear.’175 Most of the 
Liberal MPs were of the same opinion; Fitzmaurice stated that the ‘unworthy 
suspicion of everything Russian that seems at times to seize hold of this country’, 
although ‘Russia and England’ did not ‘have divergent interests.’176 
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Gladstone was among the Liberal speakers who participated in the Commons debates.  
He attempted to construct an alternative view on Russia which challenged the anti-
Russian stance of the official discourse. Gladstone's explained that the Russia of 1876 
was not similar to the Russia of 1853 before the Crimean War and thus the Russian 
fear was exaggerated, and he continued to build his argument on this point in his 
Blackheath speech in September.  
The last speaker of the discussion on 31 July was Disraeli, who built on his previous 
ministerial statement on 17 July. Disraeli was the only speaker who explicitly spoke 
about the atrocity stories and he argued that most of the stories were ‘fabricated’ and 
‘imaginary’. Disraeli's speech also focused on the diplomatic conduct during the 
Balkan Crisis, where he gave an explanation on the reasons for his government's 
conduct in the affair. Disraeli continued with his previous reaction to the atrocity 
reports until August, by downplaying their significance. His reaction put himself and 
his government in a more difficult position as MacGahan’s reports and Stead’s 
campaigning took place. Many MPs who had not spoken on the issue had started to 
criticise specifically Disraeli’s stance during the last session, where the atrocities were 
debated in 7 August. The last session was reminiscent of the growing anger in the 
society against the government’s pro-Ottoman policy where various MPs urged 
government to ‘do something’ to put an end to the atrocities.    
4.4) Perceptions on the Ottoman Empire and the Turks  
Similar to the Lebanese and Cretan Crises, the official discourse articulated a 
different perception of the Ottoman Empire which contrasted with the perception of 
the ‘popular’ discourse. Blaming Russia and the ‘foreign agents’ as the main 
instigators of the Balkan Crises led to a different interpretation of the Ottoman 
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Empire in the pro-government press. For instance, an article published in The 
Morning Post noted that for ‘some philanthropists’ the revolts in the Ottoman Empire 
was ‘a struggle of freedom against tyranny, of civilisation against barbarism, of the 
Cross against the Crescent’. The article argued that this perception was wrong and 
stated that in fact ‘the strife … was hatched to weaken the Ottoman Empire and make 
it more accessible to its foes.’177 Another article compared the civilisation of the 
Ottoman Empire with Europe asking the readers if the Ottoman Empire was as 
barbarous as depicted in British press: ‘were they so brutal, so blood-thirsty, such 
monsters, as her accusers would have us believe?’ The article asked its readers if ‘Do 
not Mussulmans in some respects at any rate put to shame their Christian 
neighbours?’178 as they were massacred in the first place. These questions aimed to 
re-articulate the concept of civilisation for the ‘Ottoman Empire’ and tried to 
challenge the perception of the barbarous ‘Ottomans’.  
Similarly, the dominant view of the sick-man discourse which represented the 
Christians as the victims of oppression in the Ottoman Empire was also contested 
which was done through comparing the condition the Christians who were living in 
the Ottoman Empire with the ones who ‘gained their freedom’ from the Empire. In 
this way, the Ottoman Empire was portrayed as a more civilized and progressive 
force, compared to its neighbours: ‘If we consider the real condition of a Christian 
under Turkish rule, and compare it with that of a Christian under even the Wallachian 
rule, we will see the wanton destruction caused by this spurious Bulgarian 
insurrection in all its horror.’179 Another example warned the readers that ‘if people 
instead of jumping at the conclusion that because the Government of Turkey is 
                                                 
177 
The Insurrection in Turkey, The Morning  Post, July 11, 1876, p. 5.  
178 
The Atrocities in Bulgaria, The Morning Post, September 19, 1876, p. 5. 
179
 The Real Conditions of Christians in Turkey, The Morning Post, August 02, 1876, p. 3.  
271 
 
 
 
supposed to be Mussulman the Christian subjects of the Sultan are oppressed’ they 
would ‘see the difference of position between the condition of masses of Christian 
subjects of the Porte and compare that comfortable, well-to-do and happy people with 
misery, wretchedness, and poverty of the masses in the Vassal states [Serbia, 
Roumania] or with that of the peasantry of Austrian Banat, Hungary or even 
Gallicia...’180 
Palmerston constructed a dichotomy of good Ottoman central government versus bad 
local authorities in the Lebanese Crisis to defend the Ottoman government. This 
argument continued in the Bulgarian Atrocities agitation by pro-government press. In 
one article, the poor living conditions of the Christian peasants in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina were presented as being entirely the fault of the governors and 
landowners of the region who exploited their ‘distance from the capital’ to exploit the 
villagers.  In comparison, the Porte (the Ottoman centre) was presented as being 
‘sincerely desirous of removing grievances and endeavouring to deal equal justice to 
Musselman and Christian.’181   
The most important function of the centre versus periphery dichotomy was that it 
reduced the Ottoman administration’s responsibility for the crimes committed in 
Bulgaria, which was at odds with the sick-man discourse's view as evidenced in 
Gladstone's insistence on the Ottoman liability for the massacres. Contrary to 
Gladstone's views, The Morning Post's correspondent noted that the Ottoman 
government knew nothing about the crimes in Bulgaria at the end of July and sent a 
special commissioner to investigate the situation at the same time as Mr. Baring was 
sent there by the British government.   
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As the press published more reports on the massacres, the proponents of the official 
discourse downplayed the significance of the ‘atrocities’ reported by the press 
through  stating that the casualties and massacres in Bulgaria were the ‘usual’ by-
product of ‘any’ war. This argument was in line with Disraeli’s first response in 
Parliament against the atrocity allegations and similar to his comparison of the 
Bulgaria with Jamaica, the ‘European’ atrocities in colonies were presented as 
relevant examples. This ‘rational’ arguments stood in contrast with the emotional, 
sensational accounts of the atrocities depicted in the sick-man discourse which 
presented the atrocities as ‘unparalleled in history’, especially evident in Gladstone's 
speech which was given only a few days after the following report were published in 
The Morning Post and claimed:  
 
‘We have forgotten, all about the great civil and religious war; we 
forget Glencoe, the bombardment of Canton, the repression of 
Indian Mutiny &c; we forgot that Pelissier smoked out Arab women 
and children in caves … We can forget atrocities committed in 
Poland almost without interruption for nearly a century.’182 
 
The examples of European atrocities were not limited to the ‘colonial’ repressions; 
other examples included the Paris Commune in which the French troops ‘shot 
Communards and women and children’. The article claimed that the atrocities were 
not ‘unprecedented’ it was happening even in the Western Europe; however, the 
British press had double standards in reporting the news: ‘when we commit atrocities 
we are heroes; but when others do the same they are assassins.’183 According to these 
articles, if the names in the stories are transposed: ‘for Turk put English, for 
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Circassians put Orangemen, for Bulgarians put Germans, and for Russia the put 
United States’ the readers ‘will be sobered.’184 
These rational arguments on the ‘ordinary nature’ of atrocities were not confined to 
The Morning Post and The Telegraph. Similar explanations were included in an article 
published in the Pall Mall Gazette in August, which was less suspicious of the 
veracity of the Bulgarian massacres but nonetheless positioned itself away from the 
Agitation with a pro-Disraeli stance. The Pall Mall in this aspect was noteworthy 
since its position of affirming the atrocities without Agitation showed the success of 
the sick-man discourse in establishing itself as ‘the truth’, even though the editorial 
position of the paper was pro-government.  
The integrity discourse directly attacked the agitators and the veracity of their reports 
in September when the public meetings were being organised across Britain. At the 
climax of the Agitation, The Morning Post became a platform where the Agitation and 
the reports which built it were contested and criticised. When Consul Schuyler’s 
report was published on 20 September, a reply written by a prominent Ottoman 
intellectual Ali Suavi was sent to The Morning Post and published the following day, 
contesting the evidence Schuyler set out in his report
185
 which also criticised 
Gladstone and the Liberal Party for their role in the Agitation.
186
  
4.5) Epilogue: Disraeli’s views in Private  
An analysis of Disraeli's private correspondence to Lady Bradford and Lady 
Chesterfield in the days of the Agitation reveals his thoughts on the Bulgarian 
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Atrocities Agitation. From the beginning of the Crisis, Disraeli was extremely 
uncomfortable with the situation, and as the Agitation was built in the summer, his 
discontent increased even further. Preserving the status quo by maintaining peace 
between the Ottoman Empire and Russia was his main policy and he evaluated the 
Agitation in this framework. For this reason, the Agitation was primarily a nuisance 
for Disraeli, not only because it was critical of his government but also because it was 
not to the benefit of the British Empire. For Disraeli, the Agitation diminished the 
chance of preserving the European peace, and it encouraged Russia to disturb the 
status quo: 
  
If we don't get peace it will be owing, in no slight degree, to our 
enlightened public who, as usual, have fallen into the Russian trap, 
and denouncing 'Bulgarian atrocities' call for the expulsion of the 
Turks from Europe which would lead to another Thirty Years' 
War. 
187  
  
Had it not been for 'Bulgarian atrocities' we should have made a 
peace satisfactory to Europe and very honorable to England.
188  
  
... [W]ar seems imminent- and a long one. So much for Mr. 
Gladstone and his friends who will avenge the 'Bulgarian atrocities' 
by the butchery of the world.
189  
  
Russian policy was a real concern for Disraeli, which demonstrates the strength of 
the anti-Russian line. For Disraeli, the Agitation was harmful for Britain since it 
helped the Russian cause. Similarly, Disraeli had real scepticism of the Russian 
Empire’s designs for the Ottoman Empire. He thought that the Balkan Crisis was ‘a 
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conspiracy of Russia from the beginning’.190 Throughout the Crisis and into the War, 
he was always suspicious of Russia and its desire to invade Turkey. In December, he 
noted that Salisbury, the British representative in the Constantinople Conference, 
succeeded in his mission to prevent such an invasion from taking place. 
One of Disraeli's major concerns was Gladstone's pamphlet, which is examined in the 
later pages of this chapter, where he proposed ‘the expulsion of the Turks from 
Europe’ as a solution to the Balkan Crisis. Disraeli was highly critical of this move, 
not because of pragmatic reasons, but because of ethical reasons: ‘I think Gladstone's 
pamphlet is outrageous. Its point was, for ethnological reasons no less, to expel the 
Turks as a race from Europe.’191 Although Disraeli was perceived as being ‘pro-
Turkish’, his main aim was to maintain the peace; for this reason, he exasperatedly 
wrote that he wished the Russians and the Turks were at the bottom of the Black Sea, 
upon learning that the two States opted for war in February 1877. 
Disraeli’s pro-Ottoman policy, combined with his personal views proves the limits of 
the ideology in the face of realpolitik. Disraeli, similar to Palmerston and other Prime 
Ministers before him, designed his policy not because of his affection towards the 
Ottoman Empire but due to political calculations. There was a strong strand of 
Russophobic thinking in the Foreign Office and British political elite, because of the 
perceived economic and military threat from Russian Empire to the British interests. 
Disraeli was true to his words when he claimed it was he, not the Liberal Party, who 
was the true successor of Palmerston. This was particularly the case when the Eastern 
policy was concerned. Disraeli's demand to preserve to the Ottoman territorial 
integrity was primarily because of his suspicion towards Russian desires, which 
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signifies the importance of the anti-Russian line in the integrity discourse. His 
negative perception of the Agitation demonstrates the ‘pragmatic’ aspect of the 
integrity discourse; he believed that preserving the status quo in the East served the 
British interests. For this reason, the Agitation for Disraeli was first of all a political 
nuisance that played into Russia's hands. 
In the longer run however, the same realpolitik pragmatism was also valid for the 
Liberals and Gladstone. Gladstone approved British invasion of Egypt in 1882 after 
all the anti-interventionist public display of the Agitation, precisely because of the 
same reasons which made Disraeli a staunch supporter of the pro-Ottoman policy.  
5.)  Conclusion 
The literature examined the Bulgarian Atrocities Agitation as a separate and unique 
event of the 19
th
 century; however, as this chapter has shown, it was the established 
political discourses of the earlier decade which made the Agitation possible. Thus, the 
Atrocities Agitation could only be understood if both the discursive and the political 
context which enabled it is taken into account.  
The political context of the Agitation is well documented in the literature. The 
emerging political parties, the rivalry between the two prominent figures Gladstone 
and Disraeli are among the central themes used by the scholars to explain the 
Agitation. In addition to these, the visible increase in the power of the press 
demonstrated the emergence of the ‘masses’ as a political force in mid-Victorian 
Britain.  
The discursive context, on the other hand, has not been taken into account. The 
discourses used in the Agitation were clearly in continuity with the British 
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discourses on the Ottomans formulated in the earlier decade. Naturally, these 
discourses were transformed during the Agitation, especially as a result of the 
transformation in the journalistic style. The sick-man discourse, which was already 
popular in the previous decade, was transformed under the influence of the reports 
on atrocity, which marked the most important difference from the earlier era. The 
atrocities were reported in a sensationalist style, which in effect caused a 
radicalisation of the anti-Ottoman discourses Increased newspaper sales and the 
inclusion of Gladstone in the debate helped the sick-man discourse to further 
popularise within the masses. Moreover, the official discourse, which was 
articulated through ‘British interests’, and Russophobia lost momentum, although 
the latter was still effective on the society and revived, especially after Russia 
declared war to the Ottoman Empire. Nonetheless, it became especially difficult for 
the government and Disraeli to defend the ‘traditional’ policy because of the 
increased strength of the anti-Ottoman discourse in Britain. The Bulgarian Atrocities 
Agitation marked the hitherto peak of the anti-Ottoman discourses in Britain, which 
had a definitive influence the Anglo-Ottoman relations.  
The most important impact of the Agitation was its long-term effect. After the Berlin 
Treaty, and the fall of Disraeli from power in 1880, the relations between the 
Ottomans and Britain kept deteriorating. For the Ottomans, the British acquisition of 
Cyprus in 1878 and invasion of Egypt in 1882 were two major acts that changed the 
view on the British, and transformed it from a friendly Great Power to a potential 
enemy. The rise of German Empire in 1890s further lessened Britain's importance 
both economically and militarily for the Ottoman Empire. For Britain, on the other 
hand, the domination of the sick-man discourse in both public and official view was 
supported with the changes in Britain's strategic priorities in Mediterranean. The 
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Ottomans appeared as a more distant and more ‘Islamic’ lands for the British, and the 
latter was important to Britain as far as India was concerned. Even in 1876, Gladstone 
was extremely careful when talking about the Muslims precisely because of the large 
Muslim populations living in British India. With that concern apart, the Ottoman 
realm was perceived in the way constructed by the sick-man discourse in 1860s and 
1870s; as an Islamic despotism which was the adversary of the European Christianity 
and liberal values or, in short, ‘ European civilisation’.  
The discourses on race and religion aimed to define a particular group of people as a 
united whole and imposed a hierarchy upon them; the Muslim peoples were always 
considered subordinate to Christians, who were divided into West-East groups in a 
similar way. In these examples of the sick-man discourse, the Ottoman Empire was 
described as a tyrannical, barbaric rule outside the ‘civilized’ Western world, which 
also pointed to its inferiority. This feature has not changed from 1860s onwards, and 
although the first phase did not produce much on these categories, the racial 
discourses became further radicalised, especially after Gladstone’s intervention.   
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Chapter 8: Conclusion  
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The starting point of this dissertation was the Bulgarian Atrocities Agitation of 1876, 
but it quickly became apparent that the perceptions of ‘the Ottoman’, ‘the Muslims’ 
and the ‘Turk’ that dominated this campaign were at least in part rooted in earlier 
perceptions. While this thesis established the importance of the Agitation, it also 
demonstrated that the Agitation should be understood as a part of a wider process 
which constructed the ‘Ottomans’ as an ‘Other’ in Britain. The continuities between 
the perceptions in three separate case studies emerge as the most important evidence 
of for this point in this thesis, and more importantly, it was this process which 
demarcated the mid-19
th
 century perceptions from the earlier ones.  
The British perceptions on the ‘Ottomans’ in the 19th century was overlooked by the 
literature. Until now, there was only one monograph that dealt with the topic, which 
focused only on the perceptions of the travellers, disregarding other available sources. 
This dissertation is the first attempt to fill this gap and to provide a better 
understanding of the nineteenth-century perceptions of the ‘Ottomans’ in Britain. This 
thesis has also demonstrated that a study on 'perceptions’ raised specific 
methodological questions. Discourse analytic framework and empirical based case 
study approach were used to tackle these issues and explore the construction and 
development of perceptions in depth.  
Throughout this thesis, discourse analysis proved to be a useful tool in explaining the 
British ‘perceptions’. Discourse analysis helped to interpret vast amount of sources 
used in this thesis into consistent and meaningful blocks. Once discourse analysis has 
been deployed to interpret these sources, it became clear that two discernible and 
consistent method of thought emerged from the available sources. Each of these was 
consistently formed, linking various discursive elements together to form an 
overarching explanation to the events in the Ottoman realm. I have named these two 
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separate interpretations as discourses because they not only provided an explanation 
to the crises in question, but also constructed the identities of the people under 
scrutiny. It was this link between explaining a social event, and constructing the 
identities of the actors involved in this event which made discourse theory invaluable 
for this thesis. In each of the three case studies, these two separate and rival 
discourses were consistently reiterated. During each reiteration, these discourses were 
not merely reproduced, they were also transformed.  
These transformations were due to the ‘political’ nature of the discourse formation 
process. In discourses meanings are only partially fixed; they were constantly formed 
and re-formed depending on the context. This theoretical aspect is very useful in 
explaining why the meaning of the term ‘Turk’, ‘Muslim’ or ‘Christian’ varied 
between case studies and between the two discourses.   
The study of the British discourses on the Ottomans, 1860-1878, has contributed to 
our understanding on the construction of the mid-Victorian British perceptions. 
Exploring many hitherto largely unexplored newspaper and parliamentary sources, 
and using a case study method to instigate a comparative and evident-based approach, 
this study looks more in depth at the discursive construction of the Ottomans in mid-
Victorian Britain. By utilising a discourse analytic framework, this thesis has 
demonstrated that the British elite had formulated two distinct political discourses in 
the mid-19
th
 century. Furthermore, through comparing three case studies, this thesis 
also demonstrated the connection between the transformations which happened in 
Britain and the discursive constructions of the Ottomans as an ‘Other’. This was 
particularly done through tracing the debates on the foreign policy where the official 
policy and the alternative policy were in clear contrast. In this way, this thesis also 
demonstrated the impact of the public opinion in formulating the foreign policy in 
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1876, where Disraeli was forced to abandon his traditional policy and alter it to meet 
the public demands. 
The literature on the early modern perceptions has established that the perceptions of 
the ‘Ottomans’ were plural. For example, the early modern perceptions of the 
Ottoman Empire, under the influence of the Ottoman Empire’s military might, was 
more positive in Britain, although some, such as the 16th century scholar Knolles, 
disagreed with these views, as demonstrated in Chapter 3. The Enlightenment 
influenced the British perceptions of the Muslims and the Ottoman Empire in a 
negative way, which was depicted as an Oriental despotism.  
These two different perceptions continued to exist side by side in Britain until the 19
th
 
century. This thesis has revealed that the mid-19
th
 century British perceptions had 
differed from the earlier ones due to its ‘political’ nature. The main difference of the 
‘modern’ period therefore was the ‘politicisation’ of the perceptions in the 19th 
century, which transformed the way the ‘Other’ is perceived in Britain. The Ottomans 
were perceived as different, an ‘Other’ in Britain in the earlier centuries; however 
these perceptions were limited to a small set of educated elite and constructed in the 
form of ‘vague’ images. For instance, the Muslims were depicted as ‘lazy’ or 
‘indolent’ without any further political signification.   
The perceptions in the mid-19
th
 century was constructed in two political discourses; 
the official integrity discourse was contested by the popular sick-man discourse. 
These two discourses competed for dominance in the British press in the 1860s until 
the sick-man discourse prevailed in the popular level popularity with the Bulgarian 
Atrocities Agitation. The most important outcome of the Agitation’s success was the 
‘radicalisation’ of the perceptions of the Muslims, Turks and the Ottoman Empire, as 
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discussed in Chapter 7.   
The success of the sick-man discourse through the Agitation was embedded in the 
transformation of the British society and politics in the mid-century, which was 
visible in the three cases examined in this thesis. The first important transformation 
was the increased ‘democratisation’ of the British politics in this period, as analysed 
in Chapter 4. The enfranchisement of larger sections of British society and the 
development of non-parliamentary pressure groups were the examples of the 
democratisation of the politics, which increased the influence and importance of the 
public opinion in policy making. The Second important factor was the rise of the 
press, which went hand in hand with the democratisation of the politics. The press 
became more important in influencing the public opinion, and hence, its influence on 
policy making also increased. The rise of the press and public had altered the way 
politics were constructed in Britain; the politicians became more attentive to public 
opinion and felt the need to legitimise their actions through creating public consent. 
The final important transformation was the increased importance of the Near East in 
British politics, which had brought the British elites into closer contact with the 
Ottomans society. All these were gradual transformations that started in the mid-19
th
 
century and continued into the 20
th
 century, but a comparison of the three case studies 
demonstrates the changes in British politics and their impact on the perceptions on of 
the ‘Ottomans’. 
Britain in 1860 was ruled by Palmerston, who single-handedly dominated the 
political scene. The political parties were not yet powerful enough to reflect ‘public 
opinion’ and the elite read The Times, the only newspaper with significant circulation. 
Britain in 1876, on the other hand, was a much very different place. Three major 
newspapers, the Daily News, The Times and The Daily Telegraph with circulations of 
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over 100,000 copies per day competed to draw the public’s interest and increase their 
circulation in the days of the Agitation. Two major political parties with their internal 
opposition and local branches were active in exerting pressure on their leadership. 
The politics was were no longer dominated by one strong leader; there were a number 
of existing and emerging leaders in both parties. In 1860, Palmerston did not need to 
be too worried about the public opinion in Britain on the Lebanese Civil War to 
determine British foreign policy. In comparison, Disraeli was in a far more 
uncomfortable position in 1876 to decide on British policy in the Near East. He was 
pressured by an active parliamentary opposition and a far more radical non-
parliamentary opposition who directed a sharp criticism of his policy. 
In addition to these changes, the changing strategic importance of the Near East also 
influenced the success of the sick-man discourse. The Near East became more 
important for Britain in the 19
th
 century due to a number of political reasons which 
were examined in Chapter 2. The ‘Eastern Question’ was the context in which the 
British relations with the Ottomans was determined, which linked the perceptions of 
the various ‘Oriental’ people together at this time. For instance, the perceptions of the 
Ottoman Empire in the 19
th
 century was influenced from by the perceptions of the 
Russia Empire; the perceptions of the Muslims were influenced from by the 
perceptions of the Eastern Christians; the Turk was influenced from by the perception 
of the Greek.  
All these changes had influenced the way in which the British perceptions were 
formulated. In 1860, Palmerston viewed the Lebanese Crisis differently than some 
MPs and the British press. He was supported by the Cabinet members and the Daily 
News, and together they had formulated the official discourse, which perceived the 
Ottoman Empire as a reforming empire, a valuable ally in the region. The 
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‘Palmerstonian’ official perception was criticised by the ‘popular’ perception which 
depicted a different view of the ‘Ottomans’.  In the popular sick-man discourse, the 
Ottoman Empire was deemed as the main culprit of the Civil War and perceived as a 
backward, barbaric Empire supported by the ‘civilized’ British Empire. In contrast 
with the earlier era, the perceptions were now formulated within two antagonistic 
discourses which competed with each other to define each political event, such as the 
Lebanese Civil War or the Cretan Revolt. The debates on these events revealed how 
the Ottoman Muslims, Christians and state was were understood by British as an 
outsider, an ‘Other’.  
From the Lebanese Civil War to the Atrocities Agitation, certain terms were used to 
define the Muslims/Turks/Christians of the Ottoman Empire by the proponents of the 
sick-man discourse. The most significant of these was the term ‘civilisation’, which 
demarcated the not only the British from the Ottoman, but also the ‘European’ from 
the non-European. The term civilized, as demonstrated in Chapter 6, was used 
specifically to define the Western European people; any other nation that was deemed 
to be outside Western Europe was regarded by the British elite as ‘semi-civilized’ or 
‘uncivilized’, depending on their relative position.  
The term civilisation was used to delineate the European identity, which was in line 
with the Weltanschauung of the mid-19
th
 century Britain where Social-Darwinist 
ideas was getting prevalence. Social-Darwinism, as explained in Chapter 4, was on 
the rise in Britain and this was not limited to the impact of Darwin’s studies. The 
ideas on of ‘survival of the fittest’ or ‘natural selection’ were argued by a number of 
other biologists and anthropologists. The influence of these ideas extended beyond 
the areas of scientific studies; the establishment of new research areas such as 
ethnography and anthropology proved that these ideas were also influential on in 
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‘social’ studies. Social Darwinist ideas led to the belief on of the Western European or 
British supremacy over the rest of the world. This thesis demonstrated that these ideas 
also influenced the perceptions on of the Ottomans. For instance, when the category 
of ‘race’ was used to define a particular group, such as the Maronites and Druzes in 
Chapter 5, or the Turks in Chapter 7, this was done to point out to their distance from 
the European civilization and, thus, their ‘inferiority’ in contrast to the Europeans. 
The case analyses conducted in this thesis demonstrated that both the sick-man and 
integrity discourse propagated a similar view in terms of the British supremacy on 
over the ‘Oriental’ people, proving the prevalence of these ideas in the mid-Victorian 
British elite.  
The focal point of the debates on the Ottomans was the British foreign policy, which 
became a contested area between the two discourses. This was a result of the 
‘political’ nature of the discourses, which analysed the crises in the Ottoman Empire 
in order to formulate an appropriate British foreign policy. The proponents of the 
official discourse focused on preserving the Ottoman territorial integrity, which was 
believed to be the best way to defend the British interests. Palmerston clearly stated 
that his policy of non-intervention for the Lebanese Civil War was not stemmed from 
his ‘predilection to the Turk’; it was formulated to protect the British interests. In 
comparison, the proponents of the sick-man discourse criticised the British policy in 
the East because they deemed the policy as anti-humane, anti-liberal and anti-
Christian. Similar criticisms were directed to consecutive Conservative and Liberal 
governments who continued Palmerston’s foreign policy during the Cretan Revolt. 
The debates in the 1860s, as analysed in Chapter 5 and 6, demonstrated that the harsh 
criticism of Disraeli’s foreign policy in 1876 was well rooted in the British elite. The 
difference of the agitators’ discourse from their predecessors was not in the content of 
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their arguments; it was in the presentation.  
Analysis on the foreign policy debates in this thesis, demonstrated the turn in the 
perception of the ‘Other’ in British society, and the factors influencing the 
construction of this ‘Other’. The sick-man discourse was constructed through a 
mixture of concepts such as religion, humanitarianism and liberalism. These three 
concepts were the cornerstones of the British elite’s mind set which was used to 
perceive the outside world. In all three case studies, the Christianity had a central 
position in determining the foreign policy of Britain. It was argued that the British 
policy should protect the Christian lives rather than cooperating with the non-
Christian powers. Similarly, the concept of humanitarianism had a religious 
undertone; according to the defenders of the alternative policy, Britain should civilise 
the uncivilized places as this was a ‘religious duty’.   
Although there were numerous continuities between the three cases, there was an 
important distinction. The Agitation ‘radicalised’ the perceptions on the Ottoman 
Empire and the Muslims and Turks in Britain due to the impact of the news on the 
atrocities in the press. The Eastern Christians were depicted as the victims in the 
Ottoman Empire throughout the Lebanese Civil War and the Cretan Revolt; the 
Agitation reproduced these perceptions and presented the Christians as the ‘pure’ 
victims of the atrocities. The Ottoman Empire was perceived to be a barbaric Islamic 
power, the traditional enemy of the Christian Europe and the modern enemy of 
liberalism before the Agitation. The Turks and Muslims were deemed by the Agitators 
as ‘anti-humane specimen’, as the complete anti-thesis of the humanitarian and 
civilized British 
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When going through the three case studies, it becomes quickly apparent that some of 
the perceptions discussed here are not limited to the nineteenth-century. The 
relevance of these perceptions for our present time is striking. Of course, the main 
object of these nineteenth century perceptions, the Ottoman Empire and its 
ruling/dominant ethnic group, does not exist any longer; it collapsed at the end of the 
First World War after it had decided to enter the war on the side of the Central Powers 
against the British Empire, and it was replaced, in the 1920s, by the modern Republic 
of Turkey. However, although the political structures changed in the 20
th
 century, the 
some of the perceptions constructed in the mid-19
th
 century persisted and resurfaced 
in the ‘new world order’ that occurred with the fall of the Soviet Union.   
In retrospect, the perceptions constructed on the Ottoman Empire during the Agitation 
influenced the Anglo-Ottoman relations significantly. British influence in the Porte 
was at its zenith prior to the Agitation; the British Ambassadors to the Porte exerted 
great influence on the Tanzimat statesmen who were the decision makers in the 1850s 
and 1860s. The British influence was not limited to the Ottoman statesmen; the 
Young Ottomans, similar to other Young Europe movements across Europe, argued 
for a parliamentary monarchy for the Ottoman Empire along the British model in the 
1860s, and some had published newspapers in London to defend this cause.  
All these changed significantly after the Berlin Treaty which had a significant impact 
on the Ottoman Empire. The new Sultan Abdulhamid II, whose accession was 
initiated by the Ottoman bureaucrats, firstly promulgated the Constitution and opened 
the first Ottoman Parliament and then, after the disastrous war against Russia, 
dissolved the Parliament and abolished the Constitution. From then on, until his fall 
with the Young Turk Revolution in 1908, Abdulhamid established a personal rule in 
the Ottoman Empire and became the sole authority. Abdulhamid was particularly 
296 
 
 
 
disillusioned by Britain because of its conduct prior to the Berlin Conference in 1878 
when Salisbury negotiated to seize Cyprus, with the Cyprus Convention of 1878, in 
exchange for British diplomatic support for the Ottoman Empire. Anglo-Ottoman 
relations deteriorated further in the 1880s with Gladstone’s decision to invade Egypt 
in 1882 and push for more reforms in the Balkans, a policy supported and continued 
by Salisbury’s Conservative governments. In summary, Anglo-Ottoman relations 
never recovered from the low point reached during the Bulgarian Atrocities Agitation 
until the final dissolution of the Ottoman Empire.  
Britain played a major role in the creation of the post- WWI order in the Near East, 
which was then referred to as the Middle East, and the British interest in the Middle 
East continued in the 20
th
 century. The interchangeable usage of the terms Turk and 
Muslim in the 19
th
 century gave way to a clear demarcation between the two in the 
20
th
 century. The formation of the Republic of Turkey in 1923, as a successor state to 
the Ottoman Empire, situated the term ‘Turk’ clearly within the boundaries of the 
newly formed secular republic. The Turk no longer meant the ‘Muslim’ in a wider 
sense, but it started to signify an ethnic and national identity in the British use of the 
term.  
The meaning of the term ‘Muslim’, on the other hand, had a more complicated 
development in the 20
th
 century. Similar to the development of the 19
th
 century 
perceptions, it was influenced greatly from by the political developments of the 20
th
 
century.  
The interwar Middle East consisted of a number of states, formed by the British and 
the French. After the decolonisation in the post-war period, the newly established 
independent Arab states became more independent of Anglo-French influence. Britain 
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ceased to be the dominant power in the region and instead became the ally of the 
United States, which emerged as the new imperial power in the Middle East in 
competition with the Soviet Union, until the dissolution of the latter in 1990.The 
rapid development of the oil industry after the Second World War increased the 
importance of the Arab nations for the West, and most of the Arab states, specifically 
the oil producers such as Saudi Arabia, UAE, Iraq and Kuwait established close 
political ties with the US and Britain.
1
  
The Muslim identity seemed to be of relatively less importance during the Cold War 
for the British and the West in general. This was partly because of the political 
developments in the ‘Muslim’ states, which pushed religion to the periphery of the 
society and partly because of the global politics. The Cold War international order 
was defined by the battle between the opposing ideologies: ‘democracy’ and 
‘communism’ in which religion was of secondary importance. Secularism and 
nationalism, sometimes with clear socialist undertones, was on the rise in the 20
th
 
century Muslim world. Gamal Abdel Nasser, the architect of the 1952 overthrow of 
the monarchy in Egypt, defeated the Islamic Muslim Brotherhood organization in the 
power struggle ensuing the fall of monarchy, and became the second President of the 
Egyptian Republic in 1956. Nasser was a pan-Arabist and was the chief architect of 
the Arab socialism, which was defined by his ambitious developmentalism, anti-
imperialism and secularism.  
Similar developments took place in most of the Muslim world; in Syria and Iraq, 
secular Baathist movements seized power in the 1950s and 1960s. In countries like 
                                                 
1
 For the raising importance of the oil see, F. Venn, Oil Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century, Palgrave 
Macmillan, 1986, T. Mitchell, Carbon Democracy: Political Power in the Age of Oil, Verso, 2011. See 
also, W. L. Cleveland, History of the Modern Middle East, Westview Press, 1991, R. Owen, State, 
Power and Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East, Routledge, 2004.  
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Jordan, Iran and Afghanistan, pro-secular and modernist monarchies were in power 
until late 1970s. In Palestine, Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) was formed 
in late 1964 as a Palestinian nationalist movement. Most of these regimes sought 
either Soviet or US support; in some cases they became the area of rivalry between 
the two superpowers. The establishment of Israel in 1948 and ensuing Arab-Israeli 
wars were also influenced by the global rivalry; Israel was supported by the US, 
whereas the Palestinian movement was supported by the Soviets.  
Islamism as a political ideology was an undercurrent force in the Middle East 
throughout most of the 20
th
 century, lurking beneath the US-Soviet opposition. The 
Muslim Brotherhood continued to be banned in Egypt after 1956. Similarly, Syria, 
Saudi Arabia and other Gulf monarchies had all banned the Muslim Brotherhood at 
some point in the 20
th
 century. The influential anti-secularist leader of the Muslim 
Brotherhood, Sayyid Qutb, whose ideas influenced a vast array of Islamists, was 
hanged in 1966 by Nasser’s regime. A Brotherhood uprising in Syria was suppressed 
by the Assad regime in 1982. In general, the Islamist identity was pushed to the 
fringes of the political arena in the Middle East.  
The fall of the Soviet bloc in late 1980s was a watershed moment both in the history 
of the world and for in the history of the Middle East. The end of Cold War had 
altered the order in the Middle East and Central Asia. The end of communism firstly 
meant the disappearance of the common enemy of the US-led Western alliance. 
Similarly, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the 20
th
 century secularist Arab 
movements, which were influenced from by the Soviet example to a certain degree, 
suffered an important blow. The decline of secularist movement in the Middle East 
was coupled with the rise of a new phenomenon, the jihadist Islamic movements, for 
which Afghanistan played an important role.  
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Three major events, which took place in the 1980s, had a decisive role in shaping the 
Islamic identity in the post-Cold War world. The Iranian Revolution of 1979 and the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1980 brought the Islamic identity back to the fore 
in the Middle Eastern politics. The Iranian Revolution shook the world with 
theocratic character, the first of its kind in the Middle East. The Iran hostage crisis, 
where 52 US diplomats were taken hostage by an Islamic organization supported by 
the new regime, created the first instance where the word ‘terror’ was used to define 
the acts of a Muslim group. The third important event was the Gulf War of 1991, 
where the US-led coalition attacked Iraq as a response to Iraq’s decision to invade 
Kuwait, a US-ally in the region. This war was a watershed event, as it was the first 
direct confrontation of the Western alliance in a Muslim country, except for the 
limited French and US participation to in the Lebanese Civil War.  
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan also had a pivotal role in changing the position of 
Islam in the Middle East. The mujahideen movement sprang in Afghanistan in 1980s 
as an Islamic resistance movement against the Soviet invasion. The Western alliance 
supported the Islamic mujahideen resistance in Afghanistan against the ‘common 
enemy’ while at the same time supported supporting the secular Iraq against the new 
Iran Islamic Republic in the Iran-Iraq War (1980-88). Mujahideen was an Islamic 
militia force comprised of Muslims from different nationalities, although the majority 
of the members were from Pakistan and Afghanistan. One of the Arab members of the 
mujahideen was Osama bin Laden, who formed the Al-Qaeda network in 1988 with 
the aim of pursuing global jihad in Afghanistan.   
The Taliban movement, which had its origins in the mujahideen movement, seized 
control of Afghanistan in 1996 and established the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. 
The Taliban’s rise in Afghanistan was symptomatic; it demonstrated the rise of the 
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‘Islamic’ or Muslim identity in the post-Cold War world. The Western media, 
including the British media, had covered the crimes perpetrated by the Taliban regime 
in Afghanistan, which brought the perception of the ‘Muslim’ back to the media 
attention. Al-Qaeda had started its attacks on US foreign missions in 1990s, bombing 
several US embassies in Africa.  
The turning point in the rise of jihadism for the West was, of course, 11 September 
2001, when Islamist militants launched a surprise attack to on the World Trade Centre 
in New York and the Pentagon in Washington DC, causing some 3000 civilian 
casualties. The responsibility for what became known as 9-11 was later claimed by 
Osama bin Laden, the leader of the Al-Qaeda network, and this triggered the invasion 
of Afghanistan by an US-led coalition in 2002 and subsequently Iraq in 2003. Britain 
participated to in both invasions to a great degree, sending thousands of troops to both 
countries to fight against Al-Qaeda and Taliban militants in Afghanistan and the 
insurgence in Iraq.  
Therefore, the 21
st
 century had witnessed a new episode in the perceptions of 
Muslims in Britain. The Muslims, nearly forgotten in the 20
th
 century world by the 
British, emerged as the new ‘enemy’ in the 21st century. The term Islam started to be 
juxtaposed to ‘terror’ especially after the events such as 9-11 or the London 
underground bombings of 7 July 2005. Britain was drawn into a prolonged conflicts 
against Islamist fighters around the world from 1991 onwards. The first Gulf War in 
1991 was followed by the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq and continued with the 
recent aerial bombardments of Islamic State in Syria and Iraq as of October 2014.  
The Muslims therefore, re-entered the public sphere in Britain as the ‘new enemy’, 
especially in the context of the ‘War on Terror’. The Muslims were perceived as the 
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‘Other’ in Britain and replaced the ‘communist’ of the Cold War. There is constant 
media interest on the ‘Muslim’, who are now classified in two groups; as the ‘Good 
Muslims’ and the ‘Bad Muslims’, as noted by Mamdani.2 The terrorist ‘Bad’ Muslims 
were distinguished from the peaceful Muslims, mostly residing in the Western 
nations; the terror is understood to be the doings of the Bad ‘barbaric’ Muslims.  
The construction of the current perceptions of the Muslims resembles that of the 
historical British perceptions analysed in this thesis, which increasingly presented the 
Muslims as the sole culprits of the complicated social antagonisms. The 19
th
 century 
British elites had failed to understand the impact of modernisation in the Ottoman 
Empire, which was the major reason behind all the Lebanon, Cretan and Balkan 
crises. The 19
th
 century Ottoman Empire was caught between the need to modernise 
the state through increased centralisation and bureaucratisation and the local 
population’s demands for autonomy and independence. This was precisely the reason 
behind the failure of the Tanzimat reforms in fulfilling their aim of preserving the 
unity of the Ottoman Empire. As the reforms were implemented in the provinces, the 
local populations became more eager to break-away or to return to the old 
autonomous state, resulting with in civil wars or revolutions. The British elite, 
convinced of their own cultural superiority over the ’barbarous East’, failed to 
perceive these process. The Lebanese Civil War, Cretan Revolt and Bulgarian 
Atrocities were perceived to be the Muslim attack on the Christians or a mutual 
killing of ‘hostile and backward races.’  
This is not too far removed from the contemporary understanding of the Islamic 
terror, which is a product of modernisation and global politics rather than an inherent 
                                                 
2
 M. Mamdani, Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: A Political Perspective on Culture and Terrorism, 
American Anthropolist, Vol. 104, No. 3, 2002, pp. 766-775.  
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part of Islamic culture or the ‘Muslim character’. Afghanistan in 1980s was 
radicalised as it became an area of proxy war between the two superpowers of the 
Cold War. The mujahedeen movement, supported by the US and its allies, led to the 
creation of Al-Qaeda, which used modern tactics to attack the West. The modern 
nature of this terrorism was evident in the recent rise of the Islamic State during the 
summer of 2014; the IS militants who were experts in using social media operated the 
sophisticated military equipment captured from the Iraqi Army and exploited the 
political vacuum created by the Iraqi invasion of 2003. All these demonstrates the 
relevance of the 19
th
 century perceptions in the modern world.  
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Appendix 1: Graphs1   
                                                 
1Sources: Data on Parliament and newspapers is hand collected by the author. Electoral data is taken 
from F.W. S. Craig, British Electoral Facts, 1832-1980, Parliamentary Research Services, 1981.  
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Figure 1: Number of Journal Articles in British Periodicals on Turkey 
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Figure 2: Number of News on Turkey in the British Newspapers  
 
 
Figure 3: Speeches made on 'Turkey' in Parliament 
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Figure 4: Speeches made on different countries in Parliament 
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Figure 5: Speeches on 'Bulgaria' in Parliament 
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Figure 6: Circulation Figures of Main Newspapers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Life Cycle of Bulgarian Atrocities Agitation  
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Figure 8: Size of British Electorate  
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Figure 9: Percentage of Votes Gained by the Parties in the Elections 
 
 
 
Figure 10: Number of Seats Gained in Parliament 
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Appendix 2: A Chronology of Events 
during the Balkan Crisis  
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April-July 1875: The First series of revolt started in Bosnia & Herzegovina.  
August 26 1875: The Ottoman Government decreased the Interest payments on loans 
causing unrest in the financial markets.  
December 30 1875: The Andrassy Note was declared by Powers to end the 
hostilities.  
February 13 1876: Porte Declared the Acceptance of Andrass y Note.  
May 2 1876: Beginning of the Revolt in Bulgarian towns Filibe and Pazarcik.  
May 6 1876: Mob killed French and German consuls in Salonica following an 
(alleged) incident between Greeks and Muslims, over the Greek attack to a Muslim 
girl converted from Christianity.  
May 8 1876: A revolt in Constantinople by religious students against the unpopular 
Grand Vizier Nedim Pasha, who was accused of being under Russian influence.  
May 11-June 9 1876: The First Phase of the fighting in Bulgaria where most of the 
massacres took place.  
May 26 1876: Prince Milan of Serbia signed an alliance with Montenegro against the 
Ottomans.  
May 30 1876: Deposition of the Ottoman Sultan Abdulaziz by Suleyman Pasha and 
Midhat Pasha, the head of Military Academy and the most influential politician 
respectively.  
329 
 
 
May 30 1876: Serbia and Montenegro declared war on the Ottoman Empire. Apart 
from a few border clashes no sizeable confrontation happened between two sides.  
June 24 1876: Daily News reported the first news on the Bulgarian Atrocities 
June 30 1876:  Serbia declared War on the Ottomans.  
July 2 1876: Montenegro declared war on the Ottomans. 
July 8 1876: Russia and Austria signed a pact and decided to intervene if the Serbia 
& Montenegro to be defeated by the Ottomans. Russian volunteers were sent to the 
war zone under the control of a general from the Russian army.  
August 18-24 1876: Serbian forces were defeated in the battle by the Ottomans and 
withdrew to inner Serbia.  
August 31 1876: A fatwa was issued to dethrone Murad V due to his mental illness. 
Abdulhamid II was throned as the third Ottoman Sultan in three months by Midhat 
Pasha and his allies.  
September 22/28 1876: Serbian forces attacked the Ottoman forces and were routed 
again. Russian Ambassador to Porte, Igantiev intervened and forced the Ottoman 
government to retreat from Serbia.  
October 7 1876: Abdulhamid II ordered for the establishment of a Constitutional 
Commission with the aim of preparing a Constitution for the Empire under Midhat 
Pasha's chairmanship.  
October 31 1876: Russian Empire gave an ultimatum to the Porte demanding cease-
fire between Serbia and the Ottomans. 
November 3 1876: The Ottoman forces in Serbia retreated.  
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November 4 1876: Bismark offered to convene an international conference in 
Constantinople after Disraeli's calls to end the Crisis. 
December 19 1876: Midhat Pasha was appointed as the Grand Vizier and his 
cabinet's main task was declared as to promulgate the Constitution.  
December 23 1876: The First Ottoman Constitution was promulgated at the official 
opening day of the Constantinople Conference, the international conference convened 
with the aim of putting an end to the Crisis.  
January 15 1877: Czar had agreed a secret treaty with the Austria where the latter 
promised neutrality in case of a Russo-Ottoman war in exchange of the right to 
occupy Bosnia and Herzegovina.  
January 20 1877: The Conference broke up after Midhat Pasha refused the Great 
Power plan for Balkans, which included very harsh terms of foreign involvement into 
the region. 
February 5 1877: Midhat was dismissed by the Sultan on the pretext of failing to 
agree with Powers at the Conference. 
February 28 1877: Serbia signed a peace treaty with the Ottomans ending the war. 
Montenegro refused the Ottoman peace proposal. 
March 19 1877: The first Ottoman Parliament was opened in Constantinople with 
two houses similar to the British Parliament. 
April 16 1877: Russians agreed with Roumania, still under Ottoman suzerainity but 
de facto independent, for the right to pass their armies from their borders.   
April 24 1877: The Russian Empire declared war on the Ottomans. Disraeli was 
331 
 
 
neither able to sign an alliance with the Austrians nor gather Cabinet support for war 
on the Ottoman side.  
June 30 1877: Lord Beaconsfield (Disraeli) secured the Cabinet support to save the 
Ottomans from Russia but unable to convince a continental power, thus decided to 
send the British fleet to Bashika Bay close to the Dardanelles.  
June/July 1877: Initial Russian advances were halted at Plevna (Bulgaria) and Kars 
(Eastern Anatolia) by the Ottoman army. British public opinion swung towards the 
Ottoman successes.  
November 1877 / January 1878: Russians finally managed to break the Ottoman 
defensive lines and started their advance towards Constantinople. 
January 1878: Serbia declared war on the Ottomans and joined Montenegro and 
Russia.  
January 31 1878: Armistace was signed between the Russian and the Ottoman 
Empires.  
 
February 13 1878: The Ottoman Parliament was suspended by Abdulhamid II 
following harsh criticisms of the MPs on the conduct of the War.  
March 3 1878: Treaty of San Stefano was signed with the same terms of armistace 
between Russians and Ottomans. Serbia, Montenegro and Romania were given 
independence, a large autonomous Bulgaria with its own army was created, new 
reforms were promised in Bosnia, Thessaly and Crete. A very large (four times the 
Ottoman annual budget) indemnity was agreed and the Muslim populated Eastern 
332 
 
 
Anatolian towns were given to Russia.  
May 30 1878: Strong European reaction to the terms resulted with the Berlin 
Conference where nearly all of the terms of the San Stefano was to be reviewed.  
June 4 1878: The Cyprus Convention was signed between Britain and the Ottomans. 
Britain requested to administer and occupy Cyprus in exchange for their support in 
the upcoming Berlin Treaty. In this way Britain guaranteed to possess a naval force 
large enough to check further Russian advances in Eastern Anatolia.  
July 13 1878: Berlin Treaty was signed with new terms; much smaller but 
nonetheless autonomous Bulgaria was declared. Austria occupied Bosnia & 
Herzegovina, most of the Eastern Anatolian provinces were given back to the 
Ottomans and the Ottomans gained some of the Russian occupied territory in Balkans 
back.   
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Appendix 3: Biographical Information  
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1.) Short Biographies of the British Officials/Statesman 
Edmund Backhouse (1824-1906): Liberal MP for Darlington served two terms, 
between 1867 and 1880. At the time of the meeting he was the Liberal MP of 
Darlington. He was a backbencher during his time in the Commons, and he was a 
member of the Quaker belief, and a member of one of the most powerful Quaker 
families in Darlington. Mr. Theodore Fry, the Darlington MP after 1880 elections was 
present in the meeting as well. 
George Campbell, 8
th
 Duke of Argyll (1823-1900): A Scottish peer and Liberal 
politician who was interested in the Eastern Question and became a prominent voice 
opposing the British support the Ottomans in the Balkan Crisis. He wrote a book 
titled, The Eastern Question, in 1877 on the issue. He also served as Postmaster 
General in Palmerston’s Cabinet (1855-1858) and later appointed as the Secretary of 
State in India in Gladstone’s Cabinet between 1868-1874. 
Charles Henry Churchill (1807-1869): He served the British army as a Colonel 
during the Mehmed Ali Crisis of 1840 in Syria and then lived in Damascus, Mount 
Lebanon and Beirut throughout the 1840s and 1850s. He was the author of a three 
volume publication, Ten Years Residence in Mount Lebanon, and a book on Abdel-
Kader a Muslim who saved many lives during the Damascus massacres of 1860.  
Benjamin Disraeli (1804-1881) (1
st
 Earl of Beaconsfield): He was one of the 
prominent figures of the Conservative Party. He served in the HC Deb for over 40 
years until he moved to House of Lords in 1876 and served twice as the Prime 
Minister in 1866-1868 and 1874-1870 and three times as the Chancellor of Exchequer 
in 1852, 1858-1859 and 1866-1868. He travelled to the Near East in 1830s, and wrote 
a few novels before starting his political career in 1837. He represented the 
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protectionist, imperialist part of the Conservative Party, although much of the 
‘patriotic imperialism’ was a myth produced after his death.  He was staunchly pro-
Palmerstonian and interventionist in terms of his Eastern Policy. The Bulgarian 
Atrocities Agitation damaged his reputation which was partly repaired with the Treaty 
of Berlin represented as the ‘peace with honour’ in Britain. He lost the 1880 elections 
to Gladstone. 
James Lewis Farley (1823-1885): was first appointed to Syria in 1858-1859 and 
then to Constantinople to work for the Bank of Turkey, a joint-venture between 
Britain, Ottoman Empire and France formed in 1856 to serve as an Ottoman 
commercial bank. 
James Fergusson (1832-1907): British army officer who served in the Crimean War 
and retired in 1859 to become a MP for the Conservatives in three occasions between 
1854-57, 1859-1868 and 1885-1906. He also served as an imperial administrator in 
New Zealand and India and as the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs in his later 
career.  
Edmund Fitzmaurice (1846-1935): Liberal politician who served as the Home 
Secretary in Gladstone government between years 1872-1874. In 1880, he was 
appointed as the British Commissioner by Gladstone to oversee the Ottoman 
administrative reorganisation in Bulgaria and Macedonia which was agreed in the 
Berlin Treaty (1878) and became the Parliamentary Under-Secretary for Foreign 
Affairs in 1883. 
W.E. Gladstone (1809-1898): British politician who held the Prime Minister’s office 
for four times between 1868-1873, 1880-1885, 1886 and 1892-1894 as well as 
holding the office of the Chancellor of Exchequer in 1852-1855 (Crimean War 
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Cabinet), 1859-1866, 1873-1874 and 1880-1882. Gladstone was one of the longest 
serving MPs who represented five different boroughs in the Commons over a period 
of sixty years. He started his career in the Conservative Party in 1832, was one of the 
founders of the Palmerston’s Liberal Party in 1859 and later built his fame as the 
personification of Victorian Liberalism. He was a devout Christian of Anglican 
Church and this was partly the reason behind his moralistic political discourse. He 
was in fierce rivalry with Disraeli, who replaced him as the Prime Minister following 
the 1874 elections. By 1876 Gladstone had already established himself as one of the 
major political figures of the period, and he especially appealed to working/lower 
classes where he derived his political popularity. 
Austen Henry Layard (1817-1894): English traveller, diplomat, archaeologist and 
politician. He was the Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs in 1861-1866 under 
consecutive Palmerston and Russell Cabinets. He was elected to Privy Council in 
1868 under Gladstone. He later served as an Ambassador to the Porte at the height of 
the Balkan Crisis during 1877-1880.  
Sir Charles Napier (1786-1860):  a Scottish Admiral who participated to Napoleonic 
Wars, War of 1812, the Mehmed Ali Crisis of 1839-41 and the Crimean War. 
Following his retirement from the navy, he became a Liberal MP between years 1855-
1860.  
William Monsell (1812-1894): He was an Irish landowner and Liberal politician who 
was elected from Limerick Ireland to the House of Commons between years 1848-
1874 and raised to the peerage in 1874.  He became Catholic in 1850 and he 
represented a sub-group within the Liberal Party, the Catholic Liberals. 
Henry John Temple, 3
rd
 Viscount Palmerston (1784-1865):  He held the office of 
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Secretary for Foreign Affairs three times between years 1830-1834, 1835-1841 and 
1846-1851. He also served as the Home Secretary between years 1852-1855, during 
the Crimean War. He was continuously a Member of Parliament after 1807 until his 
death; first from the ranks of the Conservatives and then Whigs. He formed the 
Liberal Party in 1859, and became the PM for the second time in 1859 with the 
Liberal Party following his first term (1855-58) which was from the ranks of the 
Whigs. He died in 1865 while serving as the Prime Minister of Britain.  
Lord John Russell (1792-1878): A Whig and then Liberal politician and statesman 
who served as the Prime Minister between 1846-1852 and then for a second time after 
Palmerston’s death from 1865-66. He was an MP for Commons from London 
between years 1813-1861, and then raised to peerage in 1861. He served as the 
Foreign Secretary in 1855-56 and then in Palmerston’s cabinet between years 1859-
1865. He was experienced in the foreign policy he served as Imperial Secretary and 
was the representative of Britain in Vienna Congress in 1855 to end the Crimean War.  
He was an influential member of the Cabinet and Parliament; and the most experience 
member of the cabinet in foreign policy making during his period as Secretary. 
Edward Stanley, 15
th
 Earl of Derby (1826-1893): Served twice as the Secretary of 
State for Foreign Office in Disraeli’s cabinets between 1866-1868 and 1874-1878. He 
led the Foreign Office during the Cretan Crisis (1866-1868) and the Eastern Crisis. 
He was a resolute supporter of the non-interventionist policy and in the latter stages 
of the Crisis he fell out with Disraeli over the Eastern policy because of his 
opposition to Prime Minister’s interventionist policy and sidelined from late 1877. In 
order to maintain peace with Russia he transferred the secret Cabinet talks to the 
Russian pro-peace Ambassador Shuvalov and as a result of this action he was forced 
to resign from Cabinet in 1878. 
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John Edwin Hilary Skinner:  A Daily News correspondent and traveller, who prior 
to his visit in Crete reported the Austria-Prussia War of 1866. He travelled to the US 
and Canada and wrote political books about these countries and upon his return 
visited to Crete and travelled to the island from Greece with a blockade runner 
steamship, which was carrying reinforcements to the island form the mainland. He 
published his travel book Roughing it in Crete upon his return to the country and 
argued for the secession of the island to Greece. 
William Thomas Stead (1849-1912): English journalist and editor of the Northern 
Echo and Pall Mall Gazette. He started to publish in the Northern Echo in 1870 and 
became the editor in 1871. His active role in the Bulgarian Atrocities Agitation made 
him known across the country and as a result he became the assistant editor of the 
London Pall Mall. He became the editor of the paper in 1883 and his sensationalist 
style paved the way for the ‘New Journalism’, the predecessor of the 20th century 
tabloid press, in Britain in the 1880s and 1890s.  
Lord Stratford Canning de Redcliffe (1786-1880): The influential British 
Ambassador to the Porte between years 1842-1858 to the Ottoman Empire who was 
deemed as being the main influence behind the Ottoman reforms. He was made a peer 
in 1852. He was an active participant on the discussions on the Ottoman Empire in 
the 1860s and 1870s and accepted as the main authority in Britain on the Eastern 
affairs.  
2.) Biographies of the Ottoman Officials/Statesman 
Sultan Abdulaziz (1830-1876): 32
nd
 sultan of the Ottoman Empire who ascended to 
the throne after the death of his brother Abdulmejid in 1861 and deposed by his 
ministers on 30 May 1876 during Balkan Crisis. He died on 4 June 1876; reasons of 
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his death is still debated on the literature. The economic crisis triggered his deposition 
as extravagant palaces constructed on his orders were blamed as a reason of Ottoman 
overspending.   
Mehmed Emin Ali Pasha (1815-1871): Ottoman statesman and one of the most 
influential men of the Tanzimat period with Fuad Pasha and Reshid Pasha. He started 
his diplomatic career as the secretary of the Ottoman Embassy in Vienna and then 
served as the Ottoman Ambassador to Great Britain between 1841-1844. He became 
the Foreign Minister numerous times; first at 1846, then in 1857-8 and between 1861-
1867. He was assigned as the Grand Vizier first in 1852, then in 1858-59 and finally 
in 1867-71. 
Mehmed Fuad Pasha: Mehmed Fuad Pasha (1814-1869) a foremost Tanzimat period 
statesman. He was one of the first in the Porte to have a Western style education and 
worked in various diplomatic posts in Europe, before becoming the Foreign Affairs 
Minister during the Crimean War. He assumed the post of the Grand Vizier, highest 
position in the Ottoman bureaucracy, twice in 1861-1863 and 1863-1866. In his final 
years he was assigned as the Minister of Foreign Affairs for the second time. He was 
fluent in French and famous with his wit and skills as a diplomat. 
Mustafa Reshid Pasha (1779-1858): The first important statesman of who was the 
chief architecht of the Tanzimat Charter. He rose in the diplomatic service and served 
as the Ambassador to France (1834-36 and 1841-45) and Britain (1836-1838). He 
cultivated personal relationship with Palmerston and played a key role during the 
diplomatic negotiations of 1840 to end the Mehmed Ali Crisis. He served as the 
Grand Vizier 6 time between 1845-58 and spent 10 years in that position.  
Mehmed Ali Pasha (1769-1849): Ottoman commander of Albanian origin who was 
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sent to Egypt in 1801 to reclaim the territory following the withdrawal of French 
forces. He was appointed as the governor of Egypt in 1805 and helped the Ottomans 
in various campaigns in Arabia, Greece and Crete during the 1810s and 1820s. He has 
embarked upon an ambitious modernisation programme in Egypt, created monopolies 
to industrialise the country and formed a modern army and navy. As a result of his 
increasing power and influence in the Near East, he rebelled against the Ottoman 
Empire in 1831 and defeated the Ottoman forces in 1832, creating the First Mehmed 
Ali Crisis. He concluded a deal with the Porte following Great Power intervention in 
1833 which fell short of his ambition to create an independent kingdom in Egypt. He 
declared war on the Ottomans again in 1838, prompting the Second Mehmed Ali 
Crisis, which ended after a joint Anglo-Austrian-Ottoman expedition to Egypt. The 
London Convention (1840) offered Mehmed Ali hereditary rule in Egypt, which he 
accepted and his family’s rule continued until the coup d’etat in 1951 which brought 
Abdel Nasser in power.  
3.) Others 
Januarius MacGahan (1844-1878): An American war correspondent of Irish descent 
who reported the Franco-Prussian War of 1871 as the New York Herald, 
correspondent for the French Army. He was sent to St. Petersburg in 1873 and 
followed the Russian Army’s invasion of Khiva. He married to a Russian women of 
nobility and made acquaintance with the Russian generals. He quit his post at the New 
York Herald in 1876 and left for Constantinople to investigate the Bulgarian 
massacres with US Consul Schuyler.  
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